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porate capacity as States. But in case of a failure of choice in the first mode, then the second, of choosing by States, is to be pursued, whereby the former States have an equal vote with the larger States.

In no other place than on this floor are the smaller States on an equal footing with the larger States in the choice of the President of the United States. It follows then, of course, that the greater the chance of bringing the States to a vote on this floor, the more advantageous it is to the smaller States, as here the smaller States are as powerful as the larger States. By the Constitution, as it now stands, there are two chances for a choice of President on this floor: 1st, when there are more persons than one who have a Constitutional majority of votes and are equal in number; 2d, when there is no person who has a Constitutional majority. Only one of the above cases can happen at a time; but there is always a chance for one of the two to happen. But, by the proposed amendment, the first before-mentioned chance can never happen; it is wholly taken away, and only one possible chance of voting on this floor by States left. For, when your ballots designate who is voted for as President, it never can happen that more persons than one can have a Constitutional majority of votes. One chance then of voting on this floor by States being taken away by the proposed amendment, it follows irresistibly that the smaller States will be injured, and the larger States benefitted. I ask then, sir, if gentlemen representing the larger States can be sincere, when they declare that they mean not to infringe upon the rights of the smaller States, as secured by this article of the Constitution, and still give their vote for the present resolution? The one in my opinion will contradict the other.

I have the honor of representing one of the larger States, but I feel no wish to lessen the rights of the smaller States, as secured by this article of the Constitution, and I trust my vote will correspond with my declaration.

I also ask, sir, if gentlemen who represent some of the smaller States are willing to give up so important a right as is secured them by this article of the Constitution? Gentlemen may think they are answering the wishes of their constituents, but I am sure if their constituents fully understood the principles of this article of the Constitution, they never would thank the gentlemen for their votes in favor of the resolution.

I well know, sir, that at first view it appears plausible that the ballots should designate who is voted for as President. I also confess, sir, that when the subject was first mentioned to me, I could see no solid objection why it should not be. But, sir, when I examine the nature of our Government, the clashing interests of the several States, the balance of power and influence necessary to be formed between the larger and smaller States, and trace all the minute ways and means by which this power and influence may operate. I find many objections. The more this article of the Constitution is investigated, the more will its principles be admired.

H. OF R.

The present mode of bringing forward candidates for the office of President and Vice President is the least liable to call forth art, intrigue, and corruption; the uncertainty of the event and the difficulty of making arrangements are strong checks to the artful and designing. But the moment the mode pointed out by this resolution is adopted, the door for intrigue and corruption is open; the candidates and their friends can calculate with certainty and apply the means direct; the power of party, influence of office, art, cunning, intrigue, and corruption, will all be used, and used to effect, because the object is certain. I would ask, sir, if this is a proper time to alter the Constitution? The public mind is agitated with violent party rage. Cool, calm reasoning is not to be expected. The general good must and will yield to party purposes, because parties will consider that to be for public good, which immediately promotes their own views. In such a state of things, I think an attempt to alter the Constitution not advisable. Again, sir, I believe it is better to suffer a small inconvenience, should any exist, than to attempt an alteration; for the habít of compliance on the part of the people with a rule of Government, is of as much importance to give effect to that rule, as the soundness of the principle contained in the rule itself. By altering the articles of the Constitution for every trivial pretext, you destroy that sacred regard which every citizen ought to have for the Constitution. For these reasons I shall assuredly vote against the resolution.

Mr. HUGER-Much as has been said, Mr. Speaker, and much of our time as has been already taken up, since the commencement of the present session, in discussing the resolution now under consideration, you will no doubt have remarked, that the debate has heretofore been almost exclusively carried on by gentlemen of one particular side of the House; neither will it have escaped your observation, that numerous as have been the speakers, and various and lengthy as have been their arguments, scarcely one of them has deemed it necessary to discuss the general merits of the question, or to show the propriety of making the proposed alteration in our national compact. The necessity, propriety, and expediency of making such an alteration, would seem, indeed, to have been regarded as points conceded on all hands, as constituting a proposition, so plain, so self-evident, so unencumbered with anything like a doubt, that it would have been superfluous to bestow a moment's thought on, or to adduce a single argument in support of it. The gentlemen, therefore, who have preceded me, taking it for granted that an alteration must, and would of course, be made, have confined themselves almost exclusively to the consideration of the manner in which it was to be brought about, and the extent to which it was at this time to be carried. I have listened with the utmost attention for several days past to the various propositions which they have presented to the consideration of the House. I have been greatly edified by their arguments and have admired the ingenuity and ability with which the

