Alabama came into the Union prior to either of the above dates, and the real question was, had the United States any title to land covered by navigable water in Alabama after its admission into the Union? In sup porting the affirmative of that proposition it was shewn that, by an express compact between the United States and Alabama, on her admission into the Union, it was agreed that the people of Alabama forever disclaimed all right or title to the waste or unappropriated lands lying within the state, and that the same should remain at the sole disposal of the United States; and that all the navigable waters within the State should forever remain public highways, and free to the citizens of that state and the United States, without any tax, duty or impost or toll therefor, imposed by that state;" and it was contended that by those articles of compact the land under the navigable waters, and the public domain above high water were alike reserved to the United States, and alike subject to be sold by them. The court below charged the jury "that if they believed the premises sued for were below usual high water mark, at the time Alabama was admitted into the Union, then the act of Congress and the patent in pursuance thereof could give the plaintiffs no title, whether the waters had receded by the labor of man only, or by alluvion. The verdict of judgment was for the defendant, afterwards affirmed by the Supreme court of the state, and re-affirmed by the supreme court of the United States. In rendering the reasons for that affirmance, the supreme court enter into an elaborate and extremely interesting discussion of constitutional rights, both federal and state, and from which your committee have made copious extracts. In the course of that reasoning the fol lowing quotation is made approvingly from 16 Peters 410: "When the revolution took place, the people of cach state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution," and the court inmediately add, "then to Alabama belong the navigable waters, and soils under them in controversy in this case, subject to the rights surrendered by the constitution to the United States; and no compact that might be made between her and the United States could diminish or enlarge these rights.” "This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the navigable waters for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they only have the constitutional power to exercise it. To give to the United States the right to transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to the mjury of state sovereignty, and deprive the state of the power to exercise a numerous and important class of police powers. By the prece * ding course of reasoning we have arrived at the general conclusions, First: The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, The new states have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states. Thirdly, The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this case." In previous portions of this report your committee have endeavored to shew, that mines of gold and silver, constituting as they do, a portion of the wealth of a sovereign state, were included in that portion of sovereign powers entitled "eminent domain ;" and by the preceding extracts from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, we find the right to the shores of navigable rivers, and the soils under them, not only belonging to the state as a sovereign right, but grouped in the same class of powers and forming also an integral part of this same municipal eminent domain. It is submitted then that the reasoning of the court applies equally to that entire class of powers, and that the conclusion is equally irresistable. First, That the mines of gold and silver and of the baser metals with which either is connected, were not granted by the constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states within whose territorial limits they are situated respectively: Secondly, The new states have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states: Thirdly, The right of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, confers not the right of the eminent domain as to those mines. There is a class of powers conferred upon Congress, which although delegating sufficient authority to accomplish the object, are yet to be regarded as falling short of the right to dash out of existence an essential attribute of state sovereignty. Thus by the constitution Congress has power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." And yet the court decide as to our navigable rivers, that the sovereign rights of the states car:not be trenched upon in that regard by the general government. Again, Congress is authorized by the constitution, "to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition of the public lands," and yet the court decide that no authority is conferred thereby upon Congress to grant to individuals any portion of the eminent domain of a state. Again, by the constitution Congress is empowered "to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin," and yet upon the principles of the decisions above referred to, it is perfectly manifest that the court would not hesitate a moment in deciding, that the power "to coin" did not confer a right to seize and convert to its own use the uncoined gold and silver belonging to a state either in the mass, or in its crude unwrought state in the mines, and that such an assumption would be in derogation of the rights of property as well as of the eminent domain of a state. Thus far your committee have examined this subject as a question of political jurisdiction, to which the right of property, as such, is a mere incident. They have felt it a duty not only to assert and maintain the rights of states against encroachments of the federal power, but to canvass and refute the somewhat prevalent doctrines of the day, that the new states still remain under a kind of special "guardianship in socage," and that when finally emancipated from thraldom, they are to stand beside the original states in the conscious degredation of lessened powers and diminished rights. To maintain such a doctrine is to blot out of the statute and cession of Virginia the fundamental condition of the trust, that the new states shall have "the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other states." To maintain such a doctrine is to deny that Michigan has been admitted into the Union "on an equal footing in all respects whatever with the original states," the constitution, laws and compact to the contrary notwithstanding. There can be no distinction between those states which acquired their independence by force of arms, and those which acquired it by the peaceful consent of older states. But whilst your committee would recommend the full and unreserved assertion upon the statute book, of the sovereign right of Michigan to all mines of precious metals within her borders; they would at the same time also recommend (for the encouragement of our citizens and all who may feel disposed to open and work any of said mines already known, or to prosecute their researches for further discoveries) not only a just, but a liberal policy to be observed. Your committee feel assured that true policy would dictate that the state should never engage in mining operations. That all mineral lands held in her own right should be disposed of in fee, after a proper inspection and graduation of minimum prices. That in the same law asserting the sovereign right, there should be a relinquishment in perpetuity of the same, in behalf of citizens of Michigan now or hereafter owning lands containing minerals, in fee derived from the gen ́eral or state government. And that for purposes of revenue the state should have recourse to an uniform specific tax, regulated by a moderate per centage upon the annual product of all mines wrought within her borders, whether the same are owned in fee or leased from the general government. To carry out these several recommendations your committee would report the accompanying bill as an amendment to the bill referred to them from the commitiee on public lands. LEGISLATURE. 1846. SENATE Doc. STATE LAND OFFICE, Marshall, March 17, 1846. S Hon. WM. L. GREENLY, President of the Senate : SIR: In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 14th inst., please find enclosed a statement of the number of acres of University and school lands sold the past year at the minimum price, and the number sold in the months of January and February of the present year. And I have taken the liberty to give also the semi-annual sales for the years 1844 and 1845, by which it will be seen that the sales from July to December in 1845, are materially heavier than in the corresponding months of the previous year; and that there is an actual increase of the sale of the primary school lands even up to the present month, notwithstanding the fact that the most choice lands are first selected and those remaining are comparatively inferior. Respectfully, &c. ABIEL SILVER, Com. |