DECEMBER, 1803.

Amendment to the Constitution.

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factions. Most sincerely, sir, do I wish that the American public could have been spectators of this whole transaction, or even that every word and every act which has passed within these walls on this day could go forth to the world. I am aware that this is impossible. But were it otherwise, I would willingly trust the issue of this question to the decision which should be given to the other. I would fearlessly leave the public mind to decide from what quarter party spirit and irritation have been manifested; by whom that conduct has been pursued which is calculated to reduce this House from the station which we ought to hold, and to lessen us in the eyes of the nation.

vote for it. Whatever gentlemen may profess, they cannot expect us at this late hour to go into a fundamental view of the principles this amendment contains. I therefore repeat the motion to adjourn, that we may to-morrow have the opportunity of discussing the merits of a question so important to the interests of the States.

been expressed in the course of this discussion from various quarters, that I am anxious for its adoption. The gentleman says that we had as well alter the ratio of representation from thirtythree thousand to five hundred thousand, and thereby deprive the smaller States of any vote on this floor. Surely the gentleman does not mean to say either that Congress have not the power to enlarge the ratio of representation, or that such increase would be injurious to the smaller States. The gentleman has expressed too great an attachment to the Constitution not to be well acquainted with it. He must know that each State is entitled by it to at least one Representative on this floor, and that by an increase of the ratio of representation, the number of Representatives might Mr. R. GRISWOLD.-The gentleman from Virbe reduced to that of the States, and the influ- ginia cannot expect us at this late hour to go into ence of the largest he only co-extensive with that a discussion of the merits of this important quesof the smallest member of the Union; and this tion. He has himself cautiously avoided going was a well known objection urged to the adoption extensively into them. Instead of showing us of the Constitution. But at last the gentleman that the amendment is not incompatible with the from North Carolina candidly confesses that he spirit of the Confederacy, he has contented himis averse to any alteration of the Constitution self with stating that though he objects to one whatsoever. One of my greatest objections to the part of it, it contains one principle to which he is Constitution is the difficulty of obtaining desira- friendly, and therefore he will vote for it. Withble amendments, which increases with the increas-out assigning his reasons, he simply says he will ing number of the States. Thinking differently from the gentleman on this point, he cannot be surprised at my acting differently. But he has surely little cause of alarm when he recollects that we possess merely the initiative in this business, and that the assent of three-fourths of the State Legislatures is necessary to give validity to what we shall do. I consider this as an answer to the charge of precipitancy, thrown out by the gentleman from Connecticut, even if it were not fully answered by the history of this amendment. One of the same nature had passed that House during the present and the preceding session. It had been the theme of conversation and discussion, both in and out of doors; and now we are charged with precipitancy, although the resolution had to pass through the ordeal of threefourths of the States. But a more serious charge is brought against this amendment. It is denounced as opening an endless source of venality and intrigue. But to my mind the present system is more favorable to such mischiefs, and it is because I regard it as the death-blow to all intrigue; because I do not wish chance to preside where there ought to be choice; because I want no blind ballot, under cover of which intrigue or corruption may take shelter, that I advocate the resolution before you. From the manner in which some gentlemen have expressed themselves on this subject, it would appear that they had had personal knowledge of some such agency heretofore. Whether such enginery has been brought into action I cannot undertake to affirm; on this subject I am totally in the dark, nor do I wish to be enlightened.

Much too has been said of the spirit of party. exhibited on this occasion, and on what is due to decorum on so solemn a subject. We ought not, we are told, to touch the Constitution under the irritation produced by the struggle of contending

The question was immediately taken on adjourning and lost-ayes 47, noes 75.

Mr. ELLIOT.-As an adjournment has been denied, it would not be considered as out of order, even at this late hour, to answer the elaborate speech of the gentleman from Virginia. I rise however to answer only one part of it. I wish, with the gentleman from Virginia, that a correct view of the whole proceedings of this day may go to the public, that they may be enabled to judge whether there has not been manifested, during the course of this business, rash precipitation, indecorum, and party irritation. With the gentleman from Virginia I am totally in the dark as to any intrigue heretofore exercised. That gentleman says, from certain circumstances, he is induced to believe some persons know of some such intrigue. This I conceive to be an attack on the minority which ought not to pass unnoticed. How far it is correct to impute such motives to gentlemen entitled-if not by the brilliancy of their genius, yet by the public suffrageto the same degree of respect with himself, I will not undertake to say. It is no privilege of a Representative to say, I believe you a corrupt, intriguing—

Mr. J. RANDOLPH wished the SPEAKER to decide whether he had said any such thing.

Mr. ELLIOT. Such was my understanding of the gentleman's expression; the allusion was of a peculiar nature, and might be intended to impeach the motives of men of different political opinion from himself, or to impeach the motives of one or

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Amendment to the Constitution.

