Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

ing against their commanders, and delivering both to his devotion. Befides, Cæfar's publick and avowed pretenfions for begining the civil war, were, to restore the tribunes and the people oppreffed (as he pretended) by the nobles.

This forced Pompey, against his inclinations, upon the neceffity of changing fides, for fear of being forfaken by both; and of clofing in with the fenate and chief magistrates, by whom he was chofen general against Cæfar.

Thus at length the fenate (at least the primitive part of them, the nobles) under Pompey, and the commons under Cæfar, came to a final decifion of the long quarrels between them. For, I think, the ambition of private men did by no means begin or occafion this war; though civil diffentions never fail of introducing and fpiriting the ambition of private men who thus become indeed the great inftruments for deciding fuch quarrels, and at laft are sure to seize on the prize. But no man, that fees a flock of vultures hovering over two armies ready to engage, can justly charge the blood drawn in the battle to them, though the carcaffes fall to their fhare. For, while the balance of power is equally held, the ambition of private men, whether orators or great commanders, gives neither danger nor fear, nor can poffibly enflave their country; but that once broken, the divided parties are forced to unite each to its head, under whofe conduct or fortune one fide is at first victorious, and at laft both are flaves. And to And to put it past difpute, that this entire fubverfion of the Roman li

berty

berty and conftitution was altogether owing to those measures, which had broke the balance between the patricians and plebeians, whereof the ambition of particular men was but an effect and confequence, we need only confider, that when the uncorrupted part of the fenate had, by the death of Cæfar, made one great effort to restore their former state and liberty, the fuccefs did not answer their hopes; but that whole affembly was fo funk in its authority, that those patriots were forced to fly, and give way to the madness of the people, who by their own difpofitions, stirred up with the harrangues of their orators, were now wholly bent upon fingle and defpotick flavery. Elfe, how could fuch a profligate as Antony, or a boy of eighteen, like Octavius, ever dare to dream of giving the law to fuch an empire and people? wherein the latter fucceeded, and entailed the vileft tyranny, that heaven in its anger ever inflicted on a corrupt and poisoned people. And this, with fo little appearance at Cæfar's death, that when Cicero wrote to Brutus, how he had prevailed by his credit with Octavius to promife him (Brutus) pardon and fecurity for his perfon, that great Roman received the notice with the utmost indignity, and returned Cicero an anfwer, yet upon record, full of the highest resentment and contempt for fuch an offer, and from fuch a hand.

Here ended all fhew or fhadow of liberty in Rome. Here was the repofitory of all the wife contentions and struggles for power between the nobles and commons, lapped up fafely in the bofom of a Nero and a Caligula, a Tiberius, and a Domitian.

Let

Let us now fee from this deduction of particular impeachments, and general diffentions in Greece and Rome, what conclufions may naturally be formed for inftruction of any other state, that may haply upon many points labour under the like circumftan

ces.

U PON

CHA P. IV.

PON the fubject of impeachments we may obferve, that the custom of accufing the nobles to the people, either by themfelves, or their orators, (now ftiled an impeachment in the name of the commons) has been very ancient both in Greece and Rome, as well as Carthage; and therefore may seem to be the inherent right of a free people, nay, perhaps it is really fo: but then it is to be confidered, first, that this custom was peculiar to republicks, or such states where the administration lay principally in the hands of the commons, and ever raged more or lefs, according to their encroachments upon abfolute power; having been always looked upon by the wifeft men and beft authors of thofe times, as an effect of licentioufnefs, and not of liberty; a diftinction, which no multitude, either reprefented or collective, has been at any time very nice in obferving. However, perhaps this custom in a popular state of impeaching particular men, may feem to be nothing elfe, but the people's choofing upon occafion to exercife their own jurifdiction in perfon; as if a king of England fhould fit as chief justice in his court of king's bench; which, they

fay

fay, in former times he fometimes did. But in Sparta, which was called a kingly government, though the people were perfectly free, yet because the administration was in the two kings and the ephori, with the affiftance of the fenate, we read of no impeachments by the people; nor was the process against great men, either upon account of ambition or ill conduct, though it reached fometimes to kings themselves, ever formed that way, as I can recollect, but only paffed through those hands, where the adminiftration lay. So likewife, during the regal government in Rome, though it was inftituted a mixed monarchy, and the people made great advances in power, yet I do not remember to have read of one impeachment from the commons against a patrician, until the consular state began, and the people had made great encroachments upon the administration.

per

Another thing to be confidered is, that allowing this right of impeachment to be as inherent as they please, yet, if the commons have been perpetually mistaken in the merits of the caufes and the fons, as well as in the confequences of fuch impeachments upon upon the peace of the ftate, we cannot conclude lefs, than that the commons in Greece and Rome (whatever they may be in other states) were by no means qualified either as profecutors or judges in fuch matters; and therefore, that it would have been prudent, to have reserved these privileges dormant, never to be produced but upon very great and urging occafions, where the state is in apparent danger, the univerfal body of the people in clamours

against

against the administration, and no other remedy in view. But for a few popular orators or tribunes, upon the score of perfonal piques; or to employ the pride they conceive in seeing themselves at the head of a party; or as a method for advancement; or moved by certain powerful arguments that could make Demofthenes Phillippize: for fuch men, I fay, when the flate would of itself gladly be quiet, and has, befides, affairs of the laft importance upon the anvil, to impeach Miltiades after a great naval victory, for not purfuing the Perfian fleet; to impeach Ariftides, the person most versed among them in the knowledge and practice of their laws, for a blind suspicion of his acting in an arbitrary way, that is, as they expound it, not in concert with the people; to impeach Pericles, after all his fervices, for a few inconfiderable accounts; or to impeach Phocion, who had been guilty of no other crime but negociating a treaty for the peace and fecurity of his country: what could the continuance of fuch proceedings end in, but the utter difcouragement of all virtuous actions and perfons, and confequently in the ruin of a state? therefore the hiftorians of those ages feldom fail to fet this matter in all its lights, leaving us in the highest and most honourable ideas of thofe perfons, who fuffered by the perfecution of the people, together with the fatal confequences they had, and how the perfecutors feldom failed to repent, when it was too late,

These impeachments perpetually falling upon many of the best men both in Greece and Rome, are a cloud of witneffes, and examples enough to difcou

rage

« AnteriorContinuar »