in the presence of divine strength he is a coward. Let the Chorus interpret for us the significance of the meeting of the two champions : 'Oh, how comely it is and how reviving To the spirits of just men long opprest! When God into the hands of their deliverer Puts invincible might To quell the mighty of the earth, th' oppressor, Tyrannic power, but raging to pursue The righteous and all such as honour truth; And feats of war defeats, With plain heroic magnitude of mind And celestial vigour arm'd." The brute violence of the flesh has for its appropriate ally the deceitful beauty of the flesh, full of vanity, and lust, and cruelty. Such beauty has now lost all its fascination for Samson. Even Harapha is less intolerable than Dalila-"Out, out, hyæna!" The Lady of "Comus" was created out of all that Milton conceived as admirable; Eve out of all in woman that is desirable; Dalila out of all that is detestable. Her feminine curiosity, her feminine love of dress-she comes towards the blind prisoner "with all her bravery on "-her fleshly desire, her incapacity for any noble thought, her feigned religion, her honeyed words implying the weakness and fatuity of him whom she addresses, her wifely treachery and hardheartedness, make up a personality which, above all others, must have been hateful to Milton. Shakspeare would have smiled, and secretly accepted the enchantress as a fruitful subject of study. Milton brings her upon the scene only to expose her, and drive her away with most genuine indignation. The Lady, Eve, Dalila-these are the women of Milton; each a great ideal figure, one dedicated to admiration, one to love, and the last to loathing. We have now gone the round of Milton's poetical works. A line will recapitulate the substance of this essay. Milton works from the starting-point of an idea, and two such ideas brought into being what he accomplished as a man and as an artist. His prose works, the outcome of his life of public action, have for their ideal centre a conception of human liberty. His poetical works, the outcome of his inner life, his life of artistic contemplation, are various renderings of one dominant idea-that the struggle for mastery between good and evil is the prime fact of life; and that a final victory of the righteous cause is assured by the existence of a divine order of the universe, which Milton knew by the name of "Providence." EDWARD DOWDEN. VOL. XIX. P MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND SAVAGE LIFE. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, VERY one who has been even moderately acquainted with the progress of ethnology must have been growingly persuaded that its investigations were destined to bring out results of deep interest to the mental philosopher. On the other hand, philosophy itself seems to have realised, that the facts of savage life might come to bear closely on many of the psychological questions disputed in the schools. Abundant evidence of this may be gathered from philosophical writings of note, and specially from those which deal with theories of moral distinctions. The steady increase of materials has, of late years, been bringing us towards a position where a survey might be made with at least an approach to a world-wide induction. We are now far in advance of the period when fragmentary references to savage life to be found in philosophic works, such, for example, as those in Locke's Essay, can be regarded as satisfactory. Our acquaintance with remote tribes is now so vastly extended, that we are completely delivered from a large number of misapprehensions which, till recently, rested on seemingly good authority. With the published observations of such travellers as Baker, Burton, Livingstone, Palgrave, Speke, and Wallace, and of such missionaries as Ellis, Moffat, Williams, Turner, and a whole host of competent witnesses, we are in a position more favourable than ever before for carrying out a careful induction. And when, to the accumulated records of travel and missionary labour, we add the investigations of such ethnologists as Lubbock, Tylor, and M'Lennan, in our own country, and researches into the Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft, which Germany has supplied, we are plainly reaching the point-if we have not actually reached it—when philosophy must avail itself of the materials so lavishly provided. The task of pronouncing on the philosophical significance of these materials, perplexing and delicate enough in any circumstances, has been greatly simplified by the publication in course of this year of the new work of Mr. Edward B. Tylor, an author already so well known by his previous treatise, entitled "Researches into the Early History of Mankind.” This new work, bearing the title of "Primitive Culture,” is by far the most important contribution which the British press has yet given to the departments of anthropology and ethnology. It embraces "researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art, and custom," and gathers into one work a vast store of information, with ample reference to authorities, such as never before was within the reach of inquirers. Whatever estimate may be formed of Mr. Tylor's theories, he is entitled to very high honour for the extent of his range of inquiry, for thoroughness of investigation, and for caution in reaching conclusions. Mr. Tylor upholds the theory of progression, and many of his arguments are coloured somewhat by his theoretic predilections, but too much praise cannot be awarded for his painstaking endeavours to elucidate the facts. The first difficulty belonging to the question is that of ascertaining the facts accurately and fully. There is obviously more credit attaching to those who have been long resident in a district than to those who have done nothing more than make a hurried visit. And still more importance is to be assigned to critical acquaintance with the language of the natives, without which no sure reliance can be placed on statements affecting their convictions. For these reasons, special weight needs to be given to the testimony of missionaries, governors, and civil commissioners, as witnesses who are likely to have had fuller opportunity for ascertaining facts than travellers could possibly have. But a second and still more serious difficulty is connected with the interpretation of native convictions and practices. We need to ascertain not only what are the beliefs and practices prevailing