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should do quite well with their organizational and polemical talents. Even if they dominated the convention and enshrined in the Constitution the new politics they have imposed in this century, we would gain a lot just in having the current philosophy of American public affairs set out explicitly. Another convention, with all its posibilities, would force a great shaking-out of American politics. Its drama would cut through the layers of mass apathy and focus popular attention on the fundamental political questions. It would force Americans to consider the kind of people we have become, and the society and government we prefer. It would allow a genuinely New Foundation, if desired.

The proximate issue, controlling government spending, is not some fiscal technicality; it reflects a growing desperation among the governed. The political appeal of the New Deal model our current constitutional order-has lain in its promise to each voter to take from and control other people for his benefit. But as leveling and legislation have proceeded, a growing majority of Americans have realized that they are now those other people, more often targets of state action than beneficiaries; yet the machinery of regulation and redistribution seems impervious to individual aspiration.

Another convention would force Americans to recall the values of the first Constitution and consider how we have changed as a nation. It would allow a recalculation of the costs of dependence upon government and the benefits of individual responsibility and voluntary public spirit. Another convention could offer perhaps a last chance to make sure we have the government we deserve.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 1979]

SHOULD THE BUDGET BE BALANCED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION?

YES

(By James Dale Davidson)

Only once since 1960 has the federal budget been balanced. Through good years and bad, the deficit has tended to increase, so that today-in the fifth year of a recovery-the President plans a deficit of $29 billion. It will likely be larger.

As the deficits have increased, so has the rate of inflation. The consumer price index has more than doubled since 1967. At current rates it will double again by the early 1980s. Costs for many necessities have been rising even faster.

This outcome is due to the fact that incurring inflationary deficits is in the self-interest of congressmen. It improves their chances of reelection. Deficits enable them to make the benefits of increased spending immediately evident to special constituencies, while disguising the costs (which are defused over large numbers of the rest of society).

This is true in either of the two ways in which deficits can be financed.

To the extent that the excessive spending is financed by the sale of bonds to the banking system, the costs will be borne by the average consumer in the supermarket and at the gas pump. If even 20 percent of the public is confused by the resulting inflation and cannot identify the source of their hurt, this involves a political advantage over the levying of taxes.

In other words, deficits achieve a successful deception of the people. As a result of this deecption many of the political pressures emerging from the excessive spending are not directed toward politicians in Washington but toward businesses and labor unions. A clamor arises for "control" of higher prices nad wage settlements which are apparently responsible for the declining living standards of the average person.

• When deficits are financed through genuine borrowing from the public, those who will bear the costs are the future generations who must pay taxes to redeem the bonds. This too reduces the political costs of the spending. By passing the bills on to our children, their children, and others who are not yet born, members of Congress evade the responsibility for their spending decisions.

In other areas of life we recognize that it is necessary to take account of the self-interest of individuals in order to obtain behavior which points toward the public interest. In fact, we have built the most productive society in all history by harnessing the profit motive in private enterprise. That productivity is now being destroyed, however, because we have not extended the same insights about human nature to the operations of government.

Just as we could not expect the nation to be well shod if shoemakers obtained a higher income for producing ill-fitting and uncomfortable shoes, so we should not be surprised that we are victimized by inflation when we make it within the self-interest of politicans to contribute to inflation. If we wish to stop inflation, we must change the circumstances in which the decisions to inflate are taken.

A balanced budget amendment would do that. It would require the politicians to be accountable; to own up explicity and honestly to the full costs of their spending.

That is something which no political body in history has ever wanted to do. Once politicians shake free from fiscal discipline it is only by a kind of miracle that they are ever induced to voluntarily restrain themselves again. The record of many countries proves this. Thankfully, our constitutional fathers foresaw that a day might come when the Congress would fail the people. They gave us the means through Article V to go around the Congress to propose constitutional amendments by the convention process at times when the Congress itself was the cause of a defect in our system.

