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cusable, those telegrams must have shown him, if proof were necessary, the emergency in which Pope was placed, and that the coucentration of the two armies was not being effected in the time expected, and as a consequence that Pope was in a critical position, needing immediate help to save his army from defeat. It was under these circumstances that General McClellan left the Peninsula.

When he reached Aquia on the 24th, under most positive and pressing orders from Washington, General Popt, who had been holding the line of the Rappabannock for nearly a week against the assaults of Lee's whole army, and keeping up communication with Fredericksburg, so as to receive the re-enforcements McClellan had been ordered to send up from the Peninsula-finding these re-enforcements not coming by water to join his left as fast as Lee marched by land around his right, and that his right, though stretched to Waterloo Bridge, had been turned and his rear threatened, had been obliged to throw back his right first to Warrenton, and then to Gainesville, and his left and centre from Rappahannock and Sulphur Springs, to Warrenton Junction, Bristol and Manassas. General McClellan knew on the 24th, when at Aquia, of the abandoning of Rappahannock Station, and of Pope's having broken his communication with Fredericksburg, and himself reported the facts to General Halleck.

August 26th, General Halleck ordered General McClellan from A quia to Alexandria, and told him “General Franklin's Corps” which had arrived at Alexandria, “ will march as soon as it receives transportation.”

General Pope had, when his line was stretched from below Rappahannock Station to beyond Warrenton, asked that Franklin's Corps might be sent out to take post on his right at Gainesville, to which there was transportation by turnpike and railroad, to guard against what afterwards happened,--the movement of the enemy through that place, on his rear. The failure to have that corps at that place or in the action at all, was one of the chief causes of Pope's failure. Why was this?

August 27th, as already stated, General McClellan was directed “ to take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria.” On the same day he was informed of the position of Pope's head-quarters; of that of most of Pope's forces; of where Pope wished re-enforcements sent him-Gainesville; and that Fitz John Porter, then under Pope, reported a battle imminent. At 10 A. M. on that day, he was told by Halleck, “ that Franklin's Corps shonld march in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible; and again at 12 P. M., ho was further told by Halleck that “ Franklin's Corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by Railroad.

It is well to bear in mind these explicit orders, and the circumstances under which, and the object for which they were given, for General McClellan either seems to have forgotten them, or to have utterly failed to appreciate their importance. A battle reported by his favorite general, Fitz-John Porter, as imminent, within cannon sound of where he was,—the road to the battle-field, a wide, straight, Macadam turnpike, wellknown to both General McClellan and General Franklin, as each had been over it more than once,--the whole of the enemy and army which had been pressing Pope since the 9th, now concentrating to overwhelm him,-here one would think, was every motive for him to do, as he claims to have done, every thing in his power to send re-enforcements forward, and to send them instantly.

Why was it then, that, at 7.15 P. M., on the 29th, more than two days after the order for it to go by forced marches to reenforce an army engaged in battle, Franklin's Corps was still at Anandale, abont seven miles from Alexandria, and Franklin himself in Alexandria ? General Halleck says it was all contrary to his orders, and McClellan acknowledges himself “responsible for both these circumstances.”

In the meantime, Pope's forces fought the battles of the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and were now to fight that of the 30th without Franklin's help. Why was this? Were the orders to send Franklin out countermanded ? General Halleck says they were not. As it is never just to judge a person by the light obtained after the fact, let us see, so far as the correspondence enables us, what were the different phases of the case as they presented themselves at the time.

The iņtimation to McClellan on the 26th, that Franklin was to go to the front, was followed by the positive orders of the 27th, given at 10 A. M. and 12 m. On that day General McClellan reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington; and that he had given orders to place the corps

in readiness to march to the next in rank. At the same time, he reports heavy firing at Centreville.

On the 28th, Halleck, learning that McClellan, who it seems had also gone to Washington, had not returned to Alexandria, sent orders to Franklin direct, to move with his corps (the 28th) towards Manassas Junction. On the 28th, at 3. P. M., Halleck informs McClellan that “not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy forced.” On the same day, at 7.40 P. M., he again tells him :

that day

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There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's Corps towards Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons come to their relief.”

There is no possible room for misunderstanding the intention of the General-in-Chief from these orders. He wished, and ordered, that communication should be at once re-established with Pope, and Pope re-enforced in time to be of service.

Why did not McClellan re-establish the communication, and re-enforce Pope in time to be of service? Why did he halt Franklin's Corps at Anandale ?

He gives reasons for this in his telegram to Halleck of August 29th. “By referring to my telegrams," he says, “ of 10.30 A. M., 12 m., and 1 P. M., together with your reply of 2.48 r. M., you will see why Franklin's Corps halted at Anandale."

Let us examine these telegrams in connection with the circumstances then existing. The first is follows:

CAMP NEAR ALEXANDRIA,

August 29, 10.30 A. M. “Franklin's Corps are in motion; started about six A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's Hill to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna via Freeman Hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's Brigade is still at Aquia. If Sumnermoves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington; yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived. Have but three squadrons belonging to the Army of the Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resist

I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville?

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

ance.

To this Halleck replies :

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862. Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's Brigade ordered

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up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alex. andria on Sunday last for three hours. I hear nothing from Drainsville.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

To this McClellan sends the second of the dispatches he refers to, as follows. There are two telegrams of the same date.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,

August 29, 1862, 12 m. Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's Corps to continue ? He is without reserve ammunition, and without transportation.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Mafor-General. Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS Army POTOMAC,

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, Aug. 29, 186-, 12 M. Have ordered most of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tennallytown. Would it meet your views to post rest of Sumner's Corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, Chain Bridge, and even Tennallytown?

Franklin has only 10,000 to 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish the force to advance?

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Army. Major-General HALLECK. General-in-Chief. Then follows the telegram of 1 P. M.:

HEAD-QUARTERS NEAR ALEXANDRIA,

August 29, 1862, 1 P. M. I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give order at once. Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marsh, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Marshall's, Miner's, and Hall's Hills. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really think ought not, under the present circumstances, to proceed beyond Anandale ?

G. B. MOCLELLAN, Major-General. General HALLECK, General-in-Chief,

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