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respective propositions have been supported. You will permit me to add, sir, that I have heard with infinite pleasure, the declarations and assurances of attachment to our present happy Constitution, which have been so frequently expressed by al most every gentleman who has taken any part in the debate. It has given me peculiar satisfaction to hear these sentiments repeated again and again, by characters no less respectable for their talents, than distinguished for their influence in the community. The fears and apprehensions which, I will candidly acknowledge, had made a deep and painful impression on my mind, have been greatly lessened, in some degree removed, by the assurances of unfeigned acquiescence in, and perfect contentment with the present Constitution of the United States, and by the expressions of unequivocal disapprobation of every other alteration in the national compact, (save the one now proposed,) which have fallen from quarters, from whence, I will not deny, that I had anticipated and apprehended sentiments of a very contrary tendency. But whilst I give full and perfect credit, Mr. Speaker, to the assertions of honorable gentlemen; whilst I rejoice most sincerely that the members of this respectable body one and all accord, and unite in one common attachment to that compact which forms the bond of our Union; whilst I deprecate the idea of casting anything like an imputation on the motives of any member on this floor, I cannot but lament that an exception is made in one instance, and that the Constitution is not allowed to remain unaltered and as it now stands. I impute not, I repeat it, any improper motives to the friends of the resolution at present under consideration. The rage, however, for change and innovation has, of late years, spread itself with a rapidity unequalled among the nations of the earth; and we have seen and heard enough out of doors and in our own country, to authorize caution, and to excite the apprehension that there are many among us to whom great and material alterations in our national compact would be more than aceptable. Obsta principiis is an oldand trite, but, on most occasions, a sound and safe maxim. In times like the present, I deem it our only safeguard-the sheet-anchor of our political salvation. This nation has experienced too immediate, and too fortunate a change in its political situation and prospects, since the adoption of the present Constitution; we have increased too rapidly in wealth, in strength, and in national prosperity, and we enjoy too great a portion of present happiness under its benign auspices to assent easily, and at a moment's warning, to many great and evidently serious alterations in it. The most enthusiastic advocate of innovations would not venture to propose such; for it is evident the public mind is not yet sufficiently prepared to receive them. It is only by degrees, and by undermining under plausible pretexts, and at favorable moments, first one, and then another of the main supports of the fabric, that we shall be exposed to see it, sooner or later, begin to totter, then crumble, and I fear bury us in its ruins.

Here, then, on the merits of the Constitution,

OCTOBER, 1803.

as it was presented to us by the Convention, as it now is, I take my stand. Upon this ground I am unequivocally opposed to the alteration proposed, for I feel the strongest conviction that, if it obtains, we shall have given a deadly wound to the national compact, we shall have effaced one of its leading features, we shall have signed the death warrant of one of the vital and most important principles upon which it was originally established.

I have already observed, Mr. Speaker, that the gentlemen who preceded me in the present debate have avoided everything like a discussion of the general merits of the question, and confined themselves almost exclusively to the consideration of the manner in which the proposed alteration is to be brought about, and the extent to which it is at this time to be carried.

Some observations have, nevertheless, fallen from two gentlemen, both of them from the very respectable State of Virginia, which appear to me peculiarly worthy of attention. The one (Mr. CLOPTON) has presented to us a view of the subject, which, although I by no means think the correct one, is evidently that in which most of the gentlemen in this House have regarded it, and in which persons out of doors are for the most part wont to consider this, and indeed every other Constitutional question. I have listened to him however with great pleasure, and from the ingenuity and information which pervaded such of his arguments as I could fully comprehend, I feel much regret that the utmost attention on my part, owing partly to the feebleness of his voice, and partly to the unfavorable situation of his seat, did not enable me always to connect his ideas and arguments, and perfectly to understand him. This gentleman seems, for the moment, to have forgotten that the Government under which we live is formed upon Federative no less than upon Republican principles; and though wishing to introduce an important alteration in our national compact, puts the compact itself, the spirit with which it was formed, and the vital principles upon which it was established, entirely out of the question. He takes an abstract view of the subject, as if it had no connexion whatever with other parts and principles of the compact, carries us back to a state of nature, and seems to regard it as a radical error in the Constitution that the provisions and modifications it contains are not solely founded upon the broad basis of population and numbers. He talks to us of the rights of man in a state of nature, of the origin of the social compact, of the foundation upon which all Governments ought to be formed, viz: the will of the people; and, drawing his inference from these pure, unmixed, and abstract principles and theories, thinks, whilst he shows us what would be the most eligible mode of providing for the Executive branch of Government about to be formed for the protection of the people, just rising for the first time into political existence, he proves triumphantly and unanswerably that such too ought to be the mode adopted by a Union like ours, composed of so many distinct and independent sovereignties, of so old a date,

