ciple, and you transfer the whole power to the large States. Their combinations cannot be defeated; and whilst they give you a President and Vice President with perfect certainty, and in perpetual rotation, they will laugh at our interference, and deride our impotency.

Permit me, on this point, to appeal to those gentlemen who represent the large States for the correctness of the opinions which I have expressed, and to ask them whether it is consistent with their characters, as guardians of the Constitution, to avail themselves of the moment of party vio lence to pursue this serious and radical change, and to aggrandize the States which they represent, at the expense of those with whom they are connected? To those gentlemen who represent small States, it would not be necessary, under any other circumstances, to make an appeal. The interests of the States to which they belong would not be forgotten. But this is a moment when every object appears to be forgotten but the temporary views of party; and I must be permitted to remind those gentlemen, that if they suffer themselves to be carried along by the torrent, and consent to abandon the interests of the States to which they belong, their votes can never be recalled. If they agree to the resolution, and the amendment should be ingrafted upon the Constitution, the rights thus sacrificed are lost forever. For myself, I should be as well satisfied to see an amendment which should, in express terms, confine the choice of President to certain large States, as to see the resolution on your table. The effect must be precisely the same. But as it is not my intention to consume much of the time of the House, I will waive all further remarks upon this part of the subject.

There is another view of this subject, which furnishes to my mind a conclusive argument against the proposed amendment. In all governments which have hitherto existed, in which the elective principle has extended to the Executive Magistrate, it has been impossible, for any length of time, to guard against corruption in the elections. The danger is not an imaginary one, in this country. The office of President is at this time the great object of ambition, and as the wealth and population of this country increases, the powers and patronage of the President must necessarily be extended. We cannot expect to escape the fate of other Republics. Candidates for the office of President will arise, who, under the assumed garb of patriotism and disinterested benevolence, will disguise the most unprincipled ambition. Corruption will be practised by such candidates, whenever it can be done with success.

It is therefore an object of the first importance, to regulate the election in such a manner as to remove, as far as possible, both the temptation and the means of corruption. If gentlemen will attend to the proposed amendment with reference to this point, they will find that the means and the temptation to corruption must be increased. As the Constitution now stands, the man who aspires to the office of President, can at best but run the race on equal terms with some individual of his

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own party. In order to succeed, he must not only obtain for himself and his associate, a greater number of votes than his own political opponents, but he must obtain more votes than the associate himself. The chances of success are by those means rendered more remote, and however desirable the office may be, the temptation to enter the list, or to make individual exertions, are diminished. The means of corruption must generally be found in the offices at the disposal of the President; and these, it is well known, constitute a fund of great extent, and where the election is brought to such a point, as to rest with two candidates only, this fund may be used with great success. One office may be promised to this Elector as the price of his vote, whilst other offices are promised to other Electors on the same corrupt consideration, and the aspiring candidate may thus mount to the first office in the Government. But so long as your elections remain on this present footing, the means of corruption are diminished; because the aspiring candidate can only promise this corrupt distribution of offices upon eventually succeeding to the Presidency, and as his chances of success are diminished by the mode of election, his promises are of less value to the Elector, and of course will be less frequently made, and more generally rejected.

So far as I can understand the objections which are made to the present mode of election, they are brought within a narrow compass. They consist principally of a general and loose assertion, that it is reasonable and proper Electors should on all occasions designate the man they intend for a particular office; and secondly, that the experience of the last Presidential election shows the neces sity of a designation in this particular case.

If it was true, that one man only could be found within the United States qualified to fill the office of President, there would be force in the first objection. But such is not the fact. There are men to be found in every State, eminently qualified for this important trust. Where then can be the necessity of confining the votes of Electors to a single candidate? Is it an hardship upon an Elector to be compelled to vote for two candidates, when two may so easily be found? And are there not advantages arising from this mode, of a serious and decisive nature? I have already mentioned the interest which the small States have in the arrangement, and I have alluded to the door of corruption which the change will open, and it is not necessary at this time to repeat those opinions. But I must be permitted to ask, is it not of some importance, that the most eminent men should be selected for the offices of President and Vice President? The President is elected for four years; he may die within that period-he may be removed from office, or he may become disqualified to execute its duties; in either of these events the Vice President succeeds to the power. Under the existing arrangement you will secure, as far as human prudence can accomplish it, the most eminent men for these two offices. Each candidate must be voted for as President, and if the Electors fairly execute the Constitution, they will give their votes for those men who are the best qualified to ad

