1870] DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH ARMIES 481 chance that Paris would be relieved from outside. Faidherbe was indeed making some way in Picardy, Garibaldi and those with him were occupying General Werder in the south and east, but in all directions it appeared clear that the German troops in the field were able to restrain the forces opposed to them from any dangerous approach to the great siege. Meanwhile Paris was not idle. The news of the victory of Coulmiers produced, while the subsequent disasters of d'Aurelle were yet unknown, an important and threatening sortie under General Ducrot which for a while seemed to promise to be successful. For two days the fighting was kept up. But, on the 3d of December the French General withdrew, compelled so to act in part by the cold, against which his troops were improperly provided. A second great effort under General Vinoy was made upon the 21st of December, but again owing to some mismanagement of the commanders it proved unsuccessful. The coming winter, the extension of the war, the threatening activity of the besieged, drove the Germans to have recourse to more active measures. While a new levy of 200,000 men was demanded from Germany, the bombardment of Paris at length began, and on the 29th of December one of the forts was taken. Faidherbe, Chanzy, and It was the beginning of the end. Whatever was to be done to save Paris either from within or from without must be done quickly. Help might come from Faidherbe in the north, from Chanzy in the west, from Bourbaki in the south, and against the large armies which these Generals had at their command the Prussians had very inferior numbers to oppose. But the raw levies of France proved unable to perform the task set them, while the genius of Moltke, divining always the point of danger and strengthening it, seemed to neutralise their numerical superiority. Faidherbe, who had ob- Defeat of tained a transient success at Bapaume, was shortly afterwards completely defeated near St. Quentin, whither a Prussian corps had been hastily despatched by rail from Paris. The hopes of Chanzy lay in the power of Bourbaki to keep the Germans employed upon the Loire. But Bourbaki was engaged on a great enterprise, and had moved away eastward. At once divining his intention the Prussian commander entirely neglected him and sent all his troops against Chanzy, who, gallantly disputing every inch of ground, was finally defeated at Le Mans. The fate of Bourbaki was still more disastrous. Thinking to throw himself upon the German communications in Alsace, he had moved rapidly eastward and attempted to separate the German forces at Vesoul and Belfort: he VICT. 2 H failed. The enemy concentrated in the neighbourhood of Héricourt, and there after a three days' battle Bourbaki suffered a complete defeat. He attempted to retreat, but found himself entrapped by the skill of Moltke, who had not shrunk from withdrawing an army from the north and hurrying it southward. Arriving too late for the battle of Héricourt, it was in time to cut off Bourbaki's retreat, and to drive the whole of his forces into Switzerland, where in accordance with the law of neutrals they laid down their arms. Surrender of Jan. 28, 1871. These successive defeats all took place between the 12th and the 19th of January. On the last of those days the final effort of the Parisians themselves was made. Under the command of Trochu himself 100,000 men pushed out towards St. Cloud and St. Denis. Successful for a while, they were finally beaten back as the German reserves were concentrated on the threatened point. The inevitable consequence of this failure was a riot. Though it was suppressed without difficulty Trochu surrendered the command; and it was evident that at length the forces on which the Germans had relied had done their work-that famine and sedition rendered further defence impossible. On the 23d of January negotiations began. On the evening of the 28th an armistice was signed, and Paris surrendered. Food had been long collected by the Germans in expectation of the surrender, and England was ready to despatch with the greatest speed provisions for the suffering people. Upon the advance of the Germans towards Tours, Gambetta had gone to Bordeaux. He at once indignantly repudiated the armistice. But the other members of the Government of national defence proved too strong for him; recognising that he was after all but a delegate of that Government, he thought it necessary to give in his resignation. Then began an attempt to reorganise in France a Government so national and with such promise of permanence as to be capable of changing the armistice into a peace. A National Assembly was accordingly opened at Bordeaux on the 3d of February. Grévy was elected President, and Thiers put at the head of the Ministry. Listening to his advice the Assembly proceeded to take measures for relieving the country of the invaders. A Commission was despatched to Paris, and preliminaries of peace were arranged, including a convention allowing of the formal Terms of peace. Occupation of Paris for a few hours by 30,000 German March 2, 1871. troops. The terms of peace, though undoubtedly hard -including as they did the cession of Alsace and a considerable portion of Lorraine, and the payment of an enormous war indemnity, -were accepted by the Assembly. On the 2d of March, peace 1871] SURRENDER OF PARIS 483 was ratified. The brief occupation of the Champs Elysées by the German troops passed off quietly, and the invasion was at an end. Establishment But France was not yet free from its difficulties. The capitulation had roused the angry temper of the population of Paris. An opportunity was afforded in the widespread discontent for the active movement of the extreme Radical party, which had already made itself felt during the siege, and had lately been well organised under a central committee. Arms had been left in the hands of the National Guard, and under the pretence of guarding the cannon, they had drawn them into the revolutionary quarters of Paris. The number of the regular troops was small, nor were they wholly free from sympathy with the National Guard and popular party. An attempt to withdraw the artillery failed. Many of the troops of the Comrefused to oppose the insurgents. The Central Com- mune. mittee established itself at the Hôtel de Ville, the members of the Government and General Vinoy with the faithful troops withdrew, an election for the Municipality was held, and the Commune entering into office in the Hôtel de Ville became the sole recognised authority in the city. In view of the disturbances in the capital the Assembly had decided to hold its sittings in Versailles, and thither the troops on leaving Paris withdrew. The men who had appropriated the