between the neutral Powers, but that under present circumstances no offer of mediation from any quarter would be listened to. Lord Granville could only say that "her Majesty's Government had no desire to obtrude their mediation, but that France might be assured that if at any time recourse should be had to their good offices they would be freely given and zealously exerted." The impossibility at that time of any mediation was accepted by all the great Powers of Europe. The fall of the Empire changed the tone of France. The English Foreign Office was besieged by repeated requests to intervene in some way or other and to make propositions to Prussia. But at the same time, in fact on the same day, that the first of these requests was sent, Jules Favre had made his famous declaration against the cession of an inch of French territory. The reply of the English Foreign Office had been to the effect that more harm than good would be done by any attempt to mediate except upon a basis acceptable to both parties. But Bismarck's counter proclamation had indicated with perfect clearness that Prussia would require some territorial cession. The common basis could therefore not be found. It was in fact now Bismarck's turn to hold at arm's-length any offered mediation, as the French Empire had done while it still believed in its power. Nor was there ever a time till the final surrender of Paris when such a ground of intervention could be found. A deaf ear was therefore of necessity turned to the eager pleadings of the French, who urged in plain words that an armed intervention to restrain Prussia was desirable, and deplored with bitterness the abandonment of France by Europe. Various efforts Yet England never ceased to do what was possible for the interests of peace. It was through English instrumentality that the interview between Jules Favre and Bismarck in September was to secure peace. arranged; advantage was taken of the danger admitted even by the Germans of famine in Paris to press with great urgency the necessity of an armistice for calling a National Assembly; and Lord Granville even risked a somewhat humiliating rebuff from Bismarck by pressing on him, in spite of his well-known determination to engage only in direct negotiation, the presence of Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles, and certain alternatives suggested by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Even at the very close of the war a despatch of remonstrance was sent to the Prussians, which, while it acknowledged that in the full tide of its success Germany had not unreasonably refused the dictation of those who had stood aloof from the war, pointed out that were France to be totally ruined, and 1870] VARIOUS EFFORTS FOR PEACE 487 Germany "left with no resource but to sieze and occupy vast territories filled with unwilling inhabitants, blame would attach to her for having rejected not the intervention but the good offices of some of the neutral Powers of a character which had so often led to satisfactory results in international disputes." Nor did the friendly work of England cease with the war. It was largely owing to her representations that the enormous war indemnity was decreased from six to five milliards of francs. It is difficult to see how the Government could possibly have done more than it did unless it was disposed to take the extreme step of intervening in arms, which no party in England seriously desired. Yet there were not wanting men who pretended to see in the temperate tone adopted and in the genuine effort to preserve a true neutrality a want of spirit which tended to lower England in the eyes of Europe. Russian The same feeling was excited with scarcely more reason by the action of Government with regard to the modification of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Whatever chance of joint action between England and Russia in the French quarrel existed was checked Excitement by the sudden appearance of a declaration from Prince caused by the Gortschakoff in the autumn of 1870, asserting the right declaration. of any Power to withdraw of its own will from a Treaty to which it had been a party. The principle in the present case was to be applied to the Treaty of Paris neutralising the Black Sea. Taking advantage of the state of France and the known desire of neutrals to prevent any extension of the war, the Russian Government had determined to throw off the restrictions laid upon their country at the close of the Crimean war. The high-handed method indicated by Prince Gortschakoff's declaration was to be adopted. It was impossible for England to pass over in silence an interpretation of the rights of co-signataries of a Treaty so novel and so threatening. It was a more open question whether the change proposed was itself desirable or not. In the correspondence which ensued it was alleged by Russia that the circumstances of Europe had absolutely changed, and that on more than one occasion during the fourteen years which had elapsed since the signature of the Treaty, its provisions had been infringed, notably in the fusion of the Danubian Principalities into one Power. It was also asserted that the very clause in question had been several times infringed by the presence of ships of war in the Black Sea. It was therefore argued on the one hand that the Treaty was already in fact broken, and on the other that the change of circumstances rendered a revision of it a matter of necessity. Inquiry among the other Courts of Europe led the English Ministry to the conclusion that they sympathised with the Russian wish to remove restrictions which could scarcely be other than humiliating to a powerful nation, and which, as that nation was now in peace and friendship with them all, seemed unnecessary. When called to account subsequently for their action the Government declared that they would have found no single ally had they insisted on the maintenance of the restrictions. The Black Sea The case was different with regard to the method which Russia had employed for obtaining its wishes. The maintenance of treaties was too important to all the Powers to allow them calmly to accept the new doctrine. Bismarck was appealed to and suggested a Conference at which the point at issue might be settled by the Powers which had signed the Paris Treaty. He named St. Petersburg as the place where the Conference might be held. The friendship between the Czar and the Prussian King was well known, the mistrust of Prussian ambition was great, and a strong feeling arose in England that Bismarck was playing directly into Russian hands. Lord Granville protested against the choice of locality, and to remove all doubt refused to enter into conference except upon the distinct understanding that there was no foregone