among savage or barbarian tribes, but also the most probable explanations of these. We must seek to reach a theory of their theories,-a reasonable explanation of their common acceptance of peculiar systems of belief. It is at this point we come upon the philosophical problem involved. And here we are most dependent on the aid of ethnologists, who have made it their special work to compare together all varieties of savage thought, and subject them to criticism. The task they undertake is one of peculiar difficulty. They must compare all known examples of uncivilized or half-civilized life, in order to form some general theory of the present condition of the human race, such as may afford a key to the human history. In view of the vast field of observation, and the very puzzling questions to be settled, one cannot wonder if those occupied with ethnological inquiry express serious misgivings as to the certainty of the results hitherto attained. Even Mr. Tylor admits this in the most decided manner. He says: "A combined intellectual and moral measure of human condition is an instrument which no student has as yet learned properly to handle." (i. 25.) Such an admission from one who is certainly among the most competent authorities on the subject is sufficient to induce caution in our reasonings. The great question between ethnologists themselves is, whether the condition of savage tribes is to be accounted for by a theory of degradation from a higher level, or whether the condition of civilised nations is to be accounted for by a theory of progression from a low level. And between these rival theories stands the perplexing question as to the original condition of the race. Between the contending theories I shall not attempt to adjudicate. I greatly doubt whether ethnology can bring us at all near a satisfactory solution of the question as to man's original condition. But, looking at things as they are, it seems quite impossible to deny that there is very widespread evidence both of deterioration and of progression. In fact, there can be no adequate theory which does not allow for the continual presence of both. Nevertheless, if we contemplate human history on a wide scale, there appears to be little reason to hesitate as to the evidence that progression is the primary or ruling principle. That "culture must be gained," is a self-evident truth, whether individual or national life be contemplated. And what is gained can be preserved. Men are not so completely independent that each man's acquirements are entombed with his body. The present inherits a legacy from the past. There is a continuity in human acquirements -there is influence for a man's thought after he himself has gone from the scene-application for serviceable inventions, long after the inventors have been forgotten. To use a favourite term with Mr. Tylor, there is a "survival," not only of the superstitions, but also of the discoveries made amongst a people. While, then, it may safely be admitted that progression is the governing principle in human history, some care needs to be taken in the references made to the starting point. To say that the starting point was "a lon original condition," is not only an unwarranted assertion, as unproved, but is apt to be misleading on account of its ambiguity. Low civilization and low morality are not identical. They are not even nccessarily related to each other; for it is possible that * Tylor, i. 32. there may be a high morality with a low type of civilization. Modern examples we have of this, such as the description of the Dyaks of Borneo given by Alfred R. Wallace in his "Malay Archipelago." They are a people who have "passed beyond the first stage of savage life in which the struggle for existence absorbs the whole faculties,”* and Mr. Wallace says, "they are truthful and honest to a remarkable degree;" and, except in war, "crimes of violence. . . . are almost unknown." With such an example as this before us, it must be obvious how careful we need to be, in order to guard ourselves against hasty generalizations, specially such as would involve morality and civilization in necessary relationship, as if the degree of the one might be accepted as evidence as to the degree of the other. Suppose, then, that with these explanations we accept the progressive theory, as embodying the governing law of human history, though not the only law which has determined its course, what does the progressive principle imply? It amounts to this, that the human family is capable of self-improvement; that it is possessed of powers, in the exercise of which the comforts of individual and social life can be steadily increased, intellectual development can be advanced, and also, though less uniformly and certainly, moral elevation secured. I here throw out of account the question as to the original condition of man, and I seek only to ascertain what is at the basis of a progressive theory of human history. If, then, the statement just given as to the general aspect of the progressive theory be accurate, it is obvious that its whole strength rests upon the capabilities of man as a rational being. I refrain from complicating the question at this stage, by adding the moral to the rational. At the very least, it is as a rational being that man is capable of a history so different from all other forms of animate being in the world, and which finds its explanation in a theory of progression. It is by the power of thought that men are capable of contrivances for increased comfort and wider use of the resources of nature; it is by power of thought that they are able to bring their lower nature into subjection, and raise the standard of culture for the higher nature; and, to whatever theory of ethics a man lean, it is still uniformly admitted that reason guides him to the practice of morality. Looking now at the progressive theory in this light, how does it apply to the different stages of savage and barbaric life? It clearly involves the position that there is a logical consistency in human thought even in its lowest types. Allowing for tradition and custom, and for the superstition which is incident to a state of ignorance, there is a coherence in the system of beliefs, laws, and sacred rites, such as makes the system assume the appearance of a consistent unity in the eyes of the people by whom it is accepted. And as knowledge increases and thought becomes Mal. Ar., i. 139. + Ibid. i. 140. |