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and having such various, distinct, and complicated views and interests. Let me not, however, be misunderstood; I am not finding fault with, or condemning in the abstract, the principles laid down by the honorable member. Still less would I be understood to deny that the Constitution has been formed upon the broad basis of the public good, and the will of the people of the respective States. I well know, and it is for that very reason I feel so sincere an attachment to it, that the Federal compact is founded upon liberal and genuine republican principles; but let not gentlemen in the meantime forget that the Government under which we live is of a federative nature; and that these general, unmixed, and abstract principles, upon which we are called on exclusively to act, were then modified and practically applied to the wants, prejudices, and clashing interests of a numerous and increasing population, divided into a number of distinct sovereignties, spread over a vast extent of country by that very compact in which it is now proposed to make so material and essential an alteration. This is the true point of view in which the subject should be taken up; and I am happy in finding the ideas of the gentleman's colleague, to whom I before alluded, (Mr. J. RANDOLPH,) accord so perfectly with my own in the present instance, and that he too is of opinion, that this is the true and proper point of view in which not only the present but every other proposition to alter or amend the Federal compact, should invariably be considered. Sir, I am truly happy to recollect that the sentiments of that gentleman and my own accord so perfectly on this part of the subject, for, exclusively of the advantages which the weight of his authority must afford to my argument, I am free to acknowledge that it has frequently been a source of regret to me to find a difference in our view of things led me on so many occasions to differ in opinion with most of the companions of my youth whom I have met on this floor, and whom I have for so many years been in the habit of regarding as persons of honor and worth.

It was stated, and in my humble opinion correctly stated, by the honorable member from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) of whom I have last spoken, some days since, that, when we were about to make any alteration in the compact which unites these States together, it behooved us not to take into view merely what we thought, individually, it ought to have been, or wished it to be, nor what shape, were we in convention for that purpose, we should give it; but rather to consider what shape had already been given to it, and what the compact, as it presents itself to us in the Constitution, now is. Taking up the subject then under this point of view, allow me, sir, to put these questions to the House. Let me ask. what is the Constitution of the United States? From what sources did it originate? In what manner, by whom, from what causes, upon what principles, in what spirit, was it originally adopted? Is it not a federative Government, agreed upon between thirteen distinct and separate sovereignties, for their mutual defence and protection?

H. OF R.

Is it not, in its essence, a compact, a bargain, a perfect compromise of the interests, powers, influence, and rights of a number of independent societies, who have united for their common advantage, and who are no further bound or pledged to each other than by the articles and conditions in the written contract-the Constitution-which has been acceded to by them all? And is it not upon the spirit, in which the conditions of that compact was originally formed, that every amendment to, or alteration in it, should be predicated? These questions must all be necessarily answered in the affirmative. The inhabitants of these United States did not then, in forming the Federal Constitution, act in mass as one people, nor can the abstract principles borrowed from different authors on the primeval formation of political societies apply to them. The worn-out theory of a number of insulated beings assembled together in an extensive plain, and led by their common wants and necessities to form themselves into a body politic, cannot be applied to the Federal Government, nor can inferences drawn from notions of this kind afford correct grounds upon which to build or support alterations and amendments in the national compact.

Thirteen Colonies, at this time composing the United States, spread over an extensive continent, having been threatened with a privation of their rights and liberties, were induced to form a league, offensive and defensive, and to unite for their mutual and common defence. After a bloody though not inglorious contest, they severed themselves forever from the mother country, and they became and were acknowledged as thirteen independent and distinct Republics or Sovereignties. Under what gloomy and critical circumstances they found themselves for some few years after the close of the war, it would be superfluous for me to detail to this House. Let it suffice to say, that their situation was such as seriously to alarm all classes of our citizens, and to threaten complete anarchy, perhaps political dissolution, unless some bond of union, better adapted to their wants and necessities than the original Confederacy, could be established. That band of worthies therefore, as they have been aptly styled, were sent from twelve, I believe, of the States, who, having met together in convention, ultimately formed that compact, which, having been since ratified by all the States, now happily unites us in one great Union. But by whom and by what authority were the members of the Convention delegated? Whom did they represent when assembled together? They were not, it must be acknowledged, even in the degree that the members of this House are, the immediate representatives of the people, inhabiting that part of this vast continent in which the United States are comprised. They were not selected by the people at large, nor did they represent them in their original and individual capacities. No, sir, they were sent to represent the interests and views of thirteen distinct sovereignties; they were appointed by the governments of the different States, and they held their authority from the States, as

H. OF R.

Amendment to the Constitution.

