judgment under the tyranny of a distempered imagination. Now we must confess that we can see nothing like the astonishing revolution in all his sentiments and modes of thinking, which some affect to discover. We are far enough from contending that his consistency extends to every subordinate topic and every particular expression. We would never subject the voluminous works of Burke to the same severe sort of criticism which we should apply to acts of parliament. In the course of so long a political life some changes of opinion might naturally be looked for; and in writings of such extent, produced at such long intervals, composed many of them with much haste, and under the excitement of different and often opposite emergencies, it would be miraculous indeed if there were no discrepancies of statement. Neither is it asserted that, even with respect to the events of the French Revolution, he was not hurried by passion into extravagancies and exaggerations, to defend what was true by illogical argument or plausible sophistry, or that in one or two instances he was not betrayed, as will hereafter be shown, into gross inconsistencies, more especially in his reasonings from the English to the French Revolution. All that is contended for is, that throughout life the general spirit and tendency of his political system was still the same; so much so, that a careful consideration of his conduct and his writings before the French Revolution, would have enabled an impartial observer to predict that that event would not meet with his approbation. The chief characteristics of his whole system of political opinion, were a horror of the abstract principles of political science as applied to the actual circumstances of nations; an opposition to all changes of any magnitude, if proposed to be suddenly accomplished; the application of practical remedies to practical grievances, without any regard to theoretical perfection; and the timely and therefore gradual reform of abuses and corruptions. These are the leading principles, which, if we mistake not, will be found to pervade his whole system of politics; this was the spirit that informed and animated it. We are not now contending that that system was either right or wrong, or if neither the one or the other, how far it partock of both; its general consistency is all that is contended for. His system might somewhat vary in appearance; it was its very character to do so; it might put on different aspects with different circumstances; it might even submit to some important modifications; it might have its youth, its maturity, its period of hoary experience, or, if its enemies will, its dotage; its essential identity through all these changes is all that is at present maintained. It was just these principles which actuated him throughout the whole of the American War. He never debated (till actually compelled) whether it was abstractedly right to tax the colonies or not; he declared that he "abhorred such abstractions;" his arguments constantly were, that it was inerpedient to do so, because it was a great and dangerous innovation; and that "it was best to let well alone." It was this same principle which induced him to oppose parliamentary reform throughout the whole of his long political career; it was these principles which pervaded the whole of his admirable plan of economical reform, and determined him equally both in what he did and in what he left undone. And we hesitate not to say, that the opinions he formed of the French Revolution were not really (though apparently) in stricter harmony with those principles, than his conduct on all the occasions to which we have referred. This we are convinced any close and impartial student of his works will admit.

That these principles, when applied under totally different circumstances, would bear the appearance of inconsistency, may be easily conceived. Now called to resist the encroachments of the Crown, and now the excesses of the people-now employed in defending one part of the constitution, and now another, he would be thought by many to be a traitor to each party, while in fact he was the friend of all, and was but varying his means to maintain the unity of his end.

This appearance of inconsistency would be the greater on another account. It is obvious, that unless the human mind were far more free from the influence of passion than

that of Burke was, or than that of any man can be, and much more cautious and temperate in the expression of opinion than the excitement of politics will ever permit, the natural vehemence with which a man, professing to apply the same general principles under different circumstances, would express himself in any particular emergency, would give him the appearance of deserting his own principles. The moments of passion are not those for scrupulously weighing the abstract and literal consistency of every expression we now utter, with former expressions. Some deduction is to be made in each case for some exaggerations into which the intensity of present feeling has betrayed us. A pure intelligence alone could express itself with such cold caution, and mete out its words with such scrupulous accuracy, as to make the same general principles appear the same under the infinite diversities of times and circumstances ;--not to mention, that even then it would require almost as complete an exemption from prejudice in those who should venture to pronounce on the substantial identity of such principles: without this they would be ill qualified for the office of interpreters.

In maintaining, be it remembered, that the same cardinal principles characterized Burke's political system throughout the whole of his career, it is not asserted that he was not inconsistent on some particular points; points which will hereafter come more specifically under consideration;—still less, that the vehemence of feeling might not often betray him into serious exaggeration or the utmost intemperance of expression. All this may be believed without affecting the general consistency of his political opinions. Burke has himself vindicated this general consistency in a passage of such beauty that we cannot. refrain from citing it for the benefit of the reader.

"I pass to the next head of charge, Mr. Burke's inconsistency. It is certainly a great aggravation of his fault in embracing false opinions, that in doing so he is not supposed to fill up a void, but that he is guilty of a dereliction of opinions that are true and laudable. This is the great gist of the charge against him. It is not so much that he is wrong in his book (that however is alleged also) as that he has therein belied his whole life. I believe, if he could venture to value himself upon any thing, it is on the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most. Strip him of this, and you leave Lim naked indeed.