conclusion, and that the meeting was to be held out of Russia. The position of England, the Power which had chiefly insisted upon the restriction, was recognised. Lord Granville's objections were allowed, and the Conference assembled in London. As far as the principle of the maintenance of treaties was concerned the summoning of the Conference was conclusive, Russia consented to act in accordance with the wishes of the other Powers, and a declaration to that effect was the first act of the Conference on its meeting. But though the discussion was nominally free, the conclusion was after all a foregone one. The clauses which neutralised the Black Sea and forbade the presence in its waters of ships of war even of Russia and Turkey were removed. The principle that the Dardanelles and Bosphorus should be closed against external Powers during time of peace was upheld. But the Porte was allowed to open them to friendly Powers if the stipulations of the Paris Treaty were in danger. The change was no doubt a severe blow to English diplomacy. The revised clauses were regarded as the chief fruit of the Crimean war; not unnaturally the action of Government in resigning them was subjected to the severest comment. It was in vain that the general feeling of Europe was explained, and the slight value set upon the clauses by Lord 1871] THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 489 Palmerston asserted; the feeling that England had suffered humiliation gained ground. The Treaty of Washington and its attendant events tended still further to increase this feeling. Ever since the termination of the American war negotiations had been going on with The Treaty of regard to what were known as the Alabama claims. Washington. The Americans had persuaded themselves that England May 8, 1871. had played an unfriendly part during the contest, and, smarting under the injury inflicted on their trade by privateers wholly or in part fitted out in England, had demanded compensation for the alleged breach of its neutral duties on the part of England with a persistence and acrimony which seemed at times likely to produce open war. The English, aware that their effort to preserve neutrality in the face of great difficulties had been on the whole honestly made, and believing that technically no breach of neutrality had been committed, refused to listen to the angry demands of America. But the controversy seemed so unending and so threatening in its nature that the Government, with the intention of bringing the points at issue to arbitration, consented to the appointment of a joint High Commission of English and American statesmen to draw up a treaty on the subject. On the meeting of the High Commission at Washington the Americans raised a twofold claim, for direct and indirect losses, but declined to estimate their indirect claims in the hope that some settlement would be arrived at. They suggested the payment of a lump sum to cover all demands. The English, on the other hand, denying legal obligation, suggested arbitration. This alternative the Americans accepted, but only upon condition that certain principles to govern the arbitration should be agreed upon, and produced certain statements with regard to international law the acceptance of which they looked upon as absolutely necessary. The English Commissioners declared their willingness to accept these rules as binding for the future, but denied that they existed at the time of the civil war. It required a good deal of diplomatic correspondence to surmount this difficulty, but at length the English Government yielded, and though still denying the validity of the principles at the time the Alabama question arose, agreed that the arbitration should take place as if the principles had been then in force. These rules therefore formed the first part of the Treaty. The English Commissioners also consented to express a general feeling of regret for the loss occasioned by the privateers. The next difficulty arose when the English advanced counter claims arising from the Fenian raids into Canada. The Americans refused to allow that this question came within the scope of the intended Treaty. Again the English yielded, and reserved these claims for future consideration. The second part of the Treaty referred to the fisheries. Full liberty was granted on the one side to the American fishermen to fish on the coasts of British North America with the exception always of river-fishery and shell-fish, a similar privilege being granted to British subjects on the other hand as far as the 39th parallel. The Canadians regarded this exchange as largely in favour of the States. On these terms the Treaty was completed, and for the first time in history an international quarrel was referred to a formal court of arbitrators consisting of learned men appointed by various sovereigns to meet at Geneva. Before this court the cases of the rival countries were to be laid on the 13th of June 1872. Geneva. June 1872. There was a very prevalent feeling that Government had shown weakness in accepting as the basis of arbitration principles which were regarded as innovations in international law, a feeling which was conThe "Alabama" siderably strengthened by the other concessions made by arbitration at the Government, especially by the exclusion of the counter claims resting upon the Fenian raids. But public dissatisfaction rose still higher when it appeared that the wording of the Treaty was so loose that the Americans saw in it an opening for advancing not only their direct claims arising from injuries and losses actually caused by the privateers, but indirect claims of indefinite and incalculable extent arising from such causes as the transfer of American trade to English shipping, the expense of the pursuit of the Confederate cruisers, and even the prolongation of the war, all of which they traced to the carelessness of the English Government. The negotiators declared that they had always understood, basing their understanding chiefly upon the opening declaration of the American Commissioners, that these indirect claims had been entirely waved, and that the arbitration arranged by the Treaty applied to the direct claims only. The Government took the same view, and supported its Commissioners. The Ministers even went so far as to say that unless these claims were withdrawn they should regard the Treaty as based upon an entire misunderstanding, and refuse to recognise it. Mutual recriminations, and charges of dishonesty and double-dealing passed to and fro between the two Governments, but at length the Americans so far listened to reason that the extreme measure of repudiating the Treaty was not necessary. The arbitrators met upon the appointed day. When the English agent demanded a postponement on the ground |