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difference of number is naturally connected with a difference of character in the ruling power, and that it is the latter which is the ultimate criterion. Nevertheless, he has not expressed himself definitely enough about the principles of quality.

division in

There is another point in which Aristotle's division re- Aristotle's quires correction. It is incomplete, because history shows complete. us a number of States which do not come under any of his three normal forms. In all of them the supreme power belongs to men, whether it is to one man, or to the best, or to the people. But there have been States in which no human authority has been recognised, in which the supreme power has been attributed either to God, or to a God, or some other superhuman being, or to an Idea. The men who exercised rule were not regarded as its possessors, but as the servants and vicegerents of an unseen ruler, free from the weakness of human nature.

This fourth form of State, when directed to the welfare of Ideocracy. the subjects, may be designated by the general term of Ideocracy (Theocracy); and its perversion may be called Idolocracy.

Note.-Schleiermacher (Abhandlungen der Berl. Akademie der Wissensch. 1814, Ueber die Begriffe der verschiedenen Statsformen) has maintained that the three ancient divisions, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, ‘are always running into each other.' For example, in a democracy the leading men may resemble an aristocracy; and sometimes an individual, e.g. Pericles, may rule like a monarch. The same truth applies to a monarchy, and Mirabeau was right in saying (Speech of 1790 in his Works, viii. 139), ‘In a certain sense republics are monarchical, and again in a certain sense monarchies are republics.' Nevertheless, the old division is by no means an empty one, and it is perfectly true that the form of the supreme power does give a definite stamp to the whole constitution of the State, and that the most important political principles stand in the closest relations to it.

CHAPTER II.

THE SO-CALLED MIXED STATE.

The Roman
Republic.

What is

meant by a Mixed

State?

EVEN

VEN in ancient times the attempt was made to add to Aristotle's division a fourth form, called the Mixed State". Cicero especially declared the Roman State to be a model of this fourth form, a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and maintained this form to be the best of the four1.

By a Mixed State may be understood one in which monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy are moderated or limited by other political factors, e. g. a monarchy may be limited by the formation of an aristocratic Senate or Upper House, and of a primary or representative Assembly of the people. In that case it is true that such a divided constitution is better than when an individual, or a few, or the majority, rule absolutely and without restraint. But such a mixture as this does not create a new form of State, for the supreme governing power is still concentrated in the hands of the monarch, or of the aristocracy, or of the people.

a [Aristotle himself recognised mixed constitutions: e. g. Pol. iv. c. 7.] 1 Cicero, de Republ. i. 29: 'Quartum quoddam genus reipublicae maxime probandum esse censeo, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus:' and i. 45; Placet enim, esse quiddam in republica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum partitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas judicio voluntatique multitudinis.' [Polybius (vi. 11) had previously described the Roman constitution as mixed. Plato (Laws, i. 712) treated Sparta as a mixed government, but without using the phrase. On the whole question, see Cornewall Lewis, Use and Abuse of Political Terms, pp. 72-90.]

On the other hand, if it is understood that the supreme governing power is itself divided between the monarch, the aristocracy, and the people, so that two supreme governments exist side by side, each independent of the other, then Tacitus is right in rejecting the idea of a Mixed State, and in maintaining that its existence, or at any rate its continuance, is impossible 2.

b

stitution.

In later times men have considered England to be a The EngMixed State of this kind, in which rule is divided between lish Conthree supreme powers, King, Lords, and Commons, and they have asserted that the English Constitution is perfect, just because it is the ideal realisation of this mixed form. But it is an error to suppose that the English Constitution has arisen from a division of the supreme governing power. It was the monarchy which, in old times, gave to the State its special form, and the monarchy has been gradually limited, first by a powerful aristocracy, and later by the admission of democratic elements. The external form of the State has always been monarchical, and to the sovereign is attributed not only the supreme governing power (the executive), but also the highest place in the legislative bodies or parliament.

not the

to be con

Moreover, it is generally forgotten that the principle of The govAristotle's division does not rest on the nature and com- ernment, position of the legislative power; for in any advanced State legislature, this is usually representative of the chief elements of the sidered. whole nation. On the contrary, it depends on the antithesis between the government and the governed, and upon the question to whom the supreme administrative power belongs. This latter cannot be divided, not even between a king and his ministers, for this would create a diarchy or triarchy, and

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2 Tacitus, Ann. iv. 33: Cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis et consociata reipublicae forma laudari facilius

quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.'