Today, 30 states of a needed 34 have already officially petitioned the Congress to either pass a balanced budget amendment or convene a limited constitutional convention to consider that and no other subject. As this movement to halt inflationary deficit spending nears success, the Big Spenders have raised false alarms about the dangers of popular government. They say that the people cannot be trusted to select delegates to a convention and that the state legislatures cannot be trusted to refrain from ratifying absurd proposals.

Furthermore, critics of a convention conveniently ignore the fact that the Congress itself is effectively an unlimited convention which could propose any amendment it chose at any time. Through almost two hundred years no steps have been taken to repeal the Bill of Rights or do any of the other unholy things which are alleged to be likely from a limited convention. Upon close consideration, therefore, the charges against a convention would not persuade a reasonable citizen.

The experience of many countries proves that inflation, once allowed to run out of control, is destructive of freed institutions. Inflation turns expectations upside-down. It impoverishes the elderly, makes fools of those who save, and turns every contract into a fraud, eventually creating conditions which no person of goodwill could desire.

That is why we must heed the advice of responsible people of all parties and convene a limited constitutional convention. Such a convention, far less subject than is the Congress to day-to-day political pressures, could be expected to do a better job of what the Congress has as yet refused to do: introduce an outside restraint to prohibit individual congressmen from pursuing their self-sprung tendency to obtain political profits in the present by mortgaging our future. Mr. Davidson is the chairman of the National Taxpayers Union.

No

(By John Culver)

Let me state right at the outset that I strongly favor moving toward a balanced budget as part of our fight against inflation. Doing so will set an example to the country that its leaders are serious about putting their own house in order. It will help to identify and root out waste, mismanagement, and fraud. It will reduce the burden we place on future generations to pay for our current needs. But achieving a balanced budget will not persuade OPEC nations to roll back the price of oil which they have raised sixfold since 1973. It will not prevent labor and management from playing leapfrog with wages and prices. It won't improve our lagging productivity or add anything positive to our balance of payments. It won't call a halt to consumer deficit financing—which, incidentally, is of a far greater magnitude and growing much faster than the government's. And until there are answers to those intractable questions it is unrealistic to expect any sizable inroads into inflation, which by every index of public opinion is the number one problem facing the American people.

In addition to its obvious economic consequences and the fear and insecurity which it breeds, inflation poses another insidious danger. It stimulated the alltoo-human desire to blame convenient villains and demand easy answers for difficult and complex problems. In this context it is not difficult to understand the movement to require a balanced budget by constitutional amendment. It en

courages the notion that a single deft and decisive stroke will sweep away inflation. However comforting that vision may be, it in no way corresponds to the economic or political realities.

Our Constitution is a design of representative government and a charter of personal liberty. Only twice in the nation's history have we demeaned it as a vehicle for social or economic experiments. Both of those instances-slavery and prohibition-were tragic failures. Whatever the merits of a balanced budget, indelibly revising the supreme law of the land is the wrong way to go about it. One proposed amendment states categorically that expenditures in any given year may not exceed revenues but gives no guidance as to how this balance will be achieved. It could actually be done more easily by raising taxes than by cutting spending. And if spending were reduced there is no guarantee that the least useful programs would be eliminated. This is especially the case since more than 75 percent of the budget is relatively "uncontrollable"-spending obligated by previous defense contracts, for example, or medicaid payments.

In addition, such an amendment might leave the nation straitjacketed in the event of a threat to our national security or an economic emergency. Most economists fear that an abrupt balancing of the budget may push us into a recession. In such a case, each rise of 1 percent in unemployment would shrink tax revenues by $15 billion and boost outlays (for unemployment compensation and the like) by $3 to $5 billion, necessitating, by terms of the amendment, another round of higher taxes and reduced spending, deepening the recession and renewing the downward spiral. Where or if it would bottom out, no one knows.

Some proposals try to preempt the foregoing scenario by establishing a "state of emergency" escape hatch. Designing one that permits corrective action without making it so large that any excuse could justify a deficit, however, has proved an elusive goal.

