Résumé.

centuries ago, has not yet been fully cleared up. But in spite of peculiarities and inconsistencies the constitution of Germany has shown both force and vitality, and if monarchical power and unity, with the recognition of national rights and liberties, forms the essence of constitutional monarchy, must certainly be regarded as belonging to this class of States.

Looking back over the whole subject we see that the system of representative or constitutional monarchy has obtained a most decisive predominance in Western Europe. Almost every civilised European State has recognised not only personal rights but the political rights of the nation and of the classes composing it, and has admitted national representatives to a share in legislation. Monarchy is no longer absolute and unlimited, but has become a supreme legal power (oberste Rechtsmacht) limited by the rights of the subjects.

But in other points the constitutional forms are very varied. In England the monarchy is surrounded by a powerful aristocracy, and the actual conduct of affairs is dependent rather upon the majority in Parliament and the ministers who are responsible to it, than upon the individual will of the sovereign. On the continent there is no aristocracy which enjoys such power and respect. There the democratic element is the most prominent after the monarchy: aristocracy has only a moderating and mediating influence. The constitutional struggles on the continent are between monarchy and democracy, which are always striving to find their proper relations to each other and to the whole State. Each contends for exclusive rule and the suppression of its rival, but the momentary defeat of either has always been followed by a sudden revival. Constitutional monarchy on the continent avowedly strives to assume an organic form which shall give its proper rights to each part of the body politic, to the monarchy its full power and majesty, to the aristocracy dignity and influence, and to the demos peace and liberty.

On the continent generally, and especially in France [i. e. before 1870] and Germany, monarchy is the active head of

the State, not only in form but by the whole character of the constitution. Only when it comes into conflict with national instincts, and with the great current of history, is it checked by the incalculable force of public opinion which, as a rule, is passive and stationary. Except in such a case as this it is far stronger than aristocracy, which in Germany is willing to serve the crown for its own ends, and in France murmurs in impotence; it is stronger even than the national representatives, who can control the Government but cannot themselves govern. In France the Bourbon monarchy relied mainly upon the wealthy burghers, Napoleon III upon the lower classes. In the separate German States monarchy looks for support partly to the army and partly to the officials, who in their turn act as the chief restraint upon the crown, while in the Empire it relies upon the support of the masses and the governments of the different States. Nowhere has an organisation been founded which shall satisfy the claims of the demos, though numerous efforts have been made in this direction. When this has been accomplished, when the ruling dynasties have laid aside their mediaval prejudices and conformed to the modern ideas, the long struggle will be over, and full security will have been given to that limited monarchy which is destined to combine the unity of the whole with the liberty of every part, and to bring into harmony the political spirit of Rome and the German sentiment of freedom.

Note. The above subject has been treated by Gustav Zimmermann in a pamphlet, which attracted great attention at the time it appeared, entitled Die Vortrefflichkeit der constitutionellen Monarchie für England und die Unbrauchbarkeit der constitutionellen Monarchie für die Länder des Europäischen Continents, Hannover, 1852. (The excellence of constitutional monarchy for England and the impossibility of its application in continental countries.) This pamphlet is the absolutist rejoinder to the more fertile radical literature on the subject. Zimmermann, like most of his opponents, derives his notion of constitutional monarchy solely from the external forms and maxims of the English constitution. He is probably quite right in maintaining that the English system is not applicable to the continent, because its contradictions and its defects, which at home are corrected and softened down by tradition and by the interests of the ruling aristocracy, would be made far worse if it were carried out in a democratic spirit. But the English system is not identical with constitutional monarchy; it may be the greatest and, in spite of logical errors, the most successful effort to realise it, but it is not the

sole perfect realisation. To say that conditions on the continent are unsuited for the English system, is not to say that they are also unsuited for constitutional monarchy, i. e. for a monarchy which recognises that its own political rights, like those of the subject classes, are fixed and limited by the constitution and that for legislation especially all parts of the body politic must work together. An organic monarchy is necessarily constitutional, because the organism itself is the constitution. Zimmermann's perpetual designation of the chief authority as the property of the prince shows that, in spite of his keen eye for details, he has no real comprehension of the modern conception of the state. The choice of this mediæval standpoint brings him into collision with the whole current of modern life. For a time he may contrive to dam the flood, but as the waves rise he must be swept away with his frail edifice. (I leave this passage as it was written in 1857. It has been confirmed in 1866.) If there is one principle which is clearly grasped in the present day, it is that political power is a public duty as well as a public right, that it belongs to the political existence and life of the whole nation, and that it can never be regarded as the property or personal right of an individual.