[It is not the same question, whether a government is mixed, and whether it has arisen from a mixture. Cp. Aristotle's remarks about the Solonian constitution at Athens; Pol. ii. 12. §§ 2, 3, 1273 b, 35 seq.]

• [Throughout the book Bluntschli has been misled by exaggerating the power of the monarchy in the English constitution. For a more correct view, see Bagehot, English Constitution.]

would be opposed to the essential character of a State, which, as a living organism, requires unity. In all living beings there is a variety of powers and organs, but in this variety there is unity. Some organs are superior and others inferior, but there is always one supreme organ, in which the directing power is concentrated. The head and the body have no separate and independent life, but they are not equal. So also for the State, a supreme organ is a necessary condition of its existence, and this cannot be split into parts, if the State itself is to retain its unity.

There is not, therefore, any such fourth form of State as has been called a Mixed State; and so far as mixture is possible, it is amply treated in a consideration of the three simple States enumerated above.

Note.-In our days there has been much talk of 'democratic monarchy,' and the formation of such states has been designated as the work of the age. If the expression implies that monarchy must now-a-days base itself upon the masses (the demos), and must stand in close connexion with them, it is correct, but such a State is a pure monarchy, and not in any sense mixed. If, again, it implies a monarchy limited by democratic institutions or, like the July-monarchy of 1830 in France, 'surrounded by republican institutions,' it has also a certain meaning; but in this case, as history shows, there is a danger that the principles of the two institutions may come into conflict, and that monarchy may be overthrown by the rising democracy or republic. But if it implies a mixing or division of the supreme executive power, so that it is half monarchical and half democratic, then it has no reasonable meaning, and a State so constituted could not possibly endure. The French Constituent Assembly of 1789 believed, with Rousseau, in the possibility of such a division of the sovereignty between two equal powers, one of which should belong to the nation, and the other to the king. But as soon as it was practically tried, the system showed itself inconsistent and unmanageable. Pinheiro-Ferreira (Principes du droit public, § 475) declares that monarchy to be democratic in which there are no privileges; but he includes under privileges any aristocratic distinction. To him, therefore, the expression merely implies a monarchy in which there are democratic but no aristocratic organisms, i. e. an incomplete state in which the aristocratic elements are disregarded or suppressed. Compare below, Chapter XVII, on Constitutional Monarchy.

CHAPTER III.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY.

MON

quieu.

ONTESQUIEU while following in essentials the Montesdivision of Aristotle, made a distinct scientific advance in seeking for each of the three forms-monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy-a spiritual or moral principle, apart from the number of the ruling power. Whether he succeeded is another matter. In his view virtue is the principle of democracy, moderation of aristocracy, honour of monarchy, and fear of despotism. He thus made despotism a fourth kind of State, but it is better treated by Aristotle as a perversion of the normal polity. Schleiermacher made a notable attempt to classify the Schleiervarious States according to different stages in the development of political consciousness. A State originates when the people acquire the consciousness of the necessary distinction (Gegensatz) between the government and the subject.' The first step is when a small people or tribe acquires this consciousness, and the new sentiment usually seizes 'equally upon the whole mass which is ripe for political life.' Then the sense of this distinction developes among all; they unite to form the government, and then separate again to become subjects. This is democracy, in which the opposition between public spirit and private interests is only slightly

1 Schleiermacher, Ueber die Begriffe der verschiedenen Statsformen, in the Abhandlungen der Berliner Academie, 1814.

macher.

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