vernment is that, which confifts of three forms, * regno, optimatium, & populi imperio; which may be fairly tranflated, the king, lords, and commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive institution by Lycurgus; who, obferving the corruptions and depravations to which every of thefe was fubject, compounded his fcheme out of all; fo that it was made up of reges, feniores, & populus. Such also was the state of Rome under its confuls: and the author tells us, that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance, (which I take to have been nature and common reafon) but the Spartans, by thought and defign. And fuch at Carthage was the † summa reipublicæ, or power in the last resort; for they had their kings called fuffetes, and a fenate which had the power of nobles, and the people had a share esta

blished too.

Secondly, It will follow, That those reasoners, who employ fo much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure for the upholding the balance of power in Christendom, at the same time that by their practices they are endeavouring to deftroy it at home, are not fuch mighty patriots, or so much in the true interest of their country, as they would affect to be thought; but feem to be employed like a man, who pulls down with his right hand, what he has been building with his left.

Thirdly, This makes appear the error of those, who think it an uncontrollable maxim, that power is always fafer lodged in many hands, than in one:

Fragm. lib. 6.

+ Id. ib.

for,

for, if these many hands be made up only from one of the three divifions before mentioned, it is plain from those examples already produced, and easy to be paralleled in other ages and countries, that they are capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppreffion, as it is poffible for a fingle perfon to be, though we should suppose their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand.

Again, It is manifeft from what has been faid, that in order to preserve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power depofited with each party ought to be ascertained, and generally known. The defect of this, is the cause that introduces thofe ftrugglings in a state about prerogative and liberty, about encroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few, which ever did, and ever will conclude in a tyranny; firft, either of the few, or the many; but at laft, infallibly of a fingle perfon: for, whichever of the three divifions in a state is upon the scramble for more power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is) unless due care be taken by the other two, upon every new question that arises, they will be fure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of inherent right; they will nourish up a dormant power, and reserve privileges in petto, to exert upon occafions, to ferve expedients, and to urge upon neceffities; they will make large demands, and scanty conceflions, ever coming off confiderable gainers; thus at length the balance is broke, and

U 4

tyranny

tyranny let in; from which door of the three it matters not.

To pretend to a declarative right upon any occafion whatsoever, is little lefs than to make use of the whole power; that is, to declare an opinion to be law, which has always been contefted, or perhaps never started at all before fuch an incident brought it on the ftage. Not to confent to the enacting of fuch a law, which has no view befide the general good, unlefs another law fhall at the fame time país, with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this but to claim a pofitive voice, as well as a negative?* To pretend that great changes and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and confequently new additions of power, as fome reafoners have done, is a moft dangerous tenet. If dominion must follow property, let it follow in the fame pace; for, change in property through the bulk of a nation makes flow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude that whatever attempt is begun by an affembly, ought to be purfued to the end, without regard to the greateft incidents that may happen to alter the cafe; to count it mean, and below the dignity of a house, to quit a profecution; to refolve upon a conclufion before it is poffible to be apprifed of the premises; to act

This feems to allude to a practice of the house of commons called Tacking: when they fufpected that a favourite bill would be rejected, they tacked it to a money-bill; and as it was not poffible to proceed without the fupply, and as it became neceffary to reject or receive both the bills thus tacked together, this expedient perfectly answered its purpose.

thus,

thus, I fay, is to affect not only abfolute power, but infallibility too. Yet fuch unaccountable proceedings as these have popular affemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of power and privilege.

Great changes may indeed be made in a government, yet the form continue, and the balance be held but large intervals of time muft pafs between every fuch innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the constitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth; and what convulfions in our own, as well as other states, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is fresh and notorious enough: it is too foon in all confcience to repeat this error again.

Having fhewn, that there is a natural balance of power in all free ftates, and how it has been divided, fometimes by the people themselves, as in Rome; at others by the inftitutions of the legiflators, as in the several states of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is, to examine what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties has continually endeavoured, * as opportunities have ferved; as might appear from the ftories of moft ages and countries: for, abfolute power in a particular state, is of the fame nature with univerfal monarchy in feve

As opportunities have ferved; as might appear,' &c. The repetition of the particle, as, at the beginning of two members of a sentence fo near each other, has a bad effect. The former might be changed to whenever' Whenever opportunities offered; as might appear,' &c.

ral

ral ftates adjoining to each other. So endlefs and exorbitant are the defires of men, whether confidered in their perfons or their ftates, that they will grafp at all, and can form no scheme of perfect happiness with lefs. Ever fince men have been united inte governments, the hopes and endeavours after univerfal monarchy have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus, to this of the most christian king; in which purfuits, commonwealths have had their fhare, as well as monarchs: fo the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did feveral times aim at the universal monarchy of Greece; fo the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome, affected the universal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner has abfolute power been pursued by the feveral parties of each particular ftate; wherein fingle perfons have met with most fuccefs, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough: yet, being neither fo uniform in their defigns, nor fo direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got; but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of fome fingle perfon. So that it will be always a wrong step in policy, for the nobles or commons to carry their endeavours after power fo far, as to overthrow the balance: and it would be enough to damp their warmth in such pursuits, if they could once reflect, that in such a course they will be sure to run upon the very rock, that they meant to avoid; which, I fuppofe they would have us think is the tyranny, of a fingle perfon,

Many