APPENDIX-Continued STATE APPLICATIONS TO CONGRESS CALLING FOR CONVENTIONS TO PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS APPENDIX-Continued STATE APPLICATIONS TO CONGRESS CALLING FOR CONVENTIONS TO PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (1787-1963)-Continued improvement and for voter approval of any proposed changes will be minimal, and that the value of Con Con as a meaningful political experience for all the people of this state will be doubtful. I do not for one moment question the value of political parties in our system of government, and, indeed, I have worked actively for the candidates of my own party for regular political office at all levels. Nor do I in any sense mean to suggest that a constitutional convention is a non-political proceeding. On the contrary, a constitutional convention is the most fundamental political institution we have, and it is precisely for this reason that the people all of the peopleshould play a more significant role in its procedures and deliberations than they do in any other process of government. To paraphrase an old saying, the business of constitution-making is too important (and too highly political) to be left only to politicians. A constitutional convention is the institution through which the people exercise the ultimate power of government—the power to renew and repair the basic structure and machinery of the government under which they live. By contrast, since their inception, political parties have historically represented "a divergence of thought in government policy," and have contended for the pre-eminence of their conflicting ideas of governmental policy within the arena established by the structure and machinery of government, to which the parties, whatever their policy difference, all bear common allegiance. The purpose and function of a constitutional convention transcends, therefore, the normal concerns of partisan policies. THE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS The Constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall [now] provide for a convention, to consist of double the number of members of the Senate, to be elected in the same manner, at the same places, and in the same districts." " While there seems to be little question in people's minds that this mandate requires the election of two delegates from each of the 58 senate districts, as currently apportioned on a "one man-one vote" basis," there have been some doubts expressed, particularly in legislative quarters, as to whether the phrase “in the same manner" might require not only elections but also nominations for delegates to be made in the same manner as for state senators, i.e., through party primaries. In part, this hesitancy may be attributable to an understandable reluctance to part with old and familiar ways. Moreover, in the case of some legislators, there may be an equally understandable reluctance to encourage political competition in their own legislative districts. However, while constitutional conventions have traditionally been breeding grounds for new political leadership, the Michigan Convention experience of 1961-62 strongly suggests that there is a greater tendency to encourage political ambitions when convention delegates are selected on a partisan, as opposed to a non-partisan, basis." With respect to the legal question, a recent study has concluded that the General Assembly does indeed have the power to adopt legislation for the nonpartisan selection of convention delegates, specifically insofar as such legislation eliminates party primary nominations and provides for delegate elections without party designations. The principal findings of the study may be summarized as follows: 1. The Illinois Constitution itself requires only that convention delegates be directly elected by the people, that is, by qualified electors voting at free elections by means of secret ballot. 2. The party primary nominating process, unknown at the time the present Constitution was adopted, is not a demonstrable constitutional prerequisite to the elections required by the Constitution. 3. The general laws pertaining to the election of state senators cannot in any event be literally applied to the election of convention delegates, because these · People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 333 Ill. 606, 614 (1929). 5 Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 1. As senate districts are currently apportioned, the City of Chicago will have 42 delegates, Suburban Cook County 18 Delegates, and the Downstate Counties 56 delegates. People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 212, opinion supplemented, 33 Ill. 2d 11 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 30 (1966). See Sturm, Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961-1962 (Ann Arbor 1963), supra, at 114-17. Report of the Chica o Bar Association Committee on Court Revision on the Manner of Electing Delegates to Constitutional Convention (April 17, 1968). [From the Chicago Bar Record, December 1968] CON CON AT THE CROSSROADS; CONVENTION OF THE PARTIES OR OF THE PEOPLE?* (By Peter A. Tomei) ... a constitutional convention is the most fundamental political institution we have, and it is precisely for this reason that the people all of the people should play a more significant role in its procedures and deliberations than they do in any other process of government. . . . the business of constitution-making is too important (and too highly political) to be left only to politicians.” (Article, page 2) "There is an honorable place for the clash of party and interest, but the place is not here," urged the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy in his address to the opening session of the 1967 New York Constitutional Convention.' But his warning came too late, for the clash of party had already been ensured by the partisan selection of convention delegates, a majority of whom were members of Senator Kennedy's own party, and the clash of interest naturally and inevitably followed. The result was a disaster. Now, in the wake of the November 5th election, in which Con Con received one of the largest pluralities ever recorded for any candidate or any issue in Illinois history, the people may properly ask whether Illinois will heed the warning of Senator Kennedy and, indeed, of many of its own political leaders," or whether it will follow New York down the road to constitutional folly and rejection. Among the questions which will confront the General Assembly when it meets in 1969 to implement the November 5th call to a constitutional convention, none will be so critical as that concerning the procedure for delegate selection. Should the General Assembly reject the non-partisan approach to delegate selection, it can be safely predicted that the prospects for genuine constitutional •Except where otherwise noted, data for the article is based on the following principal sources: New York: Kaden, "The People: No! Some Observations on the 1967 New York Constitutional Convention," 5 Harvard Journal on Legislation 343 (1968); Ostwald, "How Not to Hold a State Con-Con," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1967, at 18. col. 3. Michigan: Sturm, Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961-62 (Ann Arbor 1963). Maryland: Note, "State Constitutional Change: The Constitutional Convention," 54 U. Va. Rev. 995 (1968); Kerrison, "Gray Day in Maryland," The Reporter, June 13, 1968; "Maryland Says 'No'," The Economist, June 1, 1968, at 29. Illinois: Tomei, "How Not to Hold a Constitutional Convention: A Critical Look at the 1920 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 49 Chicago Bar Record 179 (1968); "Report of the Committee on Constitutional Revision on a Constitutional Convention for Illinois," Appendix C, 48 Chicago Bar Record 56, 70 (1967); Davis, "Defects and Causes of Defeat of the Proposed Constitution of 1922," 26 Chicago Bar Record 276 (1945). General: Adrian, "Trends in State Constitutions," 5 Harvard Journal on Legislation 311 (1968); Bebout, "State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1965-1967," 17 Book of the States, 1968-1969 3 (Chicago 1968); Graves, "State Constitutions and Constitutional Revisión, 1963-1965," 16 Book of the States, 1966-67 3 (Chicago 1966); Graves, "State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1961-1963," 15 Book of the States, 1964-1965 3 (Chicago 1964); U.S. League of Women Voters, Inventory of Work on Consti tutional Revision (D.C. 1966). 