government of the capital had definite political views. They desired that France should be dissolved into a confederation of Communes, to each of which the fullest measure of self-government should be given, the unity of the country being secured and represented by an Assembly of Delegates from the Federal Communes. With views so absolutely opposed to those of the reactionary Assembly, and so closely affecting the interests of all the privileged classes, in armed rebellion against the constituted authorities of the country, and with their cause already sullied by the needless murder of General Thomas and the slaughter in the Place Vendôme of more than thirty unarmed men who had been there attending a demonstration in favour of order, the men of the Commune could expect no mercy at the hands of the Versailles Government. A regular war sprang up between the rival authorities, and Paris again underwent at the hands of Frenchmen a second and more disastrous bombardment than that from which it had just escaped. Allowed by the Germans to increase the number of regular troops, and easily drawing to himself the late soldiers of the Empire as they returned from captivity, Thiers was able to bring an overwhelming force against the capital. Little by little after stubborn fighting the insurgents gave ground, and at length in an agony of despair lost all self-restraint, cruelly murdered the Archbishop of Paris and other hostages whom they held in their hands, and set fire to many of the public buildings. The want of self-restraint was not all on one side. Little or no quarter was given by the assaulting troops, prisoners were shot in batches, and the triumph of the Assembly of Versailles was marked by vindictive cruelty. Position of War. There could scarcely be a question as to the position which England should take up in the presence of such events; as English interests were by no means directly involved in the quarrel, a policy of neutrality was almost necessarily imposed upon the Government. It is however always difficult for a great Power to play the part of a neutral with success. Its duty as a leading State seems to lie in moderating the demands of both the contending parties with a view to re-establishing peace. It cannot merely stand aloof. The limits of its interference are always open to question. Its ancient friendships seem to demand some effective action, its refusal to recognise the claim is likely to excite the anger of both sides. In the widespread ramifications of national intercourse it is strange if it does not find its interests more or less indirectly involved in the course of the war. It was with the full knowledge of the difficulties that would attend it that the Government decided to adopt a neutral policy. Before the actual outbreak of hostilities the good offices of England were used not without effect in urging upon the Prussian King his disavowal of the Hohenzollern candidature, and on the other side, in vain, in efforts to persuade the French to lessen the arrogant demands which they raised. Bismarck's revelation of the Belgian But almost immediately the strength of the determination of the Government to maintain a friendly neutrality was severely strained. There was a prevalent feeling in England that France had forced the war on Prussia, and English sympathy was at first entirely upon the German side. Bismarck, not unnaturally anxious to weaken as far as possible the connection, now of considerable standing, between France and England, communicated to the Times a project of a treaty, written in the handwriting of the French Ambassador Benedetti, by which it was proposed to secure to France the possession of Belgium in exchange for certain advantages guaranteed on the other hand to Prussia. The independence of Belgium was a cardinal point in the foreign policy of England, and here to all appearance was our intimate ally quietly trafficking for the possession of that country. The project was the result of certain discussions of a somewhat earlier date between the Treaty. 485 1870] POSITION OF ENGLAnd during the War French Ministry and Bismarck, and was written at the dictation of the German statesman. It had been summarily rejected by both Courts, but the document remained in Bismarck's hands and was now produced with great effect. It is true that Bismarck was himself as much implicated in the matter as Benedetti. But it at least proved how great was the jealousy felt by France of Prussian aggrandisement, and how ready the diplomatists of the Empire were to discuss any means however unscrupulous which might secure a countervailing advantage to France. It thus threw a somewhat awkward light upon the action of the Emperor in forcing on the war. friendly neu trality firmly Before the whole truth was known the excitement caused in England by the revelation of the project was considerable, and even when more fully understood it appeared to show how easily a point of the first interest to England might be touched by the coming war. The cry was loud that friendly neutrality was not enough, that an armed neutrality was necessary. The Government stood firm, but listened so far to the loud demands raised that it contracted a special treaty, signed on the 26th of August, both with France and Prussia, to the effect that it would join in arms either party to repel any encroachment upon the integrity of Belgium. It also agreed to a very considerable increase of the army. About the same time a second form of pressure was put upon the Government. England was not alone as a neutral Power; and from several of the other The policy of large countries of Europe, and especially from Italy, came eager suggestions that the neutral Powers should enter maintained. into a formal combination. This also Lord Granville was wise enough to reject. He declared himself willing to go no further than an interchange between England and other countries of an assertion that they would not depart from their neutral attitude. From this position Lord Granville never wavered, and was therefore able to deny the charge made by the French Government and reiterated by the English Opposition, that by placing herself at the head of a neutral league England had prevented other countries from giving to France the assistance they would otherwise have been willing to afford. The want of effectual mediation was the next great accusation brought against the Ministers. It was again and again asserted by the English Opposition, and with almost passionate earnestness by the French as their misfortunes increased upon them. Yet it would appear to be groundless. While France was still under the Emperor and with hopes of re-establishing its affairs, the French Government had plainly told Lord Granville that they had no objection to an understanding |