virtue of the rights which God has given it, as a father does over his children, but it rules in the name of God, therefore it is that the State is clothed with majesty.' But this is to come back to an objective theocracy, which would practically lead to the ruler being considered the personal representative of God-a view which Stahl himself rejects-and would introduce again all the assumptions and abuses bound up with it. Christ himself by his saying, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's,' has clearly and decidedly pointed out the human character of the State, and rejected every identification of political authority with specifically divine rule. Therefore political science does well in considering the existence and institutions of the State from the human point of view.

4. Not infrequently the immutability of the existing con- Divine stitution, and especially of the person of the ruler or of his right. dynasty, has been defended by the principle that the 'powers that be are ordained of God.' But that the immutability of the external forms and of personal relations is no necessary part of the divine government of the world, is shown by the whole of history; and Paul's very advice, to obey 'the powers that be,' recognises indirectly the mutability of political institutions. In the seventeenth century, indeed, that precept might cause many pious Englishmen to have sincere scruples whether it was right to resist the tyranny of James II, and to deprive him of his throne; but after William of Orange was recognised as king by the nation and the parliament, even the most scrupulous and conscientious religious Tory could honour in him the power ordained of God".'

6

5. It is the same with the question of responsibility. That Irresponsistatesmen to whom much is entrusted, and that princes who bility. have power conferred on them, are responsible to God for what they do or omit, follows from the previous principle; but that does not decide on the further question, whether and

a [The non-juring Tories were by no means in such a hurry to recognise William III. They maintained that the de fucto king was not king de jure. Bluntschli seems to have taken his idea of the scrupulous religious Tory from the Vicar of Bray.']

History of

the expression 'by the grace of God.'

how far they are also responsible to a human judge. Irresponsibility to human judges is claimed for the highest authority in the State, not because it is specially divine, but simply because it is the highest.

The statesman must not, in the belief that God determines the destiny of nations and States, and in the confidence that God will govern well, tempt God and shirk his own responsibility. Rather, he is not freed from his own responsibility, until he has conscientiously fulfilled the task entrusted to him to the best of his power7.

Note. The history of the expression by the grace of God,' which is added to the title of kings, deserves attention. At different periods it has had different senses.

(a) The expression was especially used in the Middle Ages. The old Frankish kings used indifferently the forms, 'gratia Dei,' 'divina ordinante providentia,'' divina favente gratia,' 'divina favente clementia,' ‘per Dei misericordiam. At that time the expression signified merely the humble reverence and religious gratitude of the king towards God, to whom he ascribed his personal elevation; but it was used by elected as well as hereditary princes. King Pipin, who owed his elevation to a revolution, used the formula as readily as his son Charles the Great.

In the Frankish period it expressed no sovereign power. Bishops and abbots, although legally chosen or appointed by kings, and temporal counts, although royal officials, added this formula to their titles.

(b) In the German-Roman Empire the expression at first continued in the same way. Not only elected kings, but dukes, counts who held offices under the king, and bishops and abbots recognised in the same way the grace of God. Sometimes temporal magnates add to the grace of God the grace of the emperor, and spiritual princes the grace of the pope. Dei et imperiali gratia,' 'Dei et apostolicae sedis gratia.'

Gradually, however, the exclusive use of the phrase 'Grace of God' comes to signify immediate or direct authority; as opposed to the derived authority of a vassal. The expression corresponded above all to the medieval tendency to derive all power from God.

(c) After the Reformation the Lutheran theologians began to proclaim the saying of Paul, the powers that be, are ordained of God,' as a Christian dogma, and to declare those in authority the anointed representatives of God. Luther himself was less narrow; he once wrote to King Henry VIII of England: I, Martin Luther, by the grace of God ecclesiastes, to Henry, by the ungrace of God King of England.' The theologians who held by the letter did not consider that the apostle Paul expressly applied that saying to

C'est un

7 Lamartine, Révolut. de 1848, i. p. 47, says of himself: Il tentait Dieu et le peuple. Lamartine se reprocha depuis sévèrement cette faute. tort grave de renvoyer à Dieu ce que Dieu a laissé à l'homme d'État, la responsabilité; il y avait là un défi à la Providence.'

the Roman Emperor Nero, who had received his power from the Roman people, and meant to oppose the theocratically minded Jewish Christians who contemned the heathen emperor. They overlooked the fact that the apostle Peter had quite the same intention, when he recommended to the Christians obedience to human government (1 Peter ii. 13). They gloried in being the defenders of the divine right of temporal princes.

