a

pretation, however, has been rejected by many commentators. Other passages may still be adduced, "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.” (Gal. v. 17.) We are desired "to mortify the deeds of the body." Rom. viii. 13.

Nor can it be said that baptism removes all the effect of original sin. It is enough if we are by it delivered from the wrath of God, and acquire a federal right to such assistances as will enable us to resist our corrupt nature; but the disposition to evil still remains. Hence it is, that Roman Catholic writers have denied the sinfulness of concupiscence or lust. For, as they believe that original sin is quite taken away by baptism, and, nevertheless, find that this disposition still remains in us, they therefore conclude, that it is no more than the natural state in which Adam was made at first, except that he was assisted with supernatural grace to enable him to overcome it.

2

Among others by Whitby, Hammond, and Kettlewell.

b In Rom. vii. 7. St. Paul declares, "that he had not known sin but by the law." He then gives an instance of this: "he had not known lust except the law had said, thou shalt not covet." Lust, therefore, he expressly asserts is sin. The Council of Trent, however, boldly avow their opposition to the Apostle: "The concupiscence which "the Apostle Paul sometime calleth sin, this holy council declareth, "that the Catholic Church never understood it to be called sin." Conc. Trid. Sess. 5. See Jewel's Def. of Apol. p. 2. c. 11. Div. 3; Field of the Church, 1. 3. c. 26., and Prideaux's Fas. Cont. p. 115. Roman Catholic writers make original sin to consist wholly in

ARTICLE X.

OF FREE-WILL.

THE CONDITION OF MAN AFTER THE FALL OF ADAM
IS SUCH, THAT HE CANNOT TURN AND PREPARE HIM-
SELF BY HIS OWN NATURAL STRENGTH, TO FAITH
AND CALLING UPON GOD.b
WHEREFORE, WE HAVE

NO POWER TO DO GOOD WORKS PLEASANT AND AC-
CEPTABLE TO GOD, WITHOUT THE GRACE of god by
CHRIST PREVENTING US, THAT WE MAY HAVE A GOOD
WILL, AND WORKING WITH US WHEN WE HAVE THAT
GOOD WILL.

BEFORE we proceed to the immediate consideration of the Article, it will be necessary to state

the privation of this supernatural righteousness, but not in any positive corruption of the nature. In opposition to this doctrine, perhaps, the Article states that man is not only very far gone from original righteousness," but also actually "inclined to evil." See Archbp. Laurence's Bampton Lect. Ser. 3. n. (4.)

a

The doctors of the Roman Church held, that man could by his own exertions so prepare himself for grace, that though he could not actually merit everlasting life, still these exertions would render it incumbent on God, consistently with his attributes, to give him (what was hence called) grace de congruo, by which he could obtain immortality by condign merit. In opposition to this, perhaps, the article is directed. See Archb. Laurence's Lectures, ser. 4. note (4.)

b The Roman doctors, likewise, held that prayer was accept

a

the true notion of liberty. Some imagine that liberty must suppose a freedom to do or not to do, and to act differently at pleasure. Such entire liberty, however, does not seem necessary to constitute an action morally good or bad. Thus, God acts with the most perfect liberty, yet he cannot sin; and angels are moral agents, yet they cannot be otherwise than virtuous. The true notion of liberty seems to be this, that a rational being is not determined as mere matter, by the impulse of other bodies upon it, but that it is capable of thought, and upon considering the objects set before it, makes a decision and a consequent choice. In this inward capacity of thinking, and of acting and choosing upon thought, liberty seems to consist.

It may be asked here, whether the will is not always determined by the final judgment of the understanding? If this be granted, then no liberty will be left to our faculties; for, if a proposition appears true to the understanding, it

able to God, ex opere operato; in allusion to this idea, perhaps, the article adds faith, to, calling upon God. See A. Laur, ser. 5. note (7.) These Lectures throw considerable light on the history of our Articles.

a See Locke's Works, v. 1. p. 223. Ed. 1812. Reid's Essays, p. 326. Ed. 1803. And Sterry on the Freedom of the Will.

b The affirmative of this question is held by Turretin, Inst. Theol. L. 10. Q. 3. The negative, by Curcellæus, Oper. Theol. p. 965 : Limborch, Theol. Chr. 1. 2. c. 23, and Field, of the Church, Ap. to B. 3. c. 10.

must assent to it; if then the choice of the will follows that assent, we should thus be concluded under a fate, or necessity. In opposition to this, however, it is certain, that we perceive in ourselves a liberty of directing or diverting our thoughts to or from particular objects. It is true, that sometimes an appetite or passion agitates us so strongly, that it seems to hurry us along with it; and on the other hand, the impressions of religion frequently affect our minds so forcibly, that they appear to master us; yet in both cases a man acts freely, because he thinks and chooses for himself; and though he may not feel himself absolutely indifferent to either side, yet he has still such a remote liberty, that he can turn his thoughts to other objects, and thus resist those impressions.

The revelation of religion is the proposing truths to us by which our understandings are enlightened and our wills guided. But as these truths are of themselves unable to stem the tide of nature, particularly if it be much excited, the design of all religion, therefore, is to give them such a force, that they may be able to persuade and govern us. The question then is, whether a man can, by the powers of nature and reason, without any other inward assistances, so far turn and dispose his own raind, as to believe, and to do works pleasant and acceptable to God. Pelagius held, that man's liberty was so perfect,

that he could himself follow the precepts of the Gospel, and only needed the grace of pardon for the past. The Semipelagians thought that an assisting grace was necessary to enable a man to continue in a course of religious duties, but that the first conversion of the will to God, was the effect of the agent's free choice. In opposition to these errors,

The Article asserts the necessity both of an assisting and a preventing grace.

1. As to the necessity of an assisting grace. In the Old Testament, there were not express promises made by Moses of such internal assistances, yet both David and Solomon evidently looked for them. Thus, David prays to God, Ps. li. 10.," to create in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him." And in Ps. cxix. 27., he prays that he "may understand the

way of God's precepts," and that " his heart may be enlarged." Solomon, too, says, Prov. iii. 34., that "God gives grace to the lowly." Again, in the old dispensation, as the laws were written on tables of stone, so the peculiar characteristic of the new was, that it should have in it something more than an external revelation, and that

a This sect was founded by Cassian, a Monk, who endeavoured to steer a middle course between the doctrines of St. Augustin on the one hand, and Pelagius on the other. See Basnage, Histoire de l'Eglise, t. 1. 1. 12. c. 1.