OCTOBER, 1803.

States, and not from the people of the United very unequal in size, strength, wealth, and popuStates generally and indiscriminately. When met lation. The basis of a republican government, therefore, in convention, their object was not to however, is no doubt the will of the people; and form one general consolidated government for that will could only be expressed and brought into the inhabitants scattered over this vast territory, action in a country so extensive as ours, by reprebut to modify still further, and to draw still closer sentation and elections. How then was that repthe bands of alliance, by which these States were resentation to be apportioned and those elections already connected. And it cannot surely be for- organized? To adopt the most common and simgotten, that one of the strongest objections, one ple principle in the abstract, and allow the repreof those most insisted on against the Constitution, sentation to depend entirely on numbers, and the was, that federative principles had not been suffi- elections to be made indiscriminately and without ciently retained, or rather that they had been to- modification by the people at large, would have tally abandoned, and the Constitution approached been to put an end at once and at one blow to all too nearly to a consolidation of the different mem- State sovereignty, to amalgamate the inhabitants bers of the Confederacy, and one general national of thirteen free and independent Republics into Government. It is not necessary for me here to one common mass, and to place the smaller and detail the difficulties, which opposed themselves more feeble completely and forever at the mercy to the formation and adoption of any compact, of the more powerful and larger States. But was more efficient than that of the old Confederacy, this done? was such a result desirable? would nor would the opportunities I have had of know- the States at that day have acquiesced in any ing them, (for I was not only under age, but ab- similar arrangement? Most certainly not; and, sent from America, when the Convention met) consequently, a totally different modification and enable me to do justice to the subject. Every compromise took place. The Legislative departone knows, however, that difficulties without num- ment of the Government was divided into two ber did present themselves, and the Convention distinct branches- a Senate and House of Reprewas more than once on the eve of dissolving sentatives. In the latter, it is true, the principle itself without agreeing upon anything. It is a of numbers and population was, to a certain degree, fact equally well ascertained, that the great bone adopted, yet still under very important modificaof contention, the point of all others which it was tions, and with evident deviation from the abstract most difficult to adjust, was the jarring interests principle. In the first place, a certain class of and opposite pretensions of the large and small people, who unfortunately existed in one portion States. This was the point upon which the of the Union, though not allowed any immediate whole business turned, and gentlemen will see at interest themselves in the Government, and reonce the justice of the remark, when they recol-garded rather as property than as beings entitled lect that although every other amendment whatever, after the year eighteen hundred and eight, may be made to the Constitution, by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States, yet a single exception is made, and it is particularly specified, that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

Why then this single exception, but because the interest and opposite pretensions of the large and small States were the great bone of contention, and the equal suffrage in the Senate the great, the essential compromise between these conflicting interests and pretensions. But this, though the most important, the sine qua non of any compromise, was by no means the only compromise which took place between them.

to any civil or political rights, were included at a certain ratio in the calculation of the number of Representatives who were to have a seat in this House. This difficult and knotty point happily settled, it was in the second place determined that the members of this body, though understood to be the immediate representatives of the people, should not be elected by the people of the United States at large, as one people; but its share of the whole representation according to the ratio and in conformity to the compromise above specified, was apportioned to each respective State, and is to be exclusively elected by the people of that State. Notwithstanding every modification, however, which could be devised, it was evident, and perfectly understood, that although the smaller States would have a voice and proportionate vote, yet The great outlines of the Constitution were, I the interest and the will of the larger must virtualpresume, Mr. Speaker, agreed on without much ly prevail in the House of Representatives, and difficulty, and pretty generally acquiesced in. It that they would in fact dispose of this body at was understood on all hands that the Government their will. As a partial check, therefore, as some should be formed on republican principles-that little safeguard against this overweening power the great departments of which it must necessarily on their part, the federative principle was comconsist should be distinct, and, as far as possible, pletely retained in its utmost purity, and without independent of each other. The difficulty was in the smallest modification, in the other branch of the detail, and more especially in respect to the Legislature, the Senate; and not only an equal quantum of State sovereignty which was to be vote and representation is given to all the States, yielded to the Union, and the degree of influence however large, or however small, but the members which was to be respectively given up or retained who compose the Senate are not even to be electby the large and small States. Both were at thated by the people of the several States, but are to time independent of each other, and perfectly be chosen by, and immediately to represent, the equal in their rights and sovereign powers, though government of each individual State. The diffi

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culties which presented themselves in organizing the Legislative department of the Government, being thus surmounted and compromised, another question no less embarrassing and difficult to solve, arose, viz: in what manner the Executive powers ought to be disposed of.

