soldiery his diminishing popularity was evident. He would seem to have been desirous to mark his renewed acquisition of power by some striking exploit, which should at once hush amid the enthusiasm of a national war the voices of his opponents and restore by the glories of victory the shaken allegiance of the army. He saw in the jealousy of Prussian aggrandisement which since the events of 1866 had been prevalent in France a ready instrument for his purpose. His diplomatic agents by their mistaken information misled him so completely that he supposed Austria and the South of Germany would hail him as a friend, while those in charge of the military administration at home, with equal want of honesty and of knowledge, persuaded him that his army was in the highest state of preparation. Advantage therefore was at once taken of the Hohenzollern candidature to raise a cry against the ambitious views of Prussia. Not satisfied, it was said, with its triumphs at home and its interference in the East, it was bent on establishing its influence in Spain, at the very threshold of France. The French Minister in Berlin was instructed to protest against this conduct, and when he obtained no redress, Gramont, the War Minister, was authorised to utter in the legislative chamber words which could mean little less than war. It was in vain that the Prussian monarch declared that his assent to the candidature was a family and not a national act, and that Prince Leopold himself withdrew his claim. The Emperor and his Ministers would not be satisfied. They demanded a written disclaimer from King William and a promise that the candidature should not be renewed. Pressing himself upon the King with these arrogant demands, Benedetti, the French Ambassador, met with a somewhat rough reception. Exaggerated importance was given to the incident. The French Ministry again uttered inflammatory speeches in the Assemblies, demanded a large credit for the War Minister, and within a few days proceeded to a formal declaration of war.

the war.

It was intended no doubt that this sudden act should be followed by Beginning of an equally sudden exertion of military force. Napoleon intended to push at once between Prussia and the Southern States of Germany, which he expected to find friendly to his interests. But when it came to the point the army on which he relied proved in no condition for immediate movement. Delay was necessary, and delay enabled the Prussians to bring their admirable organisation at once into play, to secure the friendship of their southern fellow-countrymen, and to change the defensive war with which they were threatened into one of active offence. The French

1870]

FALL OF THE EMPIRE

477

Emperor, who had himself taken the command of his army, did indeed strike the first blow by an idle bombardment of the open town of Saarbrück, but the movement was without result. The real warfare began when the army of the Crown Prince surprised a portion of Marshal MacMahon's army at Weissemburg, and two days afterwards, on the 6th of August, completely defeated the Marshal himself at Wörth. The battle was the result of a combined advance of the Prussians, and on the same day, in the neighbourhood of Saarbrück, upon the heights of Spicheren, the armies of Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles won an equally decisive victory over the French. MacMahon's army in Alsace was virtually destroyed at Weissemburg, and was compelled to find its way back as best it could to Châlons, where the army of reserve was stationed. The armies of Lorraine, with which the Emperor himself was, withdrew into the valley of the Moselle, resting upon the great fortress of Metz. Into the gap thus formed the Prussians at once pushed. Coming both from the north and the south they thrust themselves between Metz and Châlons, and succeeded after a series of murderous engagements in inclosing the French with Bazaine at their head in Metz. The Emperor with difficulty made his way to Châlons, but in fact his power had left him. The disastrous news of the first defeats had produced a wild excitement in Paris, and the demand for his deposition was loudly raised. The Empress made a gallant effort to uphold the cause of her husband and child, assumed the post of Regent, appointed a new Ministry of a more thoroughly Napoleonic character under General Montauban, and set energetically to work to put Paris in a state of defence. But the course of the war soon scattered to the winds the efforts of the Empress. While Bazaine, to whom the chief command had been intrusted, allowed himself to be shut up in Metz by the northern and central armies of the Prussians, MacMahon, withdrawing by a circuitous route before the advancing forces of the Crown Prince, reached Châlons in safety. To release Bazaine's army, which included almost the whole of the organised force of France, seemed a matter of prime necessity. Setting out from Châlons with 180,000 men, MacMahon and the Emperor marched in a north-easterly direction, with a view of reaching the valley of the Meuse, and forcing their way down it. The Crown Prince followed the movement; so strong were the armies around Metz that it was found possible to despatch a body of 80,000 to his assistance. Thus with more than 200,000 men at command, and aided by the slow and badly organised march of the French, he forestalled MacMahon's action, placed himself between the

Deposition of
Napoleon.
Sept. 4, 1870.

French army and Metz, cut its communications with Châlons, and forced it to take refuge in Sedan. There on the last day of August and 1st of September the crowning battle of the campaign was fought, and the Emperor was compelled to surrender with his whole army. The news of this catastrophe was fatal to the dynasty of Napoleon. At a midnight meeting of the legislative body the formal deposition of the Emperor was demanded, but when after a short adjournment it again met to discuss the question, it was evident that the power had passed into other hands. The populace broke into the Assembly, and headed by Gambetta and the chief members of the Opposition, proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville. There a provisional government, subsequently known as the Government of National Defence, was declared. With Trochu as its President, Jules Favre as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gambetta Minister of the Interior, it began its work by suppressing the Legislative Body and the Senate, and allowing the Republic to be proclaimed at the chief provincial cities of France. It was hoped by onlookers that the fall of Napoleon, to whom the war was due, and the completeness of the vengeance which the Prussians had inflicted upon their assailant, might lead to an honourable peace. The hope was dispelled by the utterances of Jules Favre and a counter declaration of Bismarck. As the mouthpiece of the new Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that it undertook as its first duty to clear France from the invaders, and would listen to no terms of peace implying the abandonment of one inch of territory or one stone of a French fortress. In reply the Prussian Minister explained clearly that Germany, after the terrible efforts to which it had been driven by French aggression, could not be satisfied without a strong defensive frontier including the possession of Strasburg and Metz. Thus the second act of the drama of the great war began. The Crown Prince resumed his march upon Paris from which his movement towards Sedan had drawn him. On the 20th the Prussian King had reached Ferrières, the remnants of the French armies were defeated before the city, and Paris was completely invested. In the absence of any constitutionally established Government recognised by the whole of France great difficulties arose in the way of negotiations, and it seemed not unnatural that some cessation of hostilities to allow of elections and reorganisation should be granted by the Prussians even in their own interest. A conference between Bismarck and Jules Favre was arranged through the instrumentality of the English Ambassador; but as the

