The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality. Psychological Review - Página 206editado por - 1904Vista completa - Acerca de este libro
| Paul Carus - 1892 - 760 páginas
...thought, he goes on to say: "The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which...think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is if so facto beliei'ed and pf sited as absolute reality." (P. 288). Elsewhere he says : "... all propositions,... | |
| Everett Dean Martin - 1920 - 342 páginas
...check us. As William James said : The sense that anything we think is unreal can only come when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which...think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as "absolute reality." Our immediate social environment is all slipping... | |
| Alexander Magnus Drummond - 1925 - 322 páginas
...idea." ' "The sense that anything we think of is unreal," says James, "can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which...think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality." 2 And again, ". . . all propositions, whether... | |
| Charles S. Peirce - 1982 - 388 páginas
...(Ethics, II. 49, Scholium.) The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which...think. Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality. Now, how comes it that one thing thought of can... | |
| John R. Shook - 2003 - 368 páginas
...explicit treatment of 'Reality-feeling' in distinction from 'Belief in his Feeling and Will, Chap. VII. I may believe all these as true statements of fact...explain, it can never annul it. The only things that can be contradicted are judgments of relations. The presentation 'rain-bow' is real, but the judgment 'rain-bow... | |
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