H. OF R.

ity, would, of course, apply with increased force in the case of the Executive. To divide this branch, as had been done in the former instance, would be, as I have already shown, to enfeeble it, to deprive it of all energy, to render it insufficient and entirely unequal to the purposes for which it was Before I proceed to investigate this part of the intended. If the Executive power, on the other Constitution, it may not be amiss, Mr. Speaker, hand, was to be vested in a single person, and he to observe that in the formation of any political elected by the people of the United States, or even association upon free principles, it has ever been on the modified principles upon which the memdeemed the Gordian knot, the great desideratum, bers of the House of Representatives were to be to find out and to ascertain the best mode of dis- elected, it followed, of necessity, that the larger posing of and organizing the Executive branch of States would elect whom they pleased, and consethe Government; nor is the experiment which quently, the Executive branch of the Government these States are now (I trust successfully) mak- would be entirely under their control and the ing of the practicability of uniting so vast a terri- champion and promoter of their views and intertory as is comprised in the American Confeder-ests. But the large States have an entire control acy, under one general and national government, over one of the two Houses, of which the National (founded on free and republican principles,) more Legislature is composed, and an equality of votes interesting or important to the interests of man- (with all the advantages accruing from superior kind, in any one point of view, than as relates to strength and power, and consequently superior inthe creation and disposal of the Executive power. fluence) in the other. If. then, in addition to all The history and experience of past ages show this, the election of the Executive is put in their us indeed the rocks and quicksands, among which hands, you add strength to the strong, grant more our bark may be stranded and wrecked; but we power to those already too powerful, and yield up are still left without a chart or compass, by the virtually to the large States that branch of the assistance of which we might be enabled to avail Government, which not only was to have a parourselves of the mistakes and misfortunes of those tial veto on the proceedings of the Legislature, who have gone before us, and steer our course in but would probably give impulse to the whole, safety and security. Divide the Executive power and be always on the watch and ever ready to and place it in the hands of many, and you so dis- avail itself of such favorable occurrences and fatract, weaken, and enfeeble it, that it becomes un-vorable moments as might best enable them to equal to its end: the security and protection of the body politic. Hence it seems to be the received maxim, that this branch of the Government should be as compact and as concentrated, as a due respect to existing circumstances may permit. A serious difficulty, nevertheless, remains yet to be gotten over, in relation to the mode and manner in which it is to be created and brought into action. The first impulse of our feelings and common sense, untaught by experience and waiving local objections, would seem no doubt to point out at once the mode of election: yet such have been the inconveniences, such the fatal and bloody effects of creating the Executive branch in this way, that we have found not only in monarchical, but in some even of those governments deemed most free, an heriditary has been thought preferable to an elective Executive.

The members of the Convention, however, were too well acquainted with the feelings and sentiments of the American people to hesitate long on this point, and it was consequently determined that the Executive powers should be lodged in the hands of a single individual, under the title of President, who should hold his office during the term of four years, at the end of which period a new election should take place. But the real difficulty in the organization of this department under our Constitution now naturally suggests itself to the mind, viz: how, and by whom, this President was to be elected; for it must be obvious, that all these jealousies and conflicting views and interests of the large and small States, which had been happily compromised, as relates to the Legislative author

carry their projects of aggrandizement and encroachment on their more feeble associates, into execution. On the other hand, the larger States, to whom fortune and the nature of the case necessarily gave a preponderating influence in this instance, could scarcely be expected to make a sacrifice of this advantage to the jealousies and fears of the small and weaker, and suffer them, as a thing of course, to take possession of the Executive branch of the Government. In this dilemma, what was done by the Convention?

As usual a compromise took place, and as nearly as possible upon the same principles upon which every other provision of the Constitution is predicated. It was decided that the Executive power should rest in a single individual. It was agreed that he should be elected, not by the people at large, not by the people of each State in the first instance; but by a number of Electors (equal to the combined representation of the States in the Senate, and that of the people of the several States in the House of Representatives) elected by the people of the several States, in the proportion to which they might be respectively entitled, according to the complicated ratio which had been adopted. This modified and complicated mode of election notwithstanding, it was evident the election of the President would be in the hands of the larger States. Every additional security therefore was sought for, the ingenuity of the Convention was put to the rack to invent and devise some further means of quieting the fears and apprehensions of the smaller States, affording them every safeguard, and putting in

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