Siege of
Paris.

1870]

THE SIEGE OF PARIS

479

one demanded the cession of Strasburg and several other fortresses as a preliminary condition, and the other was pledged for the time to resist all such concessions, the negotiations came to nothing. The only hope of moderating the war seemed to lie in the intervention of the neutral powers; and Thiers, the foremost of French statesmen, set out on a voluntary mission to the capitals of Europe for the purpose of obtaining it. Meanwhile the march of the Crown Prince to Sedan had given the Parisians time to organise their defence; the forts had been armed and strengthened, 400,000 national guards and mobiles organised, marines brought to work the guns, and vast quantities of ammunition made. But the Prussian generals placed their hopes upon famine and political difficulties within the city, and shrank from active measures of assault. To maintain the vast blockade taxed all their powers. Though they had 650,000 men in France, two-thirds of these were employed elsewhere. Bazaine, with his army, had still to be kept shut up in Metz, the communications with Germany had to be guarded, and at first Strasburg and several other important fortresses still held out. It seemed not impossible if the unconquered part of France could be roused to energy that the capital might yet be saved. The duty of making the attempt was undertaken by Gambetta. Escaping early in October from the besieged city in a balloon, he made his appear- attempt to ance at Tours, at once assumed the Ministry of War with almost dictatorial powers, and proceeded to infuse into the provinces something of his own feverish enthusiasm. Armies sprang into existence in all directions; a great force under General D'Aurelle de Paladines was gradually collected behind the Loire; Garibaldi, who had offered his services to the new Republic, took command of a mixed and irregular force in the south-east, while a third active army was established under Count Kératry in the west. But before Gambetta was able to bring any trustworthy troops into action against the Prussian lines, an event occurred which changed the aspect of affairs and proved fatal to the fortunes of France. On the 27th of October Marshal Bazaine surrendered Metz, and with it the whole of his army. Three Marshals of France, 180,000 soldiers, 3000 guns, and 40,000,000 of francs fell into the hands of the conquerors. Either wilfully to suit his own views, as his enemies assert, or from incapacity, the General had allowed this vast force resting on a first-rate fortress to be inclosed by an army hardly larger than itself. Several illmanaged and costly sorties had been made, on more than one occasion with considerable success, but they had never been pressed home;

Gambetta's

rouse France.

never to all appearance had any serious effort been made to break a way through the Prussian lines. The mere existence of the army there had however drawn away from offensive action a full third of the Prussian forces; its surrender now set them free to secure the predominance of the besiegers of Paris, and to push on to the further subjugation of the country. Gambetta's forces must henceforward expect to be themselves attacked. The news of the fall of Metz produced a fresh revolutionary outbreak in Paris; the members of the Government were for some time in the hands of the mob. The vigour of Ernest Picard, who had escaped capture and was well supported by General Trochu, suppressed the insurrection. A plebiscite confirmed by a large majority the authority of the existing Government, and the defence was actively pushed on.

At the very moment of the insurrection, Thiers returned from his mission. He had been unable to procure any active intervention from

Failure of Thiers' negotiations.

the neutrals, but had received advice and sympathy, and entered at once into negotiations with Bismarck to produce an armistice. But again the negotiations failed. Though the Germans were willing to grant a cessation of arms and to allow the election of a National Assembly, they refused to listen to the suggestion that Paris should be revictualled. It was indeed scarcely to be expected that they should thus surrender the great advantage their lengthened blockade had secured them, and as Thiers made this a necessary condition of the arrangement, his efforts, like those of Jules Favre, proved abortive. The armistice was scarcely refused when for one moment it appeared as though the French might win by arms what they could not secure by negotiation. Before the troops from Metz could enter upon their aggressive movement, General d'Aurelle had set the army of the Loire in motion, and had won over Von der Tann at Coulmiers the only real victory obtained by the French during the war. Moltke recognised the danger. He even for the moment seems to have thought that a withdrawal from Paris might be necessary. But the troops which he hurriedly despatched to Von der Tann's assistance proved sufficient to re-establish the Prussian supremacy in that direction; the French were beaten at Artenay and again at Orleans, and forced to retreat in two directions, thus breaking in half the army of the Loire. The failure was attributed to want of skill in the General. Threatened with a courtmartial, he threw up his commission; the southern army of the Loire was placed in the hands of Bourbaki, while General Chanzy with the remainder withdrew towards Le Mans. There seemed but little