"delegated;" that "it may bestow title and right; but " it can communicate no capacity, no actual qualification :”— that "it is vain, therefore, to talk of delegation; for, if "Jesus Christ be indeed LORD OF ALL, and JUDGE OF "ALL, the only question is, what are the qualifications "essential to the Being who governs, and who is to judge "the world? and to this question I answer, without fear ❝ of contradiction by any reasonable and unprejudiced mind, " OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE, and INDEPENDENCE:"-that, "if such qualities must be possessed by the Governor " and Judge of the world, they must, from their nature, "be original, and inherent, being entirely unsusceptible "of transference or communication." (Discourse IV. pages 117, 118.)

On this argument Mr. Yates expresses himself in the following terms:-"This argument relates to a subject the "most sublime and awful, and far removed from our know"ledge and experience. I fear, therefore, to maintain "my side of the question in the same dogmatical terms, ❝ in which Mr. Wardlaw maintains his. But with a con"viction, that the Scriptures alone can afford us informa❝tion on this subject, and with great reluctance to argue "the point at all on the grounds of mere human reason, "I shall venture to say, that the qualifications of omni"science, omnipotence, and independence, do not appear to me essential to the office of the delegated Governor and Judge of mankind. I do not see any reason why "the power of such a personage should extend beyond "the world over which he presides, or why his knowledge "should comprehend the actions, characters, and deserts,

not only of those who come before his tribunal, but of all "intelligent beings who have existed in other regions of

"space, and in other periods of eternity. So far as I "can judge, the power and knowledge of such an exalt"ed person may rationally be supposed to be not only "limited, but also derived and dependent. It is only re

quisite, that he possess the knowledge and power essential "to the execution of his office; how he possesses them, "whether by his own nature, or by derivation from the Almighty and Omnsicient God, appears to be of no mo❝ment. I conceive, therefore, that no valid objection can "be brought, from the improbability of the doctrine in "the view of unprejudiced reason, against the plain and "obvious sense of those passages of Scripture which de"scribe the offices of Christ in his exalted state, and re"present him as discharging them in subordination to God "the Father." (Pages 219, 220.)

There are parts of this paragraph, which can hardly fail to force a smile; but its general effect is, to settle both mind and countenance, in the gravity of serious thought.-It is true, that the subject is "sublime and awful, and far ❝removed from our knowledge and experience." Yet who can forbear smiling, when he hears a Unitarian, with so much timid caution, and lowly reserve, expressing his "great reluctance" "to argue this point on the ground of "reason?" When a RATIONAL CHRISTIAN speaks thus, we may be well assured that he is sensible of his ground being insecure; that he feels a secret consciousness, that the verdict of Reason must be against him, and, in spite of all the high compliments he pays her at other times, blushes on this occasion, to look his patroness full in the face. On points not less awful and sublime" and still farther "removed" than this "from our knowledge and experience," Mr. Yates" and his brethren can argue with abundant freedom, and

dogmatize, on what they conceive to be rational principles, with the most confident tone of decision: so that (to use Mr. Yates's own expressions a page or two before, mutatis mutandis,) "it is truly curious and entertaining "to observe, how Reason, who is called up to the tribu"nal, and treated with all possible respect, when it is "conceived that she can serve the cause of heterodoxy, is "discarded, and turned out of doors, whenever her evi"dence is unfavourable to the Unitarian system.">

When we attend for a moment to the nature of the sentiment which Mr. Yates "ventures" to advance, we will not be much surprised at his "reluctance" to submit it to the decision of "mere human reason.”

Let it be admitted, then, that "the power and knowledge "of the judge of the world need not be supposed to ex"tend beyond the world over which he presides ;"-we have formerly seen, what the extent of this knowledge must be ; -that it must comprehend a perfect and unerring acquaintance with all the thoughts and words and actions, in all their endless variety of circumstances, of every individual person of all the numberless generations of mankind that shall have existed from the beginning to the end of time; and in every successive moment of the existence of each. -The question, then, is, Is it possible that this knowledge can belong to any being, and that being not be God?When we infer from the works of creation which we see, that their maker is infinite in wisdom, our data are limited, yet our inference is unlimited. Is it, then, admitted to be fair, to conclude from a part to the whole? from what we see and know of the universe to the universe itself? and then, from an effect which must, from the nature of the thing, be limited, to deduce the unlimited, or infinite,

wisdom of the CAUSE?-If it be, then I ask further ;If any being is admitted to possess the knowledge of mankind which has just been described, are we not warranted to proceed on the same established principle of reasoning, and from this measure of knowledge to infer, that it cannot stop here;-that it must extend further? Are not our data as good, in this case, as in the former? In both, we are supposed to know to a limited extent; and if, in the one case, an unlimited inference be warrantable, so must it also be in the other: and, on the other hand, if the GOVERNOR and JUDGE may possess the knowledge described, and, after all, his knowledge be limited, I see not how the consequence can be evaded, that the FORMER OF ALL THINGS may have produced all the striking proofs of wisdom in the universe, and after all, his wisdom be limited.

But further: Mr. Yates takes no notice of the government of the world. He confines his reasoning to the exercise of judgment. If our argument required additional strength, it finds it here.-No person, who at all considers what the government of this world is, can for a moment suppose it conducted by any other than an omniscient Being, without forfeiting his claim to the possession of understanding. Apart entirely from what relates to the movements and variations of the material world, the government of mankind implies an incessant and entire acquaintance with all the thoughts, and words, and actions, of all the millions of men in every part of the globe, every successive moment of time;-together with the sovereign and universal command of whatever can contribute to affect the volitions of intelligent creatures;-an infallible previous knowledge of the effects which the occurrence of particular circumstances, or the suggestion of particular views, will produce

Hh

individual. every

on the will of The multitude of mankind is so great; the variety of character among them so endless; their connexions, and interests, so prodigiously diversified; their desires and volitions so incessantly crossing and interfering; great and small events are so involved in one another, so linked together, in an infinite diversity of ways, as reciprocal causes and effects;-that we are utterly lost in our attempts to form any conception of such a control,-even with the full conviction upon our minds, of its being the control of an omniscient Being. But, to suppose this government conducted by a mere creature, in the exercise of derived, and limited, and dependent knowledge and power!-the reader will pardon me for not saying all that I think of such a supposition.— I presume, however, I may safely repeat, that he must be "sadly pressed by his system" who is reduced to the necessity of making and defending it.

The judgment of the world supposes its previous government. To fit the Being, who is to occupy the Throne, for discriminate judgment, all the affairs of mankind must have been under his constant notice and superintendence. Characters cannot be judged, apart from the circumstances by which they have been formed; and these are, beyond all conception, diversified and minute." Every work" is to be "brought into judgment, with every secret thing "whether good or evil." This comprehends all the thoughts, and words, and actions, of every individual of the human race ;-in connexion, of course, with all their attendant circumstances.And all this is to be the work of a fellowcreature !-Reader, you may wonder if you please,-I do not, at the unwonted tone of timid and cautious diffidence which Mr. Yates assumes on this subject. It need not,