his disciples, had it not been for a gracious divine influence upon their minds, which was not granted to these murmurers and oppofers; had they not been effectually drawn, by him in whose hand are the hearts of men, and who turneth them as the rivers of water are turned. We are plainly taught in this text, taken in the connection in which it ftands,as we are alfo in a multitude of other places, that men do not firft diftinguish themselves, by hearkening to the calls of the gofpel; but that it is God that makes one to differ from another, in this refpect, by his fovereign and diftinguishing grace. The point of doctrine, therefore, that I fhall infift upon from the words is this,

That none are able to comply with the gospel, but those who are the fubjects of the fpecial and effectual grace of God; or those who are made willing, and actually do comply with it.

WHAT I have in view, in the following difcourfe, is not only to confirm this doctrine; but to endeavour to fet it in fuch a light, as to obviate the formentioned difficulty, of falvation's being offered on impoffible conditions, and men's being condemned for not doing, that which they are incapable of. And after what has been faid, I think there is no way of attempting to clear up this mystery, left, but by fhewing that there are two effentially different fenfes, in which men are faid to be incapable of doing things: or, by having recourfe to the diftinction of natural and moral inability. Accordingly, the method I propofe, is,

I. As clearly as I can, to ftate and illuftrate this dif tinction.

II. To fhow, that men certainly labour under one, or the other, of these kinds of inability to comply with the gospel, until they are made the fubjects of effectual divine grace.

And

III. MORE particularly to confider and evince, the mo ral impotence of finners, IV. ENDEAVOUR to make it appear, that there is, ordi

B

narily,

narily, no other incapacity in finners, in this matter, but only of the moral kind,

I. THEN, it is to be obferved, for the clearing up of this fubject, that there are two very different kinds of inability fo different, that the one however great does not leffen moral obligation in the leaft; whereas the other, as far as it goes,takes away obligation, and all defert of blame and punishment intirely.

THESE two kinds of inability, as I hinted, have commonly been diftinguished, by calling one a natural, the other a moral inability. Which diftinction may be briefly ftated thus. Moral inability confifts only in the want: of a heart, or difpofition, or will, to do a thing. Natural inability on the other hand, confifts in, or arifes from, want of understanding, bodily ftrength, opportunity; OF whatever may prevent, our doing a thing, when we are willing, and ftrongly enough difpofed and inclin'd to do it. Or, in fewer words, thus: whatever a man could not do, if he would, he is under a natural inability of doing; but when all the reafon one can't do a thing, is because he has not a mind to, the inability is only of a moral nature.

THIS diftinction takes place, equally with regard to evilactions, and good ones. Thus, for instance, the divine. being cannot do evil; not because he wants opportunity, or understanding, or ftrength, to do, with infinite, eafe, whatever he pleafes, but only because he is not, and it's impoffible he fhould be, inclined to do iniquity. He is fo infinitely & immutably holy, wife, juft, and good; that it is not poffible he should ever pleafe to act otherways, than in the most holy,righteous, and beft manner. Hence, though we read that, with God all things are poffible," and that he can do every thing; yet alfew here we are told," he cannot deny himself; and that it is impoffible, "for God to lie."

On the other hand, fatan is incapable of doing right, or of behaving virtuoufly, in the leaft inftance or degree. But not because he wants natural abilities; for undoubt

edly

edly in that respect, he is far fuperior to many that are truly virtuous. His being incapable of any thing but infernal wickednefs, is altogether owing to his being of fuch an infernal difpofition.

་་

AND it is not uncommon, to speak of incapacity in mankind, both as to doing good and doing evil, in this twofold fignification. Some perfons we fay are incapable of doing a mean thing. Not that we think it is above their natural capacity; but it is beneath them; they abhor, or they would scorn to do it. Others are incapable of several forts of villany, not through any want of good will enough that way. They only want a convenient opportunity, or fufficient ingenuity.-And juft fo it is in regard to doing good. Some have it not in the power of their hands; others have no heart to it. One is of a truly generous fpirit, and nothing but his own poverty, keeps him from being what Job was, a father to the poor, the fatherlefs and him that has none to help him. Another is rich, and might be a great benefactor and bleffing to all around him; but he has no heart to devife liberal things. 'He can't be free and open handed; it isn't in him to be so. He is deaf to the cries of the poor, blind to their wants, & dead to all the generous feelings of humanity and compaffion.

SOME are fo feeble and infirm, that they can do scarce any bodily labour; though they are extremely free and willing to lay themfelves out to the utmolt that their ftrength will bear, and often go beyond it. Others are ftrong and healthy enough, and might get a good living, and be useful members of fociety; but fuch is their invincible laziness, that their hands refufe to labour, and` they can hardly get them out of their bofoms. Some are effectually kept from fhining, or being very useful, in any public sphere in church or ftate, through the weakness of their heads: others, as effectually, by the badness of their hearts. Some are incapable of being taught by reafon of mere natural dulnefs: others only because they

of an unteachable fpirit, and full of felf-conceit. Some are blind, for want of eyes; but it is an old proverb, that none are more blind, than those who won't fee.

THESE examples, are fufficient to illuftrate the diftinction I am infifting on, and to make it evident, that by incapable, we often mean fomething very different from want of natural capacity. We may alfo perceive from thefe inftances, that there is a real neceffity for using fuch words as, unable, incapable, can't, &c. in this diversity of fignification, in which we fee they are used, in common fpeech, as well as in the fcriptures. For whenever any thing, whether in ourselves or without us, is really abfolutely inconfiftent with our doing a thing, we have no way fully and strongly enough to exprefs that inconfiftence, but by faying we are unable, we cannot, it is impoffible; or ufing fome word of like import. And now it is certain that want of a heart, or inclination to do a thing, may be, and is, as inconfiftent with our doing it, as any thing else could be. Covetuoufnefs is as inconfiftent with liberality as poverty is, and may as effectually hinder a man from doing deeds of charity. Indolence is as inconfiftent with industry, as bodily weakness and infirmity is. The want of an upright heart and a public fpirit, is as inconfiftent with the character of a good ruler, as the want of wisdom and understanding. And the want of all principles of virtue, must be as inconfiftent with acting virtuously, as even the want of thofe intellectual faculties, which are neceffary to moral agency. And fo on the other hand, as to doing evil things. There is no poffibility of doing them, that is, knowingly, defignedly, and as moral agents, