A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Volumen2Longmans, Green, 1874 |
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Términos y frases comunes
action advantage affections agreeable animal appear arises artificial beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances CLEANTHES common concerning connexion consequently consider consider'd contrary cou'd dæmons degree deriv'd desire direct passions distinction double relation emotion encrease entirely establish'd esteem esteem'd evil excite experience farther feel fluence force give happiness hope and fear human nature Hume imagination impressions and ideas influence interest Introd judgment justice kind latter laws lence love and hatred mankind manner means mind moral motive necessity never object obligation observ'd observe operation original ourselves pain particular pathy person phænomena phænomenon PHILO philosophers pleasure possession present pride and humility principles proceed produc'd produce promises qualities reason regard relation of ideas relation of impressions resemblance rules satisfaction SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments shew shou'd society species suppos'd suppose sympathy thing tion tis evident tis impossible twill uneasiness virtuous wou'd
Pasajes populares
Página 197 - Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Página 247 - Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
Página 248 - ... is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation...
Página 403 - Consider, anatomize the eye, survey its structure and contrivance, and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation.
Página 85 - As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, strange, or beautiful, and is still more pleased the more it finds of these perfections in the same object, so it is capable of receiving a new satisfaction by the assistance of another sense.
Página 247 - I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, ' I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is...
Página 268 - The storms and tempests were not alone removed from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only movements with which the human mind was yet acquainted.
Página 197 - A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.
Página 247 - In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Página 408 - ... That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, or universe of objects ; and if similar in its arrangement must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a different conclusion or inference ? In an abstract 408 view, they are entirely alike ; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them.