CHAPTER XV.

2. False Ideas of Constitutional Monarchy.

ALMOST all the civilised states have

LMOST all the civilised States of Europe have adopted Errors :—

it a means of reconciling, not only the contradiction bequeathed by the middle ages, between absolute rule on the one hand, and a weak and divided State on the other; but also the various currents of contemporary politics, and especially those of monarchy and democracy. It is therefore of direct practical importance to discuss the foundations of this system. But it is first necessary to clear away some errors and misconceptions that have prevailed on the subject.

The French Revolution set itself in the early years to 1. That the king realise the idea of Rousseau, that the State contains two has execupowers, the will or legislative power, and physical force or tive power only. the executive power. The people wills, the king executes,' was considered in France to be the essential formula of constitutional monarchy 1.

1 Rousseau, Contr. Soc. iii. 1: Toute action libre a deux causes, qui concourent à la produire, l'une morale, savoir la volonté qui détermine l'acte, l'autre physique, savoir la puissance qui l'exécute. . . . Le corps politique a les mêmes mobiles, on y distingue de même la force et la volonté ; celle-ci sous le nom de puissance législative, l'autre sous le nom de puissance exécutive.' Mirabeau, Speech of 1 Sept. 1789: 'Deux pouvoirs sont nécessaires à l'existence et aux fonctions du corps politique; celui de vouloir et celui d'agir. Par le premier la société établit les règles qui doivent la conduire au but qu'elle se propose, et qui est incontestablement le bien de tous. Par le second ces règles s'exécutent, et la force publique sert à faire triompher la société des obstacles que cette exécution pourrait rencontrer dans l'opposition des volontés individuelles. Chez une grande nation ces deux pouvoirs ne

2. That

the king is purely passive.

3. That the royal power is

This idea sets the people in opposition to the king, and in fact suppresses monarchy altogether, as it makes the king a mere servant of the popular will, which is external to him, and formed without his having any part in it. The fall of Louis XVI, and the proclamation of a Republic by the Jacobins, were doubtless the result of historical circumstances, but they were also the natural consequence of this principle of the constitution.

If, on the other hand, the king is regarded as the equal of the legislative power, instead of being excluded from it as a subordinate, the necessary unity of the State organism is destroyed, and an impossible diarchy, a monster with two heads, is created. This must split up the State, or else must speedily give way to either the monarchical or the democratic principle.

To avoid this absurdity Sieyès wished to make the head of the State purely passive, and regarded this as the basis of the constitutional system. Napoleon, a born monarch if ever man was, branded this proposal with indelible contempt: 'How can you expect a man of talent and honour to resign himself to play the part of a hog which is to be fattened upon two millions 3?'

6

A more common expression is that the king has the right to rule and govern, but the exercise of this right

peuvent être exercés par elle-même; de là la necessité des représentants du peuple pour l'exercice de la faculté de vouloir, ou de la puissance législative; de là encore la nécessité d'une autre espèce de représentants pour l'exercice de la faculté d'agir ou de la puissance exécutive.' Thiers, Hist. de la Révol. Franç. i. 97: "La nation veut, le roi fait," les esprits ne sortaient pas de ces élémens simples, et ils croyaient vouloir la monarchie, parce qu'ils laissaient un roi comme exécuteur des volontés nationales. La monarchie réelle, telle qu'elle existe même dans les États libres, est la domination d'un seul, à laquelle on met des bornes au moyen du concours national. . . . Mais dès l'instant que la nation peut ordonner tout ce qu'elle veut, sans que le roi puisse s'y opposer par le véto, le roi n'est plus qu'un magistrat. C'est alors la république avec un seul consul au lieu de plusieurs. Le gouvernement de Pologne, quoiqu'il y eut un roi, ne fut jamais (?) nommé une monarchie.'

2 The discord which is produced by this diarchy was well understood by the democratic-republican party in France, and they took advantage of it to .get rid of the monarchy altogether.

3 Las Casas, Mém. iv.