The above, however, is only a hypothetical cafe. following is a real fact that cannot be controverted:

The

In the year 1745, the inland duty on tea was reduced from 49. to is. in the pound, and 35 per cent. in the price.

In the year 1745, the grofs amount of the duty on tea was

But in the year after the reduction of the duty, viz. 1746, it rofe to

And in 1747, it was

£.151,168 7 i

249,018 19 11 263,140 3'

From thefe, and other facts which we cannot find room to ftate, the author concludes, that when the rate of duty is too high, the easiest way of increasing the revenue, is to lower the duty.

The remaining part of this Inquiry is employed to fhew, that when taxes are moderate, they ought to be confidered nearly under the fame point of view with mercantile profit in trade, and fhould be governed by the fame general laws.

We have feen, (fays he,) that they agree in operating through the fame media; and as it is the interest of both to conform to the law of justice, fo it is equally their intereft to conform to that phyfical law which requires, that the real price of articles fhould fall, with the accumulation of wealth, and the general improvement of fociety. To this law, individual traders yield a reluctant obedience, though, on the whole, it is their intereft to conform to it. But fovereign ftates, not feeling themfelves under the fame neceffity, inftead of obeying, have refifted it, by all their ingenuity and power; and hence have arifen all the evils of the over-tax fyftems. Thefe evils are nothing more than the natural punishments which invariably attach themfelves to those who refit a law of nature, whole final end is the diffufion of the comforts of a rich fociety through the lowest ranks of the people.

We conclude, that if flates would follow the practice of trading individuals, like them, their capitals (i. e. the quantity (obferve) of each taxed article) would increafe with the increase of the wealth of the community at large, and with the growing demand for thefe articles: that should the increase of revenue thence arifing be infufficient for the public exigencies, they ought not to attempt to augment their revenue, as they have done, by additional duties on articles already fufficiently taxed, but by laying duties on hitherto untaxed commodities.'

In the course of this inquiry, the attentive reader will find many excellent obfervations on the principles of trade, and particularly on the confequences of monopolies in trade, as refpecting the community at large, which deferve particular

attention.

The fecond inquiry refpects the expence of collecting taxes on confumable commodities, and is intended chiefly to obviate an objection that has often been urged in favour of augmenting an old tax, rather than of impofing a new one, becaufe

it has been fuppofed that the expence in collecting the laft, would be greater than the first. This writer, however, contends, with much force of argument, that this is a mistake; and he afferts, that the expence occafioned by one over-taxed article, is greater than might collect twenty at a moderate rate. 'I have known,' fays he, ten watchers on one trader at the fame time.' He feems to be particularly acquainted with the frauds practifed with regard to the excife laws, and has pointed out their confequences in a variety of cafes, with a precifion and force that cannot fail to imprefs conviction on the mind of every person who adverts to them. The expence to government, in all cafes of over-taxation, he fully proves, is exceedingly great; though, in every cafe, it is more or less ineffica

cious :

But (fays he, in his concluding obfervations on this head) thefe exertions of government muft vary, with what government are permitted to know with regard to fmuggling. When an overtaxed article is in the hands of young traders, whose moderate gains deprive them of the power to corrupt the officers, this, joined to the clamours of rivalship, roufes the attention of government to the fmuggling that prevails, and creates great expence in their exertions to fupprefs it: but after the business centers in a few monopolizers, who have great capitals, they can eafily take the revenue officers into their own pay. This is the laft ftage of the over-tax system; and then it meets the appearance of a moderate taxation. officer may be fufficient to furvey one trader. No frauds are heard of, and no profecutions take place; the few which arife are against inferior traders, who are foon altogether fuppreffed, though it is from the middling clafs that the highest rate of duty can be collected.'

One

The third inquiry in this work, refpects the question, On whom do taxes fall?-and it is intended to remove fome objections to the author's fyftem, that have arifen from certain theoretical opinions which have been entertained by various political writers of eminence on this fubject; and which he endeavours to fhew, with fome degree of fuccefs, have been ill-founded. In this part of his fubject, however, the writer is evidently more beyond his depth, than in any other part of his difquifition; and, therefore, it is lefs fatisfactory than the rest. When this question comes to be fully difcuffed by perfons who have time and talents for fuch a difquifition, it will, perhaps, be proved to be altogether an ufelefs inquiry from the beginning, and be productive of no other good effect than that at which this author points, viz. to fhew that the confequences which have been drawn by fome ingenious fpeculators on this head, from certain theories that they have adopted, are vifionary, and that the nice divifions which they have endeavoured to

make between the different claffes of confumers, are useless and nugatory. This inquiry takes up a much greater proportion of the book than its importance merited.

The third book treats of fixing the rates of duties, and of fuiting them to fifcal regulations, fo that fmuggling fhall thereby be prevented.' Here, the author being more in his own fphere, he affords proportionally more authentic information. In treating of the general relation that fubfifts between the value of a commodity, and the tax it is capable of bearing,' the following judicious obfervations are made, in order to prove that lowering the price of the materials of a manufacture, fhould be no argument for augmenting the rate of the tax on it, but the reverse:

Let us fuppofe (fays he) a pound weight of fope to coft the manufacturer ten pence, exclufive of duties; and that the duty was a penny; his temptation to fmuggle would be 10 per cent. upon the value. Increase the duty one-half, and the temptation is increased; but diminish the value of the fope, and the fame effect is produced on the manufacturer. Call the value of the fope five pence per pound weight; a penny of duty holds out a temptation of 20 per cent.: but if the duty is increased, as the value of the article is diminished, this holds out a temptation compounded of both thefe circumftances. It was, however, because the price of fope had fallen to the manufacturer, that the additional duty on that article was laid in 1780. It was then faid *, that the price of barilla (a neceffary article in the manufactory of fope) had fallen: that this reduced the price of fope to the makers, who therefore could afford to advance an additional duty of three farthings on hard fope, and ftill fell it as cheap as they did before. This was, no doubt, true; but we fhall find, that the manufacturer was more flimulated to commit fraud by the reduced value of fope, which was the reafon given for augmenting the duty. The former duties on fope were 1d. per pound. If we fuppofe the original value of the fope 6d. this was 25 per cent. If the value had continued the fame, the additional duty of three farthings would have raised the temptation to 37 per cent. But if we fuppofe the value of fope reduced to 4d. thefe duties were 56 per cent. But this is not all, the reduction of the value of fope diminished alfo the risk of the manufacturers in attempting to fmuggle; and the temptation to fraud was increased, not only in fo far as the relation of 2d. to 4d. was greater than 1d. to 6d. but also in as far as the risk of lofing 4d. was of lefs confequence than that of lofing 6d. in the event that the article was feized.

We fee then, that the reduced price of barilla, inftead of being an argument for laying on an additional duty on fope, ought rather to have been a diffuafive from that measure; and that, in general, the rate of a duty fhould not rife as the price of a commodity falls;

* See Lord North's fpeech.

but

but that the rate of a duty ought rather to rife and fall together with the natural price of the article on which it is impofed.'

Accurate reafoning is fo rare in matters of finance, that we hope to be excufed from endeavouring to bring the above within the view of fome who might, perhaps, have otherwise never adverted to it. The fame apology may be extended to what follows.

6

After having obferved that eight diftillers, refiding about the city of London, as they themselves inform, though few in number, comprifed, in importance and extent of their manufactories, upwards of eleven-twelfths of the whole distillery in England,' the anthor proceeds to point out the difference, in as -far as regards revenue, that fubfifts between great and moderate manufacturers. Among thefe remarks, the following occur:

A trader who can realize 4 or 5000l. a year by the evasion of his duties, can at once fecure fecrecy on the part of his fervants, bribe the revenue officer, reduce the fifcal price of the commodity, and retain a handfome profit to him felf. A man trading on a small fcale has none of these things in his power. The first infures himfelf fuccefs in fecuring a great fum; the last would attempt a finall gain at his utmoft peril. Accordingly we find, that while no regulations that ever were invented, or applied, could ftop the operations of the great diftillers, the middling ones, in confequence of ftrict watching, have been obliged to give up business altogether. But furely it is impolitical to give encouragements to the great, in preference to the middling diftillers. It is forcing traders out of the market, who are under the power of fifcal regulations, to put it more completly into the hands of thofe over whom the State has little or no power, and to whom fifcal regulations can but in a very partial degree extend.'

We could add many more extracts that equally discover a found judgment, and a talent for accurate obfervation, in this author: but it is time that we fhould defift. The third book clofes with a propofal for appointing an officer, fomewhat of the fame nature with that of the inspector-general in former times, who fhould be employed to pick up facts refpecting revenue matters, and to afford information and found advice to the minifter concerning revenue laws; together with a fpecimen of a fifcal hiftory of objects that were fubjected to an impoft for producing a revenue. To the laft, as an ingenious illuftration of the author's principles, we have no objection: but to the first part of the propofal, we fhould not fo readily accede. An individual, in fuch an office, would be liable to be milled in a thoufand ways; and by inftilling his notions into the ear of a minifter, he might produce much mifchief before the evil was fufpected, or could be prevented. In this free country, it is the public, and not the minifter exclufively,

who fhould be informed. The minifter fhould imbibe his fundamental knowlege in political wifdom, while he is only a private individual, and while he has leifure to inveftigate matters coolly; not after he becomes a minifter, when he cannot find time for fuch investigations. If, however, the public cannot be informed, how can the future minifter receive inftruction? We would therefore propose, and we have often wondered that it fhould never have occurred to those who have the power of making fuch an institution, that a public profeffor fhould be appointed for the fole purpose of investigating matters of taxation and revenue, on the plan of the Scotch universities, with a moderate falary only, fo as to infure his giving lectures regularly. In this way, the attention of our youth would be turned toward the fubject, which could not fail to produce many ingenious difquifitions from time to time, to enlighten the people at large, and thus to pave the way for falutary laws, and to compel the legislature to adopt them. With the people at large, and not with any particular junto of men, all laws which fhall be permanently binding on the public, must originate. A minifter more enlightened than the people, dares not act. One who is lefs informed may, by plaufible pretexts and deceptive arts, keep his footing for a time, but muft, infallibly, at last, be driven from the helm. The great object, therefore, is to inform the public at large in regard to the fubject of legiflation, before any effential reform can be fuccefffully attempted.

The volume concludes with an appendix, containing nineteen articles of public accounts, mentioned in the body of the work.

In this performance, feveral very important facts refpecting revenue are brought forward, accompanied with fhrewd remarks, and accurate reafoning, from which much ufeful information may be derived. The knowlege of the author, however, is of that kind which may be rather denominated accurate than extenfive. With the excife laws, and the different evafions and frauds to which they have given birth, he is accurately and intimately acquainted. He has ftudied them with great care, and his views refpecting them are clear, accurate, and juft, fo far as they go; though even here it is rather the correction of abufes that have already prevailed, than the developement of original improvement, that conftitutes the merit of the performance. With other departments, he is evidently much lefs intimately acquainted: nor are his conclufions refpecting them equally deferving of credit. Fortunately, however, he has feldom extended his views beyond the limits that he has prefcribed to himfelf; which we confider as a high recommendation