brethren. The two archbishops who do not belong to the movement, the Bishop of St. David's, Dean Stanley, and some others, are spoken of with bated breath in the clerical journals; and last autumn, as we all know, two prelates venturing to preach in the Established Church of Scotland, had virtually to apologize for so doing to their recalcitrant clergy. We have just seen in Convocation how difficult it was even for the Primate of all England to suggest a displacement from public worship of a barbarous creed of the worst periods of the Church's history, which condemns to perdition all who do not maintain its ipsissima verba. May it not be felt that there is greater spiritual danger in accepting than in rejecting such a creed? One Prelate strove to stave off the evil day until some fresh MSS. should be received from Venice, making our present creed, as it were, provisional! Looking at such things, it is impossible not to feel that the Church of England is in danger, and from causes which have just made shipwreck of the Church of Rome. She is not occupied perhaps with precisely the same character of improper or unnecessary things, but then those with which she is occupied show that she has not at heart those which are higher, and those with which she should be occupied ; with which if she were really occupied, these lesser matters would fall into a much lesser space. Many, if not among the clergy, at least among the laity, are aware that it is so, and some are more than aware, and are awake to the fact, and are bestirring themselves, and this even among the clergy. Would that their numbers were tenfold what they are! It is a good augury, however, to see at the head of this (the real) revival, His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, moving as he did to the admission of the fuller light at the late Convocation, speaking indeed with that caution and dignity which becomes his high office, but with the courage and insight also with which God has so greatly endowed him. This is as it should be; may he have many followers, Döllingers and Hyacinthes, who will be wise before and not after the event, to prevent the shipwreck, and not to mourn over, but attempt to construct a vessel out of the fragments which are cast ashore. A. EWING, Bp. HF E who is inclined to Pessimist opinions, and sets himself to verify his subjective views objectively, and to build up a system of Pessimism, will undoubtedly find a vast amount of material at hand both in nature and history. He need not read Voltaire's vile and coarse work, "Candide, or the Best World," in which not only all the sorrows of life, but every sort of vulgarity and vice, is cunningly heaped together and portrayed in the most cynical fashion. Nature is the theatre of endless sorrow and destruction, not by accident, but of necessity, for the pleasure of one creature rests upon the pain of another, the life of one is dependent on another's death; so that the more life and happiness nature presents, so much the more sorrow and death must there be as a necessary condition. This circumstance explains the fact that it is the nations who live amidst the most luxuriant aspects of nature who most keenly feel the transitoriness of life, so that a feeling of sadness often forms the chief feature of their views of the world. The history of man exhibits the same character and phenomena. So far as he belongs by reason of his physical life to the sphere of nature, he partakes of its universal destiny. The life and prosperity of man is always dependent on a fearful destruction of his animal, and to some extent even of his human fellow-creatures. The in * See Contemporary Review for August, 1871. tellectual progress of humanity also, depends to a great extent on evil of various kinds. Not only is the political supremacy and prosperity of one nation generally founded on the decline of other nations, but even higher attainments, improved moral principles, and general advancement, can for the most part only be reached by the infliction of many ills upon mankind. Hence martyrdom and persecution, the disturbance of peace between men and nations, and the long prevalence of lawless deeds and suffering. To such an extent has this been the case, that even noble religious and moral doctrines have often been introduced and spread just because they were not practised by their representatives, who were obviously actuated by contrary principles. Even Christianity offers many examples of this. These circumstances have given occasion for eloquent and piquant descriptions of the "miseries of life," and Schopenhauer and his followers have not failed to turn them to good account. They carefully detail all the evils of life, and paint them in the blackest colours; but since they cannot deny that life also offers much enjoyment and pleasure, this is explained to be mere semblance and delusion, or is said to be far out-balanced by evil. To prove this the whole category of pleasures and sorrows are laid in the balances. It is concluded that the sorrows far outweigh the pleasures, and that therefore it would be better not to be. But, it may be asked, what is the object of all this weighing and reasoning? What is gained for theoretical knowledge or practical life by all these representations of Pessimist views of life? We must confess that to us Pessimism appears useless for theoretical knowledge; and for practical life, not only useless, but positively injurious. Theoretically useless-do men require to be so carefully and laboriously taught that this life is so full of suffering and misery that non-existence were better? If so, they must be perfectly aware of it from daily experience, and theoretical instruction on the subject must be superfluous. But if they do not know it by experience, and have to learn it theoretically, then this Pessimist teaching is proved to be untrue, because it contradicts the natural and universal consciousness of man, which is only partially or temporarily inclined to Pessimism. Suffering which is not felt, of which man is not conscious, cannot be reckoned as suffering, nor adduced as proof of it Theoretically, then, if man was acquainted with his sorrows before, Pessimism is superfluous; if he is not acquainted with them, and has to learn them theoretically, it is untrue. For practical purposes Pessimism is not only useless but pernicious. The troubles of life are indeed great and numerous, and afflict individuals in the most manifold forms; but it is of no use, therefore, to be continually complaining of them, to regard them as invincible, and to submit to them in hopeless dejection. We should rather courageously resist them, restrict and overcome them as much as possible. It behoves man always to be superior to his destiny, and to be mastered neither by happiness nor by misery. But there is no greater foe to these sentiments and aims than fundamental, systematic Pessimism. The Pessimist theoretically heaps the sum total of all sorrows upon an individual at once,—whereas in reality they only assail him separately, and at the same time he lends him no strength to bear them, but, on the contrary, fills him with hopelessness. Men and nations who give themselves up to this universal Pessimism, become indolent and inactive, as the eastern nations abundantly prove. This, however, does not apply to partial and temporary, but only to general and systematic Pessimism. The former, of course, is dependent on actual circumstances, and is necessary for the energy and progress of mankind, as well as conducive to them. He only who is sensible of the ills of life acknowledges them, and is dissatisfied with his state and condition, will feel the need of improvement and be incited to strive after it by his own efforts. Contentment leads just as much to indolence, stagnation, and retrogression as Pessimism. We must protest against the mechanical balancing of good and evil, of the joys and sorrows of life as practised by the modern Pessimists, because it leaves the most important counterpoise against the supremacy of evil out of the question. It disregards, or does not sufficiently regard, the fact that to man has been granted a good of so great a value that it may well counterbalance all the evils of life. This is belief in God, in a higher divine power, with all the hope and consolation connected with it. This belief in God does actually exist, whether or not it may admit of proof; and so great a good is it for humanity, that where it exists in its greatest strength and purity all the ills and woes of life appear as nothing in com parison with the blessedness it confers. It is rarely found in the highest degree, except amongst choice souls, in persons of mystical tendencies, or in times of exalted religious enthusiasm, when men cheerfully endure any sufferings for the sake of their convictions, for God and for the truth-even court death, and suffer it joyfully, as in the early days of Christianity. Meanwhile, if this faith in God, in ordinary times and with the majority of men, does not exist in this strength and energy, certain it is that always and everywhere it is the chief counterpoise to the evils of life, and has consoled and sustained innumerable men in pain and misfortune. Most certainly, therefore, this should not be left out of consideration in balancing the sum of the joys and sorrows of men; and every Pessimist calculation must be looked upon as false which does not allow for this factor on the side of the good in life. It also follows from this that the Atheism of the Pessimist view of the world, based on the consideration of the overwhelming evils in it, cannot be at once admitted to be justifiable. It is concluded that if an almighty, good, and just God, a consciously-perfect Being exists, and is the Creator of the world, it would be impossible for the world to be so imperfect, and for living creatures to lead so miserable an existence as they do. According to this view, the belief in mysterious powers, spirits, and deities arose at first from the fact that man, finding himself powerless when face to face with the powers of nature and the evils of life, and in his ignorance of nature and of natural causes, imagined himself to be surrounded by mysterious powers, and sought help and protection from them. But this faith could only exist so long as these mysterious powers were conceived of as rude and imperfect, so that their characters did not appear out of congruity with the imperfections of the world. The imperfections of the world, therefore, and the sufferings of humanity, which gave rise to the belief in divinity and sustained it, must have again disturbed it, as soon as the idea of God in humanity had been so far perfected that the imperfections of the world no longer appeared compatible with the existence of God. It would indeed be singular that the more imperfect man's idea of God was, so much the firmer would be his belief in the existence of the Deity, and the more perfectly the idea of God was developed and purified, the more incredible would the existence of a God appear! The more perfect, in this way, the idea of God became in the intellectual consciousness of man, the less could He be thought of as really existent. But this train of thought is deprived of its foundation if the imperfections of the world are not really so great as in the interests of denial of a God they are assumed to be, and as they would only be if faith in God and all the consolation and support derived from it, were not found amongst men. This must be denied, or assumed to be nonexistent, in order to leave the evils of the world in all their magnitude; and so unmitigated that they would justify the denial of a God. But this is an unjustifiable argument, a petitio principii; and so the customary Pessimist argument of Atheism will not hold good, though, undoubtedly, the difficulties of the subject are by no means removed; and unsolved problems still remain for philosophical investigation. But another consideration immediately suggests itself against the truth and correctness of Pessimism. The Pessimist conception of the world bears a contradiction on the face of it, for it is based both in itself and in the thinking subject on an ideal or optimistic founda |