Finally, other proposed amendments attempt to enforce complex economic formulas. These are almost guaranteed to wreck havoc on a Constitution which has endured war, depression, wrenching social change, and spectacular technological achievement in great measure because it limits itself to timeless principles expressed in simple, flexible language. Perhaps the best known of the "formula" amendments-Dr. Milton Friedman's-is longer than the Bill of Rights. It employs imprecise technical terms such as off-budget outlays, gross national product, and inflation on whose definition economists often disagree and statistics for which vary widely.

The last method suggested to achieve a balanced budget-a constitutional convention-would set us on a voyage into uncharted waters and unpredictable procedural chaos. Not since 1787 have we tried such a course and no established procedures exist with regard to agenda, funding, delegates or voting. Nor do we know for sure whether the convention would be confined to consideration of the balanced budget issue alone. In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and political assassination, at a time when special interests and single-issue groups abound, now is not the time to risk the divisiveness of constitutional revision on a national scale.

Using currently available tools, President Carter (with the aid of Congress) has trimmed away more than half of the deficit he inherited from the previous administration. The latest projections from the Office of Management and Budget predict a surplus in FY 1981. Constructive proposals such as sunset legislation with periodic review of spending programs and automatic termination of obsolete ones will help us make more progress. Pursuit of these responsible courses of action and disciplined consideration of all individual taxing and spending questions rather than a quick constitutional fix are the way to responsibly attack inflation and excess spending.

Senator Culver, Democrat, represents the State of Iowa in the U.S. Senate.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES N. STASNY ON PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION PROCEDURES ACT

The testimony I submit today is that of a private citizen who has studied the subject of a federal constitutional convention for sixteen years. The views expressed are entirely my own based, as nearly as possible, on an objective analysis

of the problems in the process through which the several States apply for a convention and on an assessment of the merits and defects of the bills submitted to govern the proceedings of a constitutional convention.

INTRODUCTION

Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of America's most respected jurists once observed, "About seventy-five years ago I learned I was not God. And so, when the people of the various states want to do something and I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do it, I say, whether I like it or not: Damn it, let 'em do it."

In the face of the recent efforts to summon a convention to add a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, there are many who do not share Justice Holmes' casual confidence in the ability of the American people to do it well. Because the convention method of amendment stands on the constitutional frontier of unanswered questions, many fear the convention process almost as an alien force. Consequently, even while the tide runs high for a convention, there is an equally strong push to thwart the convention procedure, either by stopping it altogether or by tightly circumscribing its authority. The convention bills that twice passed the Senate in the early 1970's would have made any convention a weak, second-citizen to the congressionally initiated procedure for amending the Constitution. Under these bills, Congress would have overwhelming control of a convention.

I do not believe a convention should be held. At a time when the international situation is precarious and world economic uncertainties cast shadows over the strength of all currencies, a convention would divert our domestic attentions from pressing problems while focusing global attention on what would certainly appear to allies and adversaries alike as a fundamental challenge to the American system of government. Nevertheless, even against so grave a background, if it is the combined judgment of the States that a convention should be held, it must be fair, open, and provide every deliberative opportunity for the delegates to freely decide what, if any, amendments should be submitted for ratification by the States. Whatever problems the summoning of a convention might cause for us abroad, they would be compounded many times over at home if our own people felt the convention was a closed, heavily restricted assembly.

I. Congress and the application process

A 1952 staff report of the House Judiciary Committee called the application process "the stepchild of constitutional law." In articles appearing in the Congressional Record of March 22, 1979, September 25, 1978 and November 2, 1977 I detailed some of the problems associated with the application process. What follows is a summary review of the principal issues involved.

A. Senate Practices on Memorials and Petitions

Rule VII of the Standing Rules of the Senate controls the manner in which the Senate deals with memorials and petitions.

Reception of memorials and petitions makes up part of the Morning Business. While memorials and petitions are technically laid before the full Senate by the presiding officer, he makes no formal announcement of their receipt. They are presented by bringing them to the Clerk's desk, or by delivering them to the Secretary of the Senate. With the approval of the presiding officer, they are entered in the Journal and the Congressional Record and appropriately referred.