DECEMBER, 1803.

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. The House resumed the consideration of the question which was depending yesterday at the time of adjournment, that the House do now agree to the resolution of the Senate, in the form of a concurrent resolution of the two Houses, proposing an article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, respecting future elections of President and Vice President."

two members who generally agree with him. I know not his view in making the observation; but if the proceedings of this day shall correctly go to the public, I shall be much mistaken if they will not be of opinion that there has been more indecorous language in the speeches of that gentleman than in all the others put together. I hope the language and conduct of gentlemen on this day may be recorded; I hope this will become a subject of investigation with the people; and I hope that posterity will have no occasion to impute to them party spirit, rash precipitancy, indecorum, or anything else, that tends to lessen the respect which it is my sincere wish that the measures of this House should always command. I fear much, however, that the proceedings exhibited to-day will constitute a scene on which pos-lieve the people of the United States will concur terity will not delight to dwell, that they will wish it blotted from the annals of history, and that gentlemen themselves will, in the cool moments of reflection, regret that it ever existed. With one more remark I shall close what I have to say. If in the course of this debate any imputation has been aimed at my moral or political integrity, or if any hereafter shall be made from any quarter, however clothed in the language of brilliancy or decorated with the flowers of genius, I shall on all occasions meet it with contempt. I feel bold in the conscious purity of my motives, and I believe that the people I represent will never charge me with corruption or intrigue.

On motion of Mr. SMILIE the House adjourned about nine o'clock.-Ayes 65.

THURSDAY, December 8.

Mr. J. RANDOLPH, from the Committee of Ways and Means, on a resolution referred to them touching the expediency of discontinuing the office of Commissioner of Loans in the several States, made a report, with a concluding resolution, that it is inexpedient to discontinue said office.

The report, with accompanying documents from the Secretary of the Treasury, was referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to divide the Indiana Territory into two separate governments, was read twice, and committed to Mr. LUCAS, Mr. MORROW, Mr. CHITTENDEN, Mr. LYON, and Mr. CLAGGETT.

Mr. GREGG.-Entertaining the opinion, Mr. Speaker, that the amendment to the Constitution now on your table had been already sufficiently discussed, I did hope that the question on its final passage would have been decided yesterday. I thought the minority could have no just cause of complaint that they had not been heard, and I bewith me in this sentiment, when they attend to the lengthy speeches on the subject, with which the newspapers have been filled for several weeks. The great anxiety of the majority, discovered by their loud and repeated calls for the question, convinced me that they also were fully satisfied with what had been said, and were willing to rest the decision on the discussion that had taken place. It appeared, however, that one gentleman of the majority entertained a different opinion. At a late hour last night he again entered the field of discussion, and delivered his sentiments at considerable length. A decent respect for the minority requires that they should be heard in reply. I shall now attend with patience to gentlemen on both sides; and, although I had intended to take no part in the debate, I shall ask the indulgence of the House while I briefly state the reasons that will influence my vote, and notice the most prominent objections that have been urged by gentlemen in the opposition.

I am willing to acknowledge, Mr. Speaker, that the Constitution far surpasses in excellence, nay, that it is infinitely superior to the constitution of another country, that has been styled "the most stupendous monument of human wisdom." I believe it to be the best that now is, or perhaps that ever was, in the world. The names of those sages, to whose wisdom and patriotism we are indebted for it, will, I trust, be always recollected by the American people with gratitude and pleasure. But, sir, it is a Constitution of experiment. The wise framers of it, with all their sagacity, could A memorial of sundry sugar refiners, citizens not foresee how far its various provisions would, of, and residents in, the State of Pennsylvania, in practice, correspond with their views, or anwas presented to the House and read, stating cer- swer their expectations. It looked fair in theory, tain inconveniences and losses to which the me- but its real excellence was to be tested by expemorialists have been, and are now, subjected, in con-rience, and, therefore, a provision was inserted for sequence of a construction given at the Treasury introducing amendments, when experience should Department to an act passed the sixth of April, prove the propriety of adopting them. This, it one thousand eight hundred and two, entitled "An must be acknowledged, is an admirable provision. act to repeal the internal taxes," in the case of and also a convincing evidence of the candor of duties accruing on sugars refined within the Uni- the Convention. Conscious of their own fallited States prior to the first day of July, in the bility as men, they did not, as some have since same year, which were not delivered from the re- done, proclaim the Constitution to be perfect. fineries until after that period; and praying that They foresaw that experience might discover imCongress will take the premises into considera- perfections, and, therefore, they inserted the fifth tion, and grant such relief therein as to their wis-article, declaring that "the Congress, whenever dom shall seem meet. 'two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessa

ry, shall propose amendments to this Constitution; or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a 'convention for proposing amendments, which, in ' either case, shall be valid to all intents and pur'poses as part of this Constitution," &c.

