CHAPTER XXI.

Characteristics of direct de

THE

CRITICISM OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY.

HE character of direct democracy, with its advantages and its evils, is represented for all time in the brilliant mocracy. history of the gifted Athenian people.

Danger of popular

passion and caprice.

Democracy prefers freedom to authority. To their love of freedom the Athenians owed the perfection of their works of art, which receive and deserve the admiration of posterity. But the democratic freedom of all involves the rule of all. The body of citizens wishes to govern in person, i. e. by great national assemblies. This is only possible in small States, and among a people which has leisure to devote itself to the regular business of the State; and this again presupposes either great simplicity of life and occupations, as in the small communities of mountain valleys, or else the existence of a labouring class which is not admitted to citizenship. Among a civilised people direct democraey is always a sham, because it cannot exist without this servile part of the population.

In these large popular assemblies a sense of unlimited power is easily developed, which leads to blunders of every kind, and often substitutes arbitrary caprice for law and right. The individual may be both honest and prudent in himself, but as a member of the assembly he is liable to be carried away by the passions of the crowd, and to consent to resolutions which, a short time before, he would have unhesitatingly rejected. The orators can only influence by playing upon the popular

passions, and when once the storm has been raised no feeling of shame can check its violence 1.

ance of

If, then, democracy is to be a good constitution, the majority Importof the citizens must possess political capacity and aptness, they national must excel both in character and intelligence. Athenian character. history, however, offers the warnings of experience. Among a people of conspicuous intellectual development, whose character never appeared greater than in times of misfortune and danger, it was for a very short period that pure democracy could escape degeneracy and ruin. And even when Athens was at the zenith of its power and prosperity, its greatness was not due to the rule of the people but to the practical abandonment of that rule to a single great statesman. Thucydides says of the age of Pericles: Athens was a democracy in name, but in reality it was under the rule of the first of its citizens 2.'

The populace cannot long retain its virtue after having drunk the intoxicating wine of power. Democratic forms may exist as long as the people retains its dread of divine justice, its regard for the restraints of custom and law, and its reverence for the authority of the best men. There can be no doubt that in a democratic state the mass of the people are elevated by taking part in public affairs, and that they are distinguished from the citizens of other states by a richer and more conscious development of their faculties. The individual is compelled to look beyond the narrow limits of his own occupation and becomes familiarised with the great laws of history and

1 Burke expresses this admirably in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Clarendon Press edition, p. 110): 'Where popular authority is absolute and unrestrained, the people have an infinitely greater, because a far better founded confidence in their own power. They are themselves, in a great measure, their own instruments. They are nearer to their objects. Besides, they are less under responsibility to one of the greatest controlling powers on earth, the sense of fame and estimation. The share of infamy that is likely to fall to the lot of each individual in public acts, is small indeed; the operation of opinion being in the inverse ratio to the number of those who abuse power. Their own approbation of their own acts has to them the appearance of a public judgment in their favour. A perfect democracy is therefore the most shameless thing in the world. As it is the most shameless, it is also the most fearless.'

2 Thucydides, ii. 69.

The love of equality.

the collective life of nations. But fear and respect soon disappear as the feeling of unrestrained power gets the upper hand, and this power is the more readily abused as the distinction between rulers and ruled, which is recognised by other forms of State, is wanting in a democracy. The populace gives the rein to its evil passions: it envies and oppresses the nobler and better minority, whose existence is a standing reproach and protest against its own rule. The worst qualities of the demos come to the surface-pride, arbitrary caprice, the love of frequent and useless change, brutality: the less it rules itself, the more oppressive is its rule of others. Parties are formed whose mutual hatred is stronger than patriotism, and whose mortal struggles distract and ruin their common country. The State is endangered by incessant changes, and brought to ruin by the want of stability. Thus the Athenian State was brilliant in its greatness; but that greatness was shortlived, and was followed by a long decadence from which Athens never recovered 3.