"In the case of any man who had written something, and spoken a great deal, upon very multifarious matter, during upwards of twenty-five years' publick service, and in as great a variety of important events as perhaps have ever happened in the same number of years, it would appear a little hard, in order to charge such a man with inconsistency, to see collected by his friend, a sort of digest of his sayings, even to such as were merely sportive and jocular. This digest, however, has been made, with equal pains and partiality, and without bringing out those passages of his writings which might tend to show with what restrictions any expressions, quoted from him, ought to have been understood. From a great statesman he did not quite expect this mode of inquisition. If it only appeared in the works of common pamphleteers, Mr. Burke might safely trust to his reputation. When thus urged, he ought, prhaps, to do a little more. It shall be as little as possible, for I hope not much is wanting. To be totally silent on his charges would not be respectful to Mr. Fox. Accusations sometimes derive a weight from the persons who make them, to which they are not entitled for their matter."

“A man, who, among various objects of his equal regard, is secure of some, and full of anxiety for the fate of others, is apt to go to much greater lengths in his preference of the objects of his immediate olicitude than Mr. Burke has ever done. A man so circumstanced often seems to undervalue, to vilify, almost to reprobate and disown, those that are out of danger. This is the voice of nature and truth, and not of inconsistency and false pretence. The danger of any thing very dear to us removes, for the moment, every other affection from the mind. When Priam had his whole thoughts employed on the body of his Hector, he repels with indignation, and drives from him with a thousand reproaches, his surviving sons, who with an officious piety crowded about him to offer their assistance. A good critick there is no better than Mr. Fox) would say, that this is a master-stroke, and marks a deep understanding of nature in the father of poetry. He would despise a Zoilus, who would conclude from this

passage that Homer meant to represent this man of affliction as hating, or being indifferent and cold in his affections to the poor relicks of his house, or that he preferred a dead carcass to his living children.

"Mr. Burke does not stand in need of an allowance of this kind, which, if he did, by candid criticks ought to be granted to him. If the principles of a mixed constitution be admitted, he wants no more to justify to consistency every thing he has said and done during the course of a political life just touching to its close. I believe that gentleman has kept himself more clear of running into the fashion of wild, visionary theories, or of seeking popularity through every means, than any man perhaps ever did in the same situation.

"He was the first man who, on the hustings, at a popular election, rejected the authority of instructions from constituents; or who, in any place, has argued so fully against it. Perhaps the discredit into which that doctrine of compulsive instructions under our constitution is since fallen, may be due, in a great degree, to his opposing himself to it in that manner, and on that occasion.

"The reformers in representation, and the bills for shortening the duration of parliaments, he uniformly and steadily opposed for many years together, in contradiction to many of his best friends. These friends, however, in his better days, when they had more to hope from his service and more to fear from his loss than now they have, never chose to find any inconsistency between his acts and expressions in favour of liberty, and his votes on those questions. But there is a time for all things."

As efforts have been made to prove the inconsistency of Mr. Burke, on some fundamental points, by comparing certain detached sentences from his earlier and later writings apparently involving important discrepancies, we think it but just to his memory to cite some more unequivocal passages from the very same works tending to show the substantial identity of his political creed; that is, with due allowance for the wide diversity of circumstances in which he acted. It will be seen that our citations will have this incontestable advantage over those to which we have referred, that whereas the latter are the most intemperate expressions in favour of those opinions which, at the time he wrote, demanded (as he thought) the most strenuous defence, the former on the contrary will contain the unequivocal recognition of those opinions which at such times were most alien from the objects he had immediately in view. Our citations will have all the force of admissions. And first a few sentences from the "Thoughts on the Present Discontents."

"If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublesome to me as to another, to extol these remedies, so famous in speculation, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to resort in practice. I confess, then, that I have no sort of reliance upon either a triennial parliament, or a place-bill."

"Our constitution stands on a nice equipoise, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a risk of oversetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in a government so complicated as ours, combined at the same time with external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties: in which a considerate man will not be too ready to decide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honest man too ready to promise. They do not respect the publick nor themselves, who engage for more than they are sure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. These are my sentiments, weak perhaps, but honest and unbiassed; and submitted entirely to the opinion of grave men, well affected to the constitution of their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it."

The following sentences are from the "Speech on American Taxation.”

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Again, and again, revert to your old principles-seek peace and ensue it-leave America, if she has taxable matter in her, to tax herself. I am not here going into the distinctions of rights, not at tempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood, and these distinctions, born of our unhappy contest, will die along with it. They and we, and their and our ancestors, have been happy un

der that system. Let the memory of all actions, in contradiction to that good old mode, on both sides, be extinguished for ever. Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done it. Let this be your reason for binding their trade. Do not burthen them by taxes; you were not used to do so from the beginning. Let this be your reason for not taxing. These are the arguments of states and kingdoms. Leave the rest to the schools; for there only they may be discussed with safety."

Let us hear him on the subject of the duties of representatives and their constituents, in the very flower of his popularity, just after his election at Bristol.