The article respecting the election of President and Vice President, I have understood, was suddenly adopted by the Convention. A variety of modes of choosing the Chief Magistrate had been suggested, none of which received the approbation of a majority. Fatigued with the subject, all parties united in support of the mode contained in the article as it now stands, which was not proposed until all the other plans had been rejected. Plausible, however, as it appears, and supported, as it has been, by the opinions of very eminent men, it is on experience found to be imperfect. The result of the last election evinces this beyond the possibility of a doubt. Had the discriminating principle now contended for been at that time in the Constitution, could the Electors have designated on their ballots who they voted for as President and who as Vice President, no person will pretend to say they would not have made a President, and by that means saved the country from that anxious solicitude, from those distressing fears and alarms which were excited by the uncertainty and delay which attended that election in the House of Representatives. This single experience appears to me superior to a volume of abstract reasoning on the subject. It is, in my view, an unanswerable argument in favor of the amendment.

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ing it, I did expect would have given it their unanimous support.

To obtain such an amendment as would confine itself to the principle of discrimination, was the only object I had originally in view. That principle I consider as of the first importance. It would, I think, be sufficient to guard against the inconvenience attending the present mode of election. If the Electors are authorized to designate on their ballots who they vote for as President and who as Vice President, there is little danger of their failing to make an election, while the country continues to be divided, as it is at present, into two great political parties. I would even now prefer a proposition embracing that single principle to the amendment on the table, not only because I think it adequate to the attainment of the object in view, but, also, because I believe, in that form, it would be most likely to receive the sanction of the States. There is, I acknowledge, one feature in it, as it now stands, which recommends it to my approbation, and gives it, in my opinion, a decided preference to the proposition which went from this House to the Senate. In the event of the Electors not making a President, the House of Representatives were, by our proposition, restricted in their choice to the five highest on the list of the persons voted for as President, provided no one had a majority. By the amendment on the table, they are confined to the three highest on the list. I prefer the number three before five, because it evidently brings the choice nearer to the will of a majority of the people. This was so fully discussed, and so clearly elucidated on a former occasion, that it would be an unpardonable trespass on the patience of the House to dilate further on it at this time.

Another reason in support of the amendment, which has great weight with me, is, the public sentiment being so long and so loudly expressed in its favor. Several years have elapsed since it But the most objectionable part of this amendwas first brought into view. It originated in the ment, in the opinion of many gentlemen, and East; it has been echoed from the South, and the against which the gentleman from Vermont, in people of the West are also calling for its adop- particular, has levelled his keenest darts, is that tion. It has been advocated in turns by men of which vests the Vice President with power to all political parties. A federal member from the discharge the duties of President, in the event of federal State of New Hampshire, if I recollect a President not being elected. The passage stands right, first introduced it into Congress. A prop- thus: "And if the House of Representatives shall osition, the same in substance, was afterwards re 'not choose a President, whenever the right of newed by a federal member from the then feder-choice shall devolve on them, before the fourth al State of South Carolina. In the two last in- day of March next following, then the Vice stances it has been brought forward by republican President shall act as President," &c. members, from republican States-first, by one of It is acknowledged that, at first view, the prinmy colleagues from Pennsylvania, a republican ciple contained in this provision appears liable to State, and, during the present session, by a gen-objections, but it must be admitted that much tleman from Virginia, which is said to be also re- may be urged in its defence; nay, I will even go publican. New York, Vermont, Tennessee, Ohio, so far as to say, that on a fair and candid investiand, I believe, Kentucky, have, by their Legisla- gation, the objections will lose their weight, and tures, expressed their approbation of the measure, the principle be found not to be incorrect, considand invited its adoption. Federalists and Repub-ering the bearing it may eventually have on the licans, in every part of the country, thus uniting people, on the Electors, and on the House of Repin recommending the measure, is conclusive evi-resentatives, in making a President. Let us, sir, dence that a majority of the people, however they may differ on other political questions, are in favor of the leading principle contained in the amendment. This circumstance led me to conclude that it would have received but little opposition in this House. The members from those States that had been most forward in recommend

for a moment, examine the probable tendency of the principle. The possibility, or if you will, the probability, of the Vice President being placed in the Presidential chair, through the obstinacy or neglect of the House of Representatives to make an election, may have a powerful influence over the Electors, and produce a concentration of their

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Amendment to the Constitution.

DECEMBER, 1803.

The objections that have been raised to the amendment generally, I think, all resolve themselves into two. First, the danger of innovating on the Constitution, and, second, the jeopardy in which the small States will be placed by its adop tion.

