of conformity to the law of God; and that the latter being a negation, could not be produced by God, though he were the author of the sinful action. This distinction, however, they conceive too slight to rest the honour of God on such a subtilty, for in sins against moral laws there is an immorality in the action itself, which is inseparable from it. But independent of this, granting that sin consists in a privation, yet as that privation immediately results from the action itself, then it follows that if God be the author of the latter, he is likewise the author of the former. It is objected, that sin being a violation of God's law, he, who is not bound to observe his own law, cannot commit sin. But, an immoral action is a direct contradiction to his own nature, and cannot, therefore, be reconciled with his infinite perfection.

Besides, these direct objections to the doctrine of absolute decrees, it will be necessary to consider the answers made to the arguments of their adversaries.

1. With respect to the prescience of future contingents:

(1.) They assert that its certainty is proved from prophecy. We find in Scripture the commission of sins frequently foretold. Thus, the prophecies relating to the death and sufferings of Christ, it is admitted, were fulfilled by the

free acts of the Jews. The prescience, therefore, of these acts, must be certain.

(2.) Its certainty is proved from examples. God told David, that the men of Keilah would deliver him into the hands of Saul, on the condition of his remaining there. (1 Sam. xxiii. 11.) He did not remain, and the event did not take place. This, they say, is a manifest instance of conditional prescience. Our Saviour's declaration respecting the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, affords a similar example. (Matt. xi. 21.)

(3.) It is not inconsistent with the perfection of God. God made man a free agent, and it is, therefore, no diminution of his authority, if he governs him consistently with that freedom. The dependence then of God's decrees on the actions of his creatures, arises from no defect in his power, but is necessary in order to preserve the liberty of man.

(4.) The certainty of this prescience does not infer the necessity of the event. For things are foreseen because they are to be, but they do not happen because they are foreseen. When any thing happens, we may pronounce that it was certainly future from all eternity; therefore, the truth, that it was future, was eternally certain. Hence, God might know that truth, and yet his knowledge infer no necessity in the occurring of the circumstance.

2. With respect to the decrees of election and reprobation :

(1.) They assert that God's not executing every thing he wishes, infers no imperfection in his nature. Thus, we observe, some of his works to be more beautiful than others, and many of the productions of nature to be irregular and deformed. Such results, however, we never conceive to derogate from the order in which all things appear lovely to the divine mind. So God may wish the salvation of all men, and yet not effect that salvation without any diminution of his sovereign power. For the exertion of so absolute an act of providence as would be necessary to secure such a result, would be inconsistent with the liberty he conferred on rational crea

tures.

(2.) They assert that no argument can be derived from the situation of heathen nations. They do not deny the existence of various degrees in the gift of God's grace, not only among nations, but also among individuals; still they think that he gives to all men that which is necessary to the state in which they are. From which it must be inferred, that all men are inexcusable in his sight, since they had that which was sufficient to lead them to salvation.

(3.) They assert, that God's not giving effectual grace to all, infers no defect in his holiness. Some are placed in happier circumstances, and may

have higher privileges than others. Still as all, according to their opinion, have a sufficient degree of grace given them, so every man ought to complain of himself for not using that assistance, as he might have done, and all good men will have matter of rejoicing in God, for giving them what he foresaw would prove not only sufficient, but effectual. Still, they confess there is a difficulty in this subject, which they cannot comprehend; but not equal to those of the other side.

(4.) They conceive that Scripture gives no countenance to this doctrine. Thus, all those passages which mention the purpose, the election, the foreknowledge and the predestination of God, they explain as relating to the great design of calling the Gentiles to the knowledge of the Messiah. This had been a mystery for many ages, and was not revealed till our Saviour's commission to the Apostles: "Go and teach all nations," was declared. The Jews, too, were offended at this circumstance, and it was, therefore, necessary for the Apostles to explain it fully, whereas there could be no use in amusing men in the infancy of Christianity with unsearchable speculations concerning the decrees of God. Hence it is, that so frequent mention is made of God's choosing Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to show that the same freedom of election should be observed with respect to the Gentiles.

As to God's being said " to harden Pharaoh's heart," they say, this is to be ascribed to his permitting it to harden itself. Besides, so wicked and idolatrous a prince as he was, had been already, perhaps, under sentence of condemna tion for his crimes, and, therefore, God may have preserved him a few years longer to be a monument of his justice.

When our Saviour says, "those thou gavest me, I kept.” (Jo. xvii. 12.) This cannot be ununderstood of any absolute decree, for in the following words, he adds, " And I have lost none of them, except the son of perdition." Now, it cannot be said he was in such a decree, and yet was lost.

In the phrase, "ordained to eternal life." (Acts, xiii. 48.) The word rendered, ordained, may mean fitted or pre-disposed; so that this text, they say, cannot prove the existence of an absolute election.

3. They assert that grace is not irresistible. This they support by the following arguments:

(1.) It destroys responsibility. If a man be not possessed of such liberty as enables him to do or not to do what he pleases, his actions cease to be moral or immoral, or to expose him to rewards and punishments. Thus, madmen are not charged with the evil they do, and if men are tied down with an impotence which requires an irresistible grace to remove it, then it seems,