authority. These easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for fecuring their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council, or fenate of nobles, for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last divifion is, of the mafs or body of the people, whofe part of power is great and indifputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by deputation, to exert it. Now the three forms of government, fo generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or sometimes two, (as in Sparta) who were called kings; or in a fenate, who were called the nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the commons. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and sometimes in Rome : but the power in the last resort, was always meant by legiflators, to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politicks among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among several states with each other.

The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is beft conceived by confidering, what the nature of a balance is. It fuppofes three things: First, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two scales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now confider several states in a neighbourhood; in order It fhould be, by the civil adminiftration's being placed,' &c. VOL. II.

U

to preserve peace between these states, it is neceffary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the reft into equal scales, and upon occasion remove from one into the other, or else fall with their own weight into the lightest so in a state within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactness into the several scales. Now it is not necessary that the power should be equally divided between these three; for the balance may be held by the weakeft, who, by his addrefs and conduct, removing from either scale, and adding of his own, may keep the scales duly poised. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the confular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as reprefented by Xenophon; and that of the several limited ftates in the Gothick institution.

When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either scale, the power will never continue long in equal divifion between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the trueft account of what is understood in the most antient and approved Greek authors, by the word Tyranny; which is not meant for the feizing of the uncontrolled or abfolute power into the hands of a fingle perfon, (as many fuperficial men have grofly mistaken) but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one fcale: For, tyranny and ufurpation in

5

a ftate

a ftate are by no means confined to any number, as might easily appear from examples enough; and because the point is material, I fshall cite a few to prove it.

The Romans, having fent to Athens, and the Greek cities of Italy, for the copies of the best laws, chofe ten legislators to put them into form, and during the exercife of their office, fufpended the confular power, leaving the adminiftration of affairs in their hands. Thefe very men, though chofen for fuch a work, as the digefting a body of laws for the government of a free ftate, did immediately ufurp arbitrary power, ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and spies after the practice of the tyrants of thofe ages, affected kingly ftate, deftroyed the nobles, and oppreffed the people; one of them proceeding so far, as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime, which gave occafion to the expulfion of the regal power but fixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decemviri.

Thefe

The Ephori in Sparta, were at first only certain perfons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, while they were employed in the wars. men, at several times, ufurped the abfolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants, as any in their age.

Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Athenians chofe four hundred men for administration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of those ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under

Diodyf. Hal. lib. 10.

Thucyd, lib. 8.

U 2

which

which hateful denomination they were foon after depofed in great rage by the people.

When Athens was fubdued by Lyfander, he appointed thirty men for the adminiftration that city, who immediately fell into the rankeft tyranny but this was not all; for, conceiving their power not founded on a bafis large enough, they admitted three thousand into a share of the government; and thus fortified, became the cruelleft tyranny upon record. They murdered in cold blood great numbers of the best men, without any provocation, from the meer luft of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was such a number of tyrants together, as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us, that the city contained about ten thousand houses; and allowing one man to every houfe, who could have any share in the government, (the reft confifting of women, children, and fervants) and making other obvious abatements, these tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective.

In the time of the fecond Punick war, the balance of power in Carthage was got on the fide of the people; and this to a degree, that fome authors reckon the government to have been then among them a dominatio plebis, or tyranny of the commons; which it seems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at last among the causes, that ruined their state: + Memorab. lib. 3.

Xenoph. de Rebus Græc. 1. 2. Polyb. Frag. lib. 6.

and

and the frequent murders of their generals, which * Diodorus tells us was grown to an established custom among them, may be another inftance, that tyranny is not confined to numbers.

I fhall mention but one example more among a great number, that might be produced; † it is related by the author laft cited. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will style them in modern phrase, great speakers of the house; or only, in general, reprefentatives of the people collective) ftirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and at laft, the orators themselves, because they left off their accufations, or, to speak intelligibly, because they withdrew their impeachments; having, it feems, raised a fpirit they were not able to lay. And this laft circumftance, as cafes have lately ftood, may perhaps be worth noting.

From what has been already advanced, feveral conclufions may be drawn:

First, That a mixed government, partaking of the known forms received in the fchools, is by no means of Gothick invention, but has place in nature and reason, seems very well to agree with the fentiments of most legiflators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, ariftocracies, or democracies: for, not to mention the feveral republicks of this compofition in Gaul and Germany, defcribed by Cæfar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us, the best

go

vernment