advancing good, but also as directly opposed to God, as incompatible with His existence and works. Considerations of this sort have been long ago brought forward in various forms, and have given rise to manifold attempts to answer the question, to explain the existence and significance of evil, and to show it to be compatible with faith in an absolutely perfect God. It was in this attempt that the doctrines of original sin and predestination originated. People did not shrink from maintaining that the purpose of evil was to afford God the opportunity, which He would not otherwise have had, of revealing His justice by His revenge and wrath. We do not propose here to test these views, but will only briefly show how the existence of moral evil may be found to be compatible with the existence and works of God, and not only so, but actually to further the perfection of the world.

The perfection of creation demands that it shall be as good as possible, and, on the other hand, this perfection is demanded by the perfection of the Divine Creator, if a Creator is presupposed. Everyone will admit that that which is free and independent is more perfect than that which is not free, dependent, or lifeless. The perfection of the world demanded, and it was in accordance with the perfection of the Creator, that free creatures should be created that is, beings gifted with free will; whose acts and resolves should spring from themselves, should, as it were, result from a creative principle within them in spite of the principle of causality in the events of life. Beings, therefore, who are the originators of their own acts, and are responsible for them, must ascribe the merit or demerit of them to themselves. Intellectual, conscious creatures of this sort possessed of wills are in the main God-like; at any rate, in so far as in their freedom of action they are counterparts of the eternal independent being of God, and in relation to their moral constitution, they are the creators of themselves, and, as it were, subject to no compulsion or necessity. Thus man participates in a prerogative of the Deity, as is the case in consequence of his possession of self-conscious reason. This is the condition of human nature in its true dignity and sublimity, as it triumphs over all the crime, sorrow, and vicissitudes of this life. But even by reason of this highest characteristic of his being, man is also capable of moral evil, and this is the sine quâ non of the highest perfection of created and mortal beings, as has been explained and proved by philosophers and teachers in former times. The highest perfection is conditioned by the deepest imperfection. The imperfect, the lifeless, the enslaved, would indeed make imperfection impossible, but it would also exclude all true perfection and perfectibility.

The perfection of earthly existence is dependent on necessity and free will, but so also is imperfection, or physical and moral evil. On

necessity in nature depends its conformity to law, the sure and constant course of things and its objective rationality. Through freedom of will, a higher aim, a peculiar significance, is given to the necessary conformity of nature to law, since by its means it can be turned to account for rational purposes, cultivated and exalted. Without necessity or constant conformity to law in nature there could be no true knowledge of it, no rational use of it for definite ends, no control over it for practical purposes; but without freedom the same results would ensue, and all that would be possible would be an aimless course of things constantly repeated.

The higher significance, the rational end of existence, and with it its perfection and perfectibility, is therefore dependent on necessity and free will. But imperfection is also dependent on both since they are finite, and must show themselves in the forms of time and space, and thus the sorrows and evils of life are possible and actual. It is always found that it is that same principle in creation which constitutes the idea of its perfection, its likeness to God, which renders possible and actually produces its imperfection and corruption. This, as Leibnitz has shown, is the necessary condition of its finite nature. Were it otherwise, were the world perfect without the possibility of corruption and decay, without, therefore, the need of development, it would be equal to God Himself, it would be a second God.

All this admits of proof without much difficulty, but, nevertheless, the Pessimists will not consider their complaints and doubts about the evils of life as disposed of, but will ask-Why, then, if a finite creation, even if the best possible, could not exist without evil, was it created at all? Non-existence, they maintain, would be much better than this suffering life. The mystery and nature of life is certainly, after all, impenetrable by the human mind; for, in order to comprehend it clearly, man must be equal to God; and we must be content to forego the comprehension of this final mystery, especially as there is so much in the world itself as yet unexplained and incomprehensible. Meanwhile, we may attempt a solution of the problem, Why this world was created, and was created as it is, from what we know of the character and aim of creation ?

Of course the question, and the attempt at a solution of it, is without meaning if not regarded from a theistic stand-point— that is, for those who take the world to be the work of a personal Creator, acting with consciousness and free will. From the atheistic, naturalistic, or decidedly pantheistic stand-point, the question why this suffering world exists has no meaning, because, according to these systems, all possibility of its non-existence, or of its being different from what it is, is excluded beforehand. Neither has the question any significance for the semi-pantheistic system; for while according to this there is a distinction between God and the

world, it holds that it was necessary for God to reveal Himself by the creation of the world, though it is not exactly a necessary part of His being; so that according to this system, also, the non-existence of the world is an impossibility. Our problem, therefore, is only possible from a theistic stand-point-that is, on the supposition that the world was called into existence and created as it is as the result of God's resolve.

The question then is, why God, foreseeing the suffering, and especially the moral evil, of the world as inevitable, did not leave the world uncreated? In answer to this, it may be remarked that in any case it appears to be more in accordance with the goodness of God to create than not to create, supposing the latter as possible. For it appears to be in unison with His perfection, and especially with His goodness, to call beings into existence, to confer on them as far as possible the enjoyment of life, and the capability of attaining perfection. The motive, therefore, for creation appears stronger than that for non-creation. We conceive of existence as better than nonexistence, and even in the world as it is, happiness outweighs suffering, so that by non-creation more happiness than pain would have been prevented. Possible, actual, necessary, and foreseen evil, therefore, could not prevent creation, as it could not affect the Creator more strongly than the preponderating happiness in the world. As to moral evil, it has been already observed that at least the possibility of it was inevitable, if creation was to be perfect and godlike. This perfection demands beings with free will, and they must therefore be capable of bad, as well as of good, actions. But had God abstained from creation on account of the possibility and future actuality of evil, to prevent the misery which might arise from it and from the abuse of free will, He would then have had more regard to the possible evil in the future creation than to the good, since to avoid the unhappiness which was not compulsory, He would also have avoided the good, and this appears neither fit nor justifiable.