(d) Still more decidedly Louis XIV of France and James II of England attempted to make the grace of God' a new political dogma, and thereby to obtain a higher sanction for the absolutism of the king. Unlike all the other human rights of property, family, parliament, the right of the king was to be specifically divine, that is to say, absolute. He was to be raised above the sphere of human law. Meantime the French estates refused to sanction the king's divinity, and the English Parliament resisted still more vigorously. The English Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 definitely rejected this theocratical principle.

(e) The most decided adversaries of this principle were the German publicists, Puffendorff and Thomasius, but above all, Frederick the Great, who saw in it the fundamental error of European politics.

(f) Stahl has recently attempted to give a new acceptance to the false idea, and to smuggle it anew into the theory of the State in the form of an objective divine right of authority, as distinct from the personal deification of the absolute king. In vain: the modern world cannot be bewitched by this abortive product of a diseased imagination.

T

CHAPTER VIII.

'Might is Right.'

Is this the teaching of History?

III. THE THEORY OF FORCE.

HE State is the work of violent domination, it is based on the right of the stronger.' Thus we are assured by certain philosophers, but still oftener by despots 1.

This doctrine is favourable to despotism, for it justifies every act of violence; but it may also serve the purpose of revolutionaries as soon as they are strong enough to exercise force openly. It is ordinarily invoked by the brutal might which violates right. It is a sophism attractive only for the strong, more likely to crush than to deceive the weak: it may deceive the man who holds it, but not others.

It has been said that history proves the truth of this opinion. Certainly, force shows itself more often in the foundation of States than contract, but only very seldom has brute force alone arbitrarily produced States, and never great and lasting States. As a rule, if force, especially in the form of war, has had its share in the foundation of new States, the force was still only the servant of real claims of right. It was not the source of right, but only broke through the obstacles which prevented it flowing in its proper channels. Might did not create right, but supported it, and compelled recognition for it. Wherever in history force appears in its nakedness, there it is not an instrument of creation, but of destruction and death.

1 Plutarch (Life of Camillus, c. 17) puts this theory into the mouth of the Gallic king Brennus: The most ancient of all laws, which extends from God to the beasts, gives to the stronger rule over the weaker.'

This doctrine is a most flagrant contradiction of the conception of personal freedom. It recognises only masters and slaves. By free men (liberi) it understands freed men (libertini). It equally contradicts the idea of Right or Law, which manifestly has a spiritual and moral significance: mere physical force ought to serve right and, if it pretends to be right, it has risen against its proper master 2.

truth in the

doctrine.

However, even the errors of this doctrine contain a re- Element of siduum of truth. It makes prominent one element which is indispensable to the State, namely force (Macht), and has a certain justification as against the opposed theory which bases the State upon the arbitrary will of individuals, and leads logically to political impotence. It lays emphasis on realities and on facts, and warns us against vain attempts at realising the dreams of mere speculation, where natural forces resist.

Without force a State can neither come into being nor continue. Force is required within, as well as without; where force has produced firm and enduring results, it seeks and commonly obtains a connection with right, that is a recognition and purification by means of right. Without right the might of the stronger is brutal, it is the wolf that devours the lamb. United with right, it becomes worthy of the moral nature of man.

2 Le plus fort n'est jamais assez fort pour être toujours le maître, s'il ne transforme sa force en droit, et l'obéissance en devoir.' Rousseau, Contr. Soc. i. ch. 3; quoted by Schmitthenner, Statswissenschaft, i. p. 13.