minister the Government. Thus, under every probable event, you will find one of the most eminent of your citizens at the head of your Government. But if the amendment prevails the case must be greatly changed. The man voted for as Vice President will be selected without any decisive view to his qualifications to administer the Government. The office will generally be carried into the market to be exchanged for the votes of some large States for President. And the only criterion which will be regarded as a qualification for the office of Vice President, will be, the temporary influence of the candidate over the Electors of his State. It is in this manner you must expect to obtain a man to fill the second office in the Government, and who must succeed to the power of President, upon every vacancy. The momentary views of party may perhaps be promoted by such arrangements, but the permanent interests of the country are sacrificed.

Far from believing that experience has shown the impropriety of the existing mode of election, I am convinced, so far as it has gone, that it has evinced the wisdom of the arrangement. The general success of the Government is well understood, and exhibits a strong proof in favor of the Constitution, as it now stands. But gentlemen speak of the late election of President by the House of Representatives, and by the manner in which that transaction is described. I am persuaded the circumstances which attended it are not understood. I was a member of the House of Representatives at the time, and I take this occasion to declare that no transaction ever was more grossly misrepresented, than that has been, in every part of this country. When the election commenced in the House of Representatives, every gentleman knew that it must terminate in the choice of one or the other of the two candidates, and the only question was, who could, or would think proper, to persist the longest in support of the candidate he had first chosen. The election was conducted with perfect mildness and good humor; not an expression or look of severity escaped from any one; and when the election was closed, the House proceeded to the ordinary business of the session, as though nothing of particular importance had taken place. The candidates who on that occasion were brought into the House, were both selected by the same political party. It could not be of much importance to that party which should be chosen, nor could it be supposed to be of vast importance to their opponents. The event therefore was certain that an election would be made, and there did not exist the smallest hazard that the Government would be left without a President. Had the election terminated in favor of either candidate, those who brought them into the House must have been satisfied. If the controversy had arisen between two candidates of different political parties, the contest might have been a serious one, but that is a state of things for which the present amendment makes no provision. The public agitation, which it is said by some gentlemen existed at that time, was not called for by the occasion, and must have been harmless. The

DECEMBER, 1803.

people of this country are not at this time, nor were they then disposed to rebel against their Constitution and Government. It was not only the right but the duty of the House of Representatives, to select from the two candidates the man who in their opinion was best qualified to execute the office of President. And if the choice had fallen on the gentleman who now presides in the Senate, "all United America," to use the favorite expression of the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. G. W. CAMPBELL,) would have acquiesced in the decision, and submitted without rebellion or insurrection to the Administration. But there is one important lesson which the experience of that election has taught the people of the United States-it is this, that it becomes the great and solemn duty of Electors, upon all occasions, to give their votes for two men who shall be best qualified for the office of President. The Electors do not, they cannot know which of their own candidates will succeed. They are therefore called upon by every sacred principle to select the most eminent of their fellow-citizens. They will be stimulated on all future occasions, by the experience of the last election, to do, what I trust they have heretofore done, to give their votes for two men, in either of whom they are willing to confide the Executive power of the Government. What then can induce us to change the form of our elections? Some gentlemen have said a great deal about the voice of the people, and declared that the people demand the alteration. This is a language too frequently used within these walls. The purposes for which it is used, I leave to others to explain; but it must be perfectly understood that the clamors of designing men are too often mistaken for the voice of the people. The people are rarely disposed to seek for changes whilst they feel and enjoy the blessings of their old establishments. Be this as it may, we have been sent into this House to obey no voice but that of our own consciences and judgments.