I perfectly accord in sentiment with gentlemen in all their remarks respecting the great caution to be observed in touching the Constitution. No abstract, theoretic reasoning could induce me to alter it in many of its parts; but when on experience it is found to be defective, as in the case in the present instance, I think we are bound to exercise our Constitutional privilege in obviating that defect.

votes in favor of one candidate. The same con- death, resignation, or inability to discharge the sideration may operate as a considerable excite-powers and duties of the said office, the same shall ment to the people, to be careful in their selection devolve on the Vice President.”—Art. 2, sec. 1. of characters as candidates for the office of Vice This is only adding one other possible, and barely President. The additional chance now given of possible, for it is not a probable case of vacancy of his being called to discharge the duties of Presi- that office, and it is securing against all the dandent, will determine their choice in favor of such gers and confusion to be dreaded from an intermen as are entitled to their esteem and confidence, regnum. next to the persons whom they may nominate for President. It will also operate as a stimulus to the House of Representatives to make an election. They will not be likely through obstinacy to suffer themselves to be divested of the power of making a President, when that power constitutionally devolves upon them. They will be very reluctant to yield it to the Senate. Their immediate re sponsibility will not permit them either to refuse or neglect making a choice. They will consider themselves more immediately the organ of the public will, even for the purpose of election, than the Senate. They are so. The long period for which the Senators are appointed, clearly justifies this position. But without resorting to arguments, I will elucidate it by an example taken from the State in which I live, (Pennsylvania.) At the late election for President, the members of the House of Representatives from that State gave a vote for the present Chief Magistrate. Had the vote been given by the Senators of the State, there is no doubt it would have been different. The question then was, who speaks the voice of the people? Look to the result for an answer. As soon as the Constitutional period expired for which their Senators had been appointed, they supplied their places by successors, whose political opinions they supposed to be in coincidence with those of their members who composed the majority at the Presidential election.

But there is one provision in this part of the amendment which is certainly of very considerable importance. As I have several times observed, I again repeat, I do not think the Electors will be likely to fail in making an election. Should they, however, not agree, I cannot conceive that the House of Representatives will be so lost to a sense of duty, as either to refuse, or neglect complying with their Constitutional obligations. But should an election fail there also, we will have by this provision a person Constitutionally vested with Presidential power, until a President is elected. Surely it is better to have a Constitutional officer to discharge these important functions, (and that officer chosen too in the first instance, with an eye to such contingency, infinitely preferable,) than to suffer the office to become vacant, and thereby expose ourselves to all the evils incident to such a state of things, as would be unavoidably produced thereby. I could have wished that this provision had extended further, and directed the vacancy to be supplied by an extraordinary election within one year from the commencement of such vacancy. But as it is providing for a remote contingency, one which may not, and I hope will not happen in a century, I think we may trust it as it is. As the Constitution now stands, "In case of the removal of the President from office, or his

With respect to the objections drawn from the danger to which the small States are to be exposed if the amendment prevails, I confess, Mr. Speaker, my mind is not capable to comprehend their force. From whence do gentlemen derive those fears and alarms with which they endeavor to persuade us their minds are so distressed? Do they know, or have they ever heard of the large States forming combinations against the interest of the small ones? I live in a large State, and I declare I never heard such a thing even hinted. Such an idea, I am persuaded, would receive no currency in that State. Such a combination is unnatural-it cannot obtain.

Should local considerations ever have any influence on the election of our Chief Magistrate, that period I believe is far distant. While the country is divided into two great political parties, (and I believe it will long continue to be so divided,) each party will endeavor to select the most prominent character, whose political sentiments are in unison with their own, and place him in the Presidential chair, without any regard to local situation. His politics will be the criterion by which he will be judged, without any reference to his being an inhabitant of the Eastern, Middle, or Southern sections of the Union.

How far would the ambition of the small States extend? Look into the Constitution, and see what ample provision is there made for their security. In the Senate, a distinct and entire branch of the Legislature, they are placed on the same footing with the largest States. There, Rhode Island, which is but a ninth part of Massachusetts, has an equal vote with that large and populous State; there, Delaware is on equal ground with Pennsylvania, although it contains but little more than one-eighteenth part of her population. In this House, also, their weight is equal to that of the large States in the important election of President, when that power devolves upon the House. The Constitution declares, "that in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken

Upon the whole, the objections to this measure do not appear to me to be by any means conclu- I am inclined to think that the designating prinsive; and the arguments in its favor are of such ciple will remove every solid objection to the preweight as to satisfy me that the vote I shall give sent provisions of the Constitution. I wish not is in conformity with the Constitution, is sanc- to touch the principles of that instrument. Not tioned by the experience already had on this sub-changing its principles, I wish the election to reject, and is in unison with the wishes of a great majority of the people in every part of the country. Mr. EUSTIS considered the subject important, as it went to effect a considerable change in the existing provisions of the Constitution, in the mode of electing the Chief Magistrate; and also important, as it had long occupied the attention of the Sth CoN.-23