The presentation of memorials and petitions follows the reading of the Senate Journal, the presentation of reports and communications from the heads of departments and such bills, joints resolutions and other messages from the House of Representatives as may remain on the table undisposed of from previous day's sessions. Their reception proceeds the reports of standing and select committees.

Memorials from state legislatures are printed in full in the Senate section of the Congressional Record and a memorial may not be received unless signed. In the Senate, the practice is to list memorials from state legislatures under the heading "Petitions".

Until the start of the 95th Congress, the Senate had no orderly means of catalouging memorials submitted by the States. But, on December 16, 1976 in a memo from the Secretary of the Senate, a new system of control numbers for petitions and memorials was announced to take effect January 4, 1977.

According to the memorandum, petitions and memorials were to be combined into one category and assigned numbers preceded by the initials "POM": Under the new system petitions and memorials go first to the office of the President of the Senate who dates them. They are next sent to the Parliamentarian who assigns the control number and makes the appropriate committee referral. The Official Reporter then inserts them into the Congressional Record and the Bill Clerk sees to it that the appropriate committee physically receives the memorial or petition. This provision appears to be in contravention of Rule VII, paragraph (6) which directs that memorials are to be kept in the files of the Secretary of the Senate.

The December 16, 1976 memo also specifies that the Journal Clerk is to receive a list of the "petitions placed before the Senate and printed in the Record each day."

B. House Practices on Memorials and Petitions

Under the Rules of the House of Representatives, Memorials are treated under Rule XXII, paragraph (4), and Petitions are treated under Rule XXII, paragraph (1). They are listed separately and numbered sequentially in the House portion of the Congressional Record following the introduction of bills and resolutions at the conclusion of the day's proceedings. It is the practice to have memorials brought to the attention of the House by the Speaker.

Resolutions of state legislatures and/or primary assemblies of the people are received as memorials. They are filed with the Clerk of the House but the office of the Clerk advises they do not, in fact, retain them. Rather, they are transferred to the Speaker who refers them (through the Parliamentarian) to the appropriate committee where they are filed.

Rule XXII, paragraph (4) of the House Rules specifies that memorials and their titles shall be entered on the Journal and printed in the Congressional Record of the next day. In practice, however, the process is reversed. According to the House Journal Clerk's Office, staff members clip memorials printed in the Record and subsequently enter them on the Journal.

The office of the Bill Clerk actually prepares the briefs of the memorials that appear in the Record. The Bill Clerk receives the memorials from the Parliamentarian's office and assigns them the number which appears in the Record. He sees to it that the memorial is physically delivered to the committee to which it has been referred.

C. The convention applications: Anomalies in the Congress and the State legislatures

Of the thirty-two applications for a convention received by the Congress between 1974 and 1977, I located the texts of all but one (California 1974). Of the remaining thirty-one, sixteen were directed by the respective state legislatures to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and the President of the United States Senate. Eleven applications were directed to the attention of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of he House. Of the remaining four applications, three were addressed to the Congress without specifying an officer of either House and one was addressed only to the members of the state's congressional delegation.

Of the sixteen applications directed to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, eleven were noted in the Congressional Record by both Houses. Four of the remaining five applications were printed in full by the Senate. One was printed only by the House.

Of the eleven applications addressed to both the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate, all but one were noted in the Record by both the House and Senate. This suggests that when applications are directed to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, they are more likely to be properly received by both Houses of Congress than when they are sent to the presiding officer of each House.

Nevertheless, the principal convention bills introduced in the Congress since 1953, specify that applications for a convention be addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. This provision was included in both S. 215 which passed the Senate 84 to 0 on October 19, 1971 and in S. 1272 which passed the Senate without debate on July 9, 1973.

The provision directing memorials to the Speaker and the President of the Senate also appears to be at variance with established practice in the House of

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