If gentlemen would, upon this occasion, divest themselves of those party considerations, which are so apt to swallow up deliberation, I cannot persuade myself that they would agree to the resolution. When they view the deep wound which it inflicts on the interests of small States-when they see the wide door which it opens to corruption-the certain and pernicious effect which it must produce on the Electors of a Vice President, and the destruction of that balance of power among the States, which was settled by the Constitution, they will at least hesitate, before they give a final vote for the passsage of the resolution. The security given by the Constitution to the interests and influence of the different States, in our great national concerns, forms the only basis on which the Government can rest. Disturb those interests, and the Government must tremble to its foundation. And although the effect may not be immediately perceived, yet the day will come when it will be both seen and felt, and the large States, who have now seized a moment of passion to grasp the power, may regret the hour when they violated the compact which binds us together

Mr. DENNIS.-Encouraged by the indulgent attention with which the remarks of other gentletlemen have been received, I submit to the consideration of the House some observations on the resolution before us. Not having been present when the resolution, which originated in this House, containing alone the discriminating principle, was under consideration, and which it is presumed was fully discussed, because that point was exclusively considered, and deprived of the elaborate and learned argument of the Senate in relation to that principle, I should not have offered myself to the consideration of this House, if there had not been incorporated into the resolution other principles which have been but little investigated, and which, though called subordinate principles, I conceive to be as important as the principle of designation itself.

H. OF R.

For, let it be remembered, that this case will be but little affected by the discriminating principle. When the election shall be brought into this House the increase of States and of parties will in like manner, as in the electoral bodies, render it extremely difficult (even without the influence of fraud or corruption to prevent it,) to effect an union of a sufficient number of members voting by States, where there may be a number of candidates, to give any one of them a majority of the States. A non-election by this House then, by this resolution, is precisely equivalent to an election of the man to the Presidency who was intended as the Vice President; because, by the last member of the resolution, if no choice be made in the House by the fourth of March, then the Vice President, already chosen by the Senate, is to become the President. Thus it is, that by the magical operation of these conflicting principles, you do the very thing you mean to prevent, and elect the man intended as a secondary character to the Chief Executive Magistracy.

As far as I have been able to develope the leading argument in favor of a discrimination, it is, that by such distinction we shall insure the complete control of the public will, and that the man intended as the secondary, may never become the primary character. But, according to the last member of the resolution, instead of assuring to us that object, in every case where no one candidate shall have a majority of all the votes of the Electors, and where by any means or contrivance a choice in this House can be prevented, the person designated as Vice President becomes the President.

In considering the combined but warring principles of this resolution, we are not to consider their tendency simply in the present state of things, but look to a period when our States and our political parties shall have multiplied their numbers. Scarcely does the earth perform her annual revolution without adding to our existing numbers a sister State; and I will venture to predict that many years will not have passed away when this nation will be divided into three or four political parties. As your States and those parties augment their respective members, so will increase the difficulty of procuring a majority of electoral voices in favor of any individual. Admit that the designating principle may render it less probable that the election shall be brought into this House, as in the case of a tie, the case of a nonelection by the electoral bodies, for the reasons before assigned, on account of no one candidate having a majority of votes, may frequently occur.

lated by a love of power and possessed of allurements to acquire it, may suggest and put into motion in this House, to preponderate the balance on the side of non-election; which non-election is tantamount to an election by the Senate of their President to be the President of the United States.

Nor will the weight of that body be realized alone when the election shall be brought here; but may be exerted in the first instance to multiply candidates, perplex and divide the electoral bodies, and prevent, in them, a majority in favor of any one candidate; so as to bring as many as practicable into this body, in order that they may again perplex and obstruct it.

Surely, Mr. Speaker, the Senate ought to have been satisfied, (determined as they have been to innovate on the Constitution in a point never contemplated by any but themselves,) to have provided that the election of their President, a secondary character, should vest him with the powers, emoluments, and patronage of the high office of President of this great nation; so long and no longer than an election should be made. This would have taken away that strong inducement to intrigue and corruption, which results from exhibiting to human frailty the important price of the Chief Magistracy of this country, for four succeeding years. I was about to move such a modification or extension of that principle in Committee of the Whole; but we were told, nay, the friends of the principle of designation were told, that all efforts at amendment, even for changing an obscure and unintelligible phraseology, differently construed by those who held this language too, would be vain and illusory. These intimations have since grown into fact, in the rejection of the resolution