the refunding part, and therefore advised striking that out: but as I thought it just and right, I insisted on its standing.

On the 3d and 4th articles I observed, we were frequently charged with views of abolishing the navigation act. That, in truth, those parts of it which were of most importance to Britain, as tending to increase its naval strength, viz. those restraining the trade, to be carried on only in ships belonging to British subjects, navigated by at least three quarters British or colony seamen, &c. were as acceptable to us as they could be to Britain, since we wished to employ our own ships in preference to foreigners, and had no desire to see foreign ships enter our ports. That indeed the obliging us to land some of our commodities in England before we could carry them to foreign markets, and forbidding our importation of some goods, directly from foreign countries, we thought a hardship, and a greater loss to us than gain to Britain, and therefore proper to be repealed. But as Britain had deemed it an equivalent for her protection, we had never applied or proposed to apply for such repeal. And if they must be continued, I thought it best (since the power of parliament to make them was now disputed) that they should be re-enacted in all the colonies, which would demonstrate their consent to them. And then if, as in the sixth article, all the duties arising on them were to be collected by officers appointed and salaried in the respective

governments, and the produce paid into their treasuries, I was sure the acts would be better and more faithfully executed, and at much less expense, and one great source of misunderstanding removed between the two countries, viz. the calumnies of low officers appointed from home, who were for ever abusing the people of the country to government, to magnify their own zeal, and recommend themselves to promotion. That the extension of the Admiralty jurisdiction so much complained of would then no longer be necessary; and that besides its being the interest of the colonies to execute those acts, which is the best security, government might be satisfied of its being done, from accounts to be sent home by the naval officers of the 4th article. The gentlemen were satisfied with these reasons, and approved the 3d and 4th articles; so they were to stand.

The 5th they apprehended would meet with dif ficulty. They said, that restraining manufactures in the colonies was a favorite idea here; and therefore they wished that article to be omitted, as the proposing it would alarm and hinder perhaps the considering and granting others of more importance: but as I insisted on the equity of allowing all subjects in every country to make the most of their natural advantages, they desired I would at least alter the last word from repealed to reconsidered, which I complied with.

In maintaining the 7th article (which was at first

objected to, on the principle that all under the care of government should pay towards the support of it,) my reasons were, that if every distinct part of the king's dominions supported its own government in time of peace, it was all that could justly be required of it; that all the old or confederated colonies had done so from their beginning; that their taxes for that purpose were very considerable; that new countries had many public expenses which old ones were free from, the works being done to their hands by their ancestors, such as making roads and bridges, erecting churches, court-houses, forts, quays, and other public buildings, founding schools and places of education, hospitals and alms-houses, &c. &c.; that the voluntary and the legal subscriptions and taxes for such purposes, taken together, amounted to more than was paid by equal estates in Britain. That it would be best for Britain, on two accounts, not to take money from us as contribution to its public expense, in time of peace; first, for that just so much less would be got from us in commerce, since all we could spare was already gained from us by Britain in that way; and secondly, that coming into the hands of British ministers accustomed to prodigality of public money, it would be squandered and dissipated, answering no good general purpose. That if we were to be taxed towards the support of government in Britain, as Scotland has been since the union, we ought then to be allowed the same privileges in trade as

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she has been allowed. That if we are called upon to give to the sinking fund or the national debt, Ireland ought to be likewise called upon; and both they and we, if we gave, ought to have some means established of inquiring into the application, and securing a compliance with the terms on which we should grant. That British ministers would perhaps not like our meddling with such matters; and that hence might arise new causes of misunderstanding. That upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best on all sides, that no aids shall be asked or expected from the colonies in time of peace; that it would then be their interest to grant bountifully and exert themselves vigorously in time of war, the sooner to put an end to it. That specie was not to be had to send to England in supplies, but the colonies could carry on war with their own paper money; which would pay troops, and for provisions, transports, carriages, clothing, arms, &c. So this 7th article was at length agreed to without further objection.

The 8th the gentlemen were confident would Lever be granted. For the whole world would be of opinion that the king, who is to defend all parts of his dominions, should have of course a right to place his troops where they might best answer that purpose. I supported the article upon principles equally important in my opinion to Britain as to the colonies: for that if the king could bring into one part of his dominions, troops raised in any other

part of them, without the consent of the legislatures of the part to which they were brought, he might bring armies raised in America into England without consent of parliament, which probably would not like it, as a few years since they had not liked the introduction of the Hessians and Hanoverians, though justified by the supposition of its being a time of danger. That if there should be at any time real occasion for British troops in America, there was no doubt of obtaining the consent of the assemblies there; and I was so far from being willing to drop this article, that I thought I ought to add another, requiring all the present troops to be withdrawn, before America could be expected to treat or agree upon any terms of accommodation; as what they should now do of that kind might be deemed the effect of compulsion, the appearance of which ought as much as possible to be avoided, since those reasonable things might be agreed to, where the parties seemed at least to act freely, which would be strongly refused under threats or the semblance of force. That the withdrawing the

troops was therefore necessary to make any treaty durably binding on the part of the Americans, since proof of having acted under force, would invalidate any agreement. And it could be no wonder that we should insist on the crown's having no right to bring a standing army among us in time of peace, when we saw now before our eyes a striking instance of the ill use to be made of it, viz. to distress the