1 New York Times, Apr. 5, 1967, at 32, col. 7. According to official records of the Secretary of State, Con Con received 2,979,977 votes in favor and 1,135,440 votes against, or a plurality of 1,844,537 votes, out of a total vote cast in the Nov. 5, 1968 general election of 4,705,852. This represents a constitutional majority of 63.3 percent and a majority of those actually voting on the proposition of 72.4 percent. The percentage of persons not voting on the constitutional proposition was the lowest in Blue Ballot history, 12.5 percent. The figures for Cook County are 1,695,838 votes in favor and 415,293 votes against, out of a total vote of 2,376,211. Percentage-wise, this is a constitutional majority of 71.4 percent and a majority of those voting on the proposition of 80.3 percent. The figures for Downstate are 1.284,139 votes in favor and 720,147 votes against, out of a total vote of 2,329,641. Percentage-wise, this is a constitutional majority of 55.1 percent and a majority of those voting on the proposition of 64.1 percent. Republican Governor-elect Richard B. Ogilvie announced his support for non-partisan delegate elections on Nov. 26, 1968, and a non-partisan election bill, H. B. No. 1 cosponsored by House Speaker Ralph T. Smith (R. Alton) and Representative Harold A. Katz (D. Glencoe), was prefiled on Dec. 2, 1968. In July 1968, a non-partisan delegate election bill (H. B. No. 2769), which many thought was premature, received a favorable but insufficient vote, crossing party lines, of 72 to 64. Journal of the House of Representatives, 75th General Assembly, July 22, 1968, at 16-17. Non-partisan delegate elections were endorsed by the Chicago Tribune on Nov. 13, 1968, and by the State AFL-CIO on Nov. 14, improvement and for voter approval of any proposed changes will be minimal, and that the value of Con Con as a meaningful political experience for all the people of this state will be doubtful. I do not for one moment question the value of political parties in our system of government, and, indeed, I have worked actively for the candidates of my own party for regular political office at all levels. Nor do I in any sense mean to suggest that a constitutional convention is a non-political proceeding. On the contrary, a constitutional convention is the most fundamental political institution we have, and it is precisely for this reason that the people all of the peopleshould play a more significant role in its procedures and deliberations than they do in any other process of government. To paraphrase an old saying, the business of constitution-making is too important (and too highly political) to be left only to politicians. A constitutional convention is the institution through which the people exercise the ultimate power of government-the power to renew and repair the basic structure and machinery of the government under which they live. By contrast, since their inception, political parties have historically represented "a divergence of thought in government policy," and have contended for the pre-eminence of their conflicting ideas of governmental policy within the arena established by the structure and machinery of government, to which the parties, whatever their policy difference, all bear common allegiance. The purpose and function of a constitutional convention transcends, therefore, the normal concerns of partisan policies. THE LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS The Constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall [now] provide for a convention, to consist of double the number of members of the Senate, to be elected in the same manner, at the same places, and in the same districts." "While there seems to be little question in people's minds that this mandate requires the election of two delegates from each of the 58 senate districts, as currently apportioned on a “one man-one vote" basis," there have been some doubts expressed, particularly in legislative quarters, as to whether the phrase "in the same manner" might require not only elections but also nominations for delegates to be made in the same manner as for state senators, i.e., through party primaries. In part, this hesitancy may be attributable to an understandable reluctance to part with old and familiar ways. Moreover, in the case of some legislators, there may be an equally understandable reluctance to encourage political competition in their own legislative districts. However, while constitutional conventions have traditionally been breeding grounds for new political leadership, the Michigan Convention experience of 1961-62 strongly suggests that there is a greater tendency to encourage political ambitions when convention delegates are selected on a partisan, as opposed to a non-partisan, basis." With respect to the legal question, a recent study has concluded that the General Assembly does indeed have the power to adopt legislation for the nonpartisan selection of convention delegates, specifically insofar as such legislation eliminates party primary nominations and provides for delegate elections without party designations. The principal findings of the study may be summarized as follows: 1. The Illinois Constitution itself requires only that convention delegates be directly elected by the people, that is, by qualified electors voting at free elections by means of secret ballot. 2. The party primary nominating process, unknown at the time the present Constitution was adopted, is not a demonstrable constitutional prerequisite to the elections required by the Constitution. 3. The general laws pertaining to the election of state senators cannot in any event be literally applied to the election of convention delegates, because these • People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 333 Ill. 606, 614 (1929). 5 Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 1. As senate districts are currently apportioned, the City of Chicago will have 42 delegates, Suburban Cook County 18 Delegates, and the Downstate Counties 56 delegates. People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 212, opinion supplemented, 33 Ill. 2d 11 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 30 (1966). See Sturm, Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961-1962 (Ann Arbor 1963), supra, at 114-17. Report of the Chica o Bar Association Committee on Court Revision on the Manner of Electing Delegates to Constitutional Convention (April 17, 1968). |