A characteristic of every democracy is the love of equality. In Athens this principle was developed more logically and one-sidedly than in any later democracy. Wherever it was possible the mass of the citizens acted for themselves, because a system of representation gives a certain preference and superiority to the chosen deputies. When it was necessary to appoint individuals to office or to the senate, the Athenians preferred the blind system of lot to election, which might have paid regard to superiority of intelligence and virtue. All magistrates were frequently changed, lest prolonged authority might exalt them above the mass. The very existence of magistrates who demand obedience, seemed contrary to the democratic maxim of equality: if such inequality was indispensable, it must be softened as much as possible by the use of the lot and by frequent change. The equality which commends itself to a democracy is equality of number. Its

3 The great period of Athenian history began with Cleisthenes (B.O. 510), who founded the pure democracy, and ended with the death of Pericles (B. C. 428), so that it lasted only 82 years.

Comp. Aristot. Pol. vi. 2. § 5, 1317 b. 20.

formula is not each according to his merits,' but 'one as another 5.'

Another consequence of democratic equality is ostracism". Ostracism. Among the Greeks this was carried out openly and was regarded almost as an honour, but in modern states, though practically exercised, it is not formally recognised, and is usually regarded as a disgrace. Every constitution, if it wishes to last, must have the power of expelling elements which are incompatible with its existence. Democracy is not to be blamed when, as in Athens, it exiles individual citizens whose personal superiority is dangerous to the general equality. But it is a questionable proof of the merits of democracy that it can endure the baseness of the masses better than the superiority of individuals.

small and

To sum up what has been said, it is evident that direct Direct dedemocracy, as it existed in Greece, is fitted only for small mocracy can only states, and especially for agricultural or pastoral peoples, whose thrive in a life retains the simplicity of ancient customs. In the case of backward a people with a higher civilisation and wider relations, it may state. give a great momentary impulse, but it soon becomes insufficient and harmful. In the one case democracy appears both natural and moderate; in the other it is prone to licence and The freedom which it promises becomes in this case the unjust oppression of all nobler elements, the unrestrained and brutal ambition of the mob. The equality on which it professes to be founded is nothing but a manifest lie and a crying wrong, when once advancing civilisation has brought with it its differences and its contrasts".

excess.

5 The distinction is thus expressed by Aristotle (Pol. v. I. § 12, 1301 b. 29; § 2, 1317 b. 4): τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν.

vi. 2.

a [On ostracism cp. Arist. Pol. iii. 13. §§ 15-25, 1284 a. 17 ff.; Grote, History of Greece, Part ii. ch. 33.]

Aristotle (Pol. vi. 4) developes this opinion, which had been confirmed by experience in Greece, and was so later in Switzerland.

7 Cicero's observation is very true, de Rep. i. 26: 'quum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis justum atque moderatum, tamen aequabilitas est iniqua, quum habeat nullos gradus dignitatis.'

Direct su perseded by representative democracy.

1. Repre sentative

D"

CHAPTER XXII.

B. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE MODERN

REPUBLIC.

IRECT democracy has only existed in modern times in very exceptional and very favourable circumstances, and then its form has been much more moderate than that of Athens. It is still visible in some of the mountain cantons of Switzerland, where every year the Landsgemeinde meets, and by the raising of hands distributes the offices and dignities of the little republic, usually to the most respected families, and gives its sanction to the laws which have been prepared by the councils. These simple democracies, little touched by the stream of European life, deserve our respect for their five hundred years of a history that is rich in manly episodes and rarely stained by acts of violence, for the simplicity of their customs and the peaceful and happy existence of their inhabitants. But in recent times they have been affected by the tendency to introduce the representative forms which prevail in the other Swiss cantons and in the United States of America. The French movements of 1793 and 1848 aimed at a representative constitution, and in the present day it is the ideal of democratic parties everywhere. The modern form of democracy may be declared to be representative democracy.

As constitutional monarchy originated in England, so redemocracy presentative democracy, or the modern form of Republic, as originates the Americans prefer to call it, was developed in North America. in America. It is noteworthy that the two chief forms of the modern State