"He tells you, that the topick of instructions has occasioned much altercation and uneasiness in this city;' and he expresses himself (if I understand him rightly) in favour of the coercive authority of such instructions.

"Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But, his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

"My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?

To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience, these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenour of our constitution."

In his "Speech on Conciliation with America" he again gives full expression to his abhorrence of abstract politics.

Sir, I think you must perceive, that I am resolved this day to have nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. Some gentlemen startle-but it is true; I put it totally out of the question. It is less than nothing in my consideration. I do not indeed wonder, nor will you, Sir, that gentlemen of profound learning are fond of displaying it on this profound subject. But my consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question. I do not examine, whether the giving away a man's money be a power excepted and reserved out of the general trust of government; and how far all mankind, in all forms of polity, are entitled to an exercise of that right by the charter of nature. Or whether, on the contrary, a right of taxation is necessarily involved in the general principle of legislation, and inseparable from the ordinary supreme power. These are deep questions, where great names militate against each other; where reason is perplexed; and an appeal to authorities only thickens the confusion. For high and reverend authorities lift up their heads on both sides; and there is no sure footing in the middle. This point is the great Serbonian bog, betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, where armies whole have sunk. I do not intend to be overwhelmed in that bog, though in such respectable company. The question with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people miserable; but whether it is not your interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice, tell me I ought to do."

Again:

"I do not know, that the colonies have, in any general way, or in any cool hour, gone much beyond the demand of immunity in relation to taxes. It is not fair to judge of the temper or dispositions of any man, or any set of men, when they are composed and at rest, from their conduct, or their expressions, in a state of disturbance and irritation. It is besides a very great mistake to imagine, that mankind follow up practically any speculative principle, either of government or of freedom, as far as it will go in argument and logical illation. We Englishmen stop very short of the principles upon which we support any given part of our constitution; or even the whole of it together. I could easily, if I had not already tired you, give you very striking and convincing instances of it. This is nothing but what is natural and proper. All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights that we may enjoy others; and, we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants. As we must give away some natural liberty, to enjoy civil advantages; so we must sacrifice some civil liberties, for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great empire. But, in all fair dealings, the thing bought must bear some proportion to the purchase paid. None will barter away the immediate jewel of his soul. Though a great house is apt to make slaves haughty, yet it is purchasing a part of the artificial importance of a great empire too dear, to pay for it all essential rights, and all the intrinsick dignity of human nature. None of us who would not risk his life rather than fall under a government purely arbitrary. But although there are some amongst us who think our constitution wants many improvements, to make it a complete system of liberty; perhaps none who are of that opinion would think it right to aim at such improvement, by disturbing his country, and risking every thing that is dear to him. In every arduous enterprise, we consider what we are to lose, as well as what we are to gain; and the more and better stake of liberty every people possess, the less they will hazard in a vain attempt to make it more. These are the cords of man. Man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest; and not on metaphysical speculations. Aristotle, the great master of reasoning, cautions us, and with great weight and propriety, against this species of delusive geometrical accuracy in moral arguments, as the most fallacious of all sophistry."

In his "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol," there are expressions yet more remarkable. Thus, speaking of the legislative power which England claimed to exercise over her colonies, he tells us :

"I had indeed very earnest wishes to keep the whole body of this authority perfect and entire as I found it and to keep it so, not for our advantage solely; but principally for the sake of those on whose account all just authority exists; I mean, the people to be governed. For I thought I saw, that many cases might well happen, in which the exercise of every power comprehended in the broadest idea of legislature, might become, in its time and circumstances, not a little expedient for the peace and union of the colonies amongst themselves, as well as for their perfect harmony with Great Britain. Thinking so, (perhaps erroneously,) but being honestly of that opinion, I was at the same time very sure, that the authority, of which I was so jealous, could not under the actual circumstances of our plantations be at all preserved in any of its members, but by the greatest reserve in its application; particularly in those delicate points, in which the feelings of mankind are the most irritable.

"It is so with regard to the exercise of all the powers, which our constitution knows in any of its parts, and indeed to the substantial existence of any of the parts themselves. The king's negative to bills is one of the most indisputed of the royal prerogatives; and it extends to all cases whatsoever. I am far from certain, that if several laws, which I know, had fallen under the stroke of that sceptre, that the publick would have had a very heavy loss. But it is not the propriety of the exercise which is in question. The exercise itself is wisely forborne. Its repose may be the preservation of its existence; and its existence may be the means of saving the constitution itself, on an occasion worthy of bringing As the disputants, whose accurate and logical reasonings have brought us into our present condition, think it absurd, that powers or members of any constitution should exist rarely or never to be exercised, I hope I shall be excused in mentioning another instance, that is material. We know, that the convocation of the clergy had formerly been called, and sat with nearly as much regularity to business as parliament itself. It is now called for form only. It sits for the purpose of making some

it forth.