It may also be observed that had God abstained from creating the world on account of future evil, evil, even before it existed, would have had more weight in the divine counsels than good. Even such a negative preponderance or preventive ascendancy of evil in relation to God is inadmissible, and so it must be acknowledged that in spite of the inevitable evil in the world the creation of it was proper for God and beneficial for the creature. The existing imperfections and suffering, therefore, are not a sufficient proof against the real existence of God, and no decisive contradiction of God-consciousness in humanity. And this it is the special mission of the Theodicy, so-called, to prove.

We do not hold with Leibnitz that every evil in the world is absolutely necessary, that the world could not stand if the least of them

were wanting; and for this reason, if the freedom of the will is once admitted, besides moral evil, much suffering must be looked upon as self-produced, and therefore might not have been. Neither can we agree with Rokitanski,* a follower of Schopenhauer, when he maintains that the sum of evil in the world remains always the same; for both with individuals and nations much evil may be avoided by knowledge and experience, so that suffering may be diminished for an individual or a nation without its necessary augmentation in others. To accept this doctrine without good reason would be to favour a too unscientific mysticism. On the other hand, neither can he who takes a theistic stand-point, who regards God as an absolutely perfect being, according to man's conception of perfection, adopt the view of Jacob Boehme that the positive root and source of the evil and suffering in the world is God Himself. For that which is designated as punitive or revengeful justice, the expression or effect of which is undoubtedly felt to be human suffering, is not a source or root of evil, but only reaction against it, and it has therefore not a positive, but merely a negative, relation to it. Besides, if Boehme's doctrine were correct, that peculiar consciousness of something wrong, which does actually exist in the human mind, could hardly find a place there, and evil and suffering would be conceived of as something substantial, whereas it universally manifests itself as something accidental, as perversion, disturbance, as may easily be observed in the case of physical maladies.

We may say that this world is the best in so far as it appears to be the work of divine goodness and wisdom, and is destined for the highest ends, the perfection and blessedness of created beings; but this does not exclude the fact that it is full of imperfection and suffering. It is intended for activity, independence, and self-improvement, and cannot therefore offer tranquil enjoyment, but demands energy, effort, and conflict; for it is only by these means that the creature can achieve or become anything. If human life were nothing but a perpetual scene of enjoyment, a round of amusements, what significance or dignity could it have, or to what loftier ends could it attain? If the world were less perfect and less destined for perfectibility, there might be less suffering and less possibility of evil. It might even be free from both if life and freedom were wanting, that is if only inane or unconscious beings existed.

Every man can best solve at least for himself the profound enigma whether this world is good or bad, the best or the worst, by turning it to the best account for himself. The world is the best, but only for those who know how to make it so, which is indeed a task of great

Die Solidarität alles Thierlebens. Vortrag von Hofrath und Professor Dr. Carl Rokitanski. Wien, 1869. It is noteworthy that it is a natural philosopher and a physician who holds these views.

difficulty. It is given us as the best, but it is man's mission to make it actually so. It is not easy to see how it could be otherwise if creation is really to have any significance, and is not to be a childish and meaningless game with mere puppets.

The sweetest and sublimest harmonies are concealed in nature; but to reveal them to the world the musical genius is required, who has carefully cultivated his powers, and only discovers them himself with much pain and labour. So it is with the best world, so called, for man. And, further, even when the most enchanting musical tones are brought into harmonious conjunction, and a master-piece is produced calculated to elevate and rejoice, still, before it can delight the hearers, the art is required of bringing the work to light by means of voices and instruments, an art which can only be acquired with much labour and effort. Thus also the highest and best happiness for man in this world is near him, within and without, but it must be sought for, aimed at, and grasped, in order to make it a reality and to make the best of the world. He who will not earnestly strive to fulfil these conditions will not attain it; and for him the world will be the worst, although he will be everywhere surrounded with the possibility of the highest bliss. Just as the finest masterpiece of music does not exist for him, even though it lies before him, if he has not acquired the art of playing it, or will not take the trouble to do so.

As we have seen, our problem belongs in an especial manner to religions, and they try in one way or another to help nations and individuals to solve it. As we consider these different methods, we can assert without any hesitation that the Christian religion offers by far the best and most cheering solution; far better than the pessimism of Buddhism, the asceticism and quietism of Brahminism, or the predominant fatalism of Islamism. It may be said that the Christian doctrine unites all these solutions into a more lofty whole. It knows especially how to unite the needful submission and resignation with the equally needful energy and individual effort, thereby fitting man for the fulfilment of his mission without causing him to lose his individuality. This is rendered possible chiefly by the doctrine of God as proclaimed by Christ; by this, unlimited confidence in His fatherhood and care for all men is awakened, while at the same time the duty is laid upon all to labour faithfully, to prove their love and obedience to God, as well as to attain happiness and salvation by striving to fulfil the active duties of love towards their neighbour.

It is by these means that that optimism is established, which looks upon existence as a great good, but unites with this opinion the conviction that we must attain this blessedness for ourselves through suffering and by our own efforts.

J. FROHSCHAMMER.