But the Truth must be acknowledged, that this Paffion being given us, in a great Meafure, for our own Defence, we may innocently exert a competent Degree of it for that Purpose. Nor can we help, generally speaking, being a little more moved at our own Injuries and Sufferings, than those of others; because we cannot but have a livelier Senfe of them; and the Emotion of Mind, which proceeds from that Sense, must bear fome Proportion to it.

One Thing more to be obferved is, that though Faults are the only juft Ground of Refentment; and the greater they are, the more the Ground: yet, when they do not amount to Crimes, but are only Neglects or Tranfgreffions of fome smaller Obligation; ftill, fince a great deal of Inconvenience in Life arifes, even from thefe Inftances of wrong Behaviour; they warrant and require fuch lower Marks of our Displeasure, especially when the culpable are placed under our Inspection, as may be requifite for their Amend

ment.

And now it might well be hoped, that a fufficient Latitude was given to this neceffary Evil, the Exercife of Anger. But these are

narrow

narrow Bounds for a Paffion, which, if let loofe, will admit of none. We can be angry with Perfons, not only for their Faults, but their good Qualities and Accomplishments, when they excel, or come too near, Us or our Favourites: not only for doing amiss, but for doing their Duty, if it interfere with any of our Designs or Humours, Nay, we can be angry with them for having done their Duty to us; done the kindest Thing they could for us, reminded us of our Failings, though in a friendly Way; or fhewn themselves in

any

Instance more concerned for us, than we are for ourselves. We can be angry with Perfons, even when they have done us Kindneffes; for not doing us fuch great ones, or not fo foon, or not in fuch a Manner, as we would have had them: though perhaps they were not bound to do us any. And we can be extremely angry with them for having any Degree of Regard to their own Interests, when ours are concerned: first looking upon ourselves as all the World, and the rest of Mankind as nothing; then fired with the utmost Indignation, that this should be disputed. But in leffer Matters, we can be angry with Men even for their natural Tempers, when

they happen to be more gravely, or more chearfully, or any Way differently, turned from our own: for their not liking the fame Employments or Amusements, their not falling into the fame Opinions and Ways of thinking, fometimes on the most trifling Subjects; nay, for not perceiving and acknowledging immediately the Strength of an Argument, or the Weight of an Authority.

Again, we can be angry for the unkind. Words or Actions, to which we ourselves have given the Provocation: and will make no Allowances for little Unreasonableneffes in others, where we have, perhaps by great ones, fet the Pattern, and thrown the Temptation in their Way. We can be angry at those who are employed by us, for mistaking or not fucceeding in Cafes, where they have done as well as ever they could, and certainly did not contrive to be ignorant or fail on Purpose to vex us. We can be angry at them for mere accidental Misfortunes in our Affairs: Things, which were not provided against, because they were not to be expected; or which a reasonable Degree of Care proved infufficient to provide against; or, it may be, which all the Care in the World could not have prevented.

vented. Nay, in our idleft Diverfions, we can be as vehemently difcompofed, as about the most important Business. And, in the general Course of our Behaviour, we can be impatient about every Thing, if we have been made uneasy about any Thing: and quite out of Humour, perhaps for a confiderable Time together, without either having, or almost thinking we have, any Manner of Provocation to it. Indeed something of this, in toọ many, seems constitutional: and, so far as it is, ought to have Allowances made for it by every one, except those who are liable to it. But they themselves cannot reflect too feriously, how often and how much they make all about them fuffer for no Cause at all; and those moft, whom they ought least how ftrangely and wildly unreafonable they are, when under the Power of this bad Spirit: and how firmly they are obliged to watch against it continually, and free themselves, when seized by it, as foon as poffibly they can.

In all these Instances, Anger is fo evidently unjust, that happily no Pretence can be made for indulging it. But there are others, in which, Faults having been really committed, a Plea for resenting is really furnished; and

yet, if we refolve to act rightly and wifely, no Refentment at all must be fhewn or entertained. We have not been received perhaps with the good Breeding, or treated with the Regard or good Humour, that we might expect: Expreffions, not fo prudent or obliging, have dropt from Persons in Relation to us: Things, in which we meant no Harm, have been taken wrong: Our Defires and Inclinations have not been confulted, when they ought: Our Opinión or Recommendation hath been too little attended to: Our Advice or Directions too little obferved: or fome one or another of a thousand Matters of this Sort hath happened. And doubtlefs every one of them, fuppofing the Fact to have been as we imagine, is a Fault: and, though of a flighter Sort, fhould be carefully avoided by thofe, with whom we live; and, let me add, by ourselves too. But, alas, they with whom we live, and we ourfelves too, are Creatures, naturally subject to fuch Faults. Indifcretions and Thoughtlefsnefs, odd Humours and Perverfenefs, little Partialities and Prejudices, ever were and will be amongst Men, even the better Kind of Men. And therefore what can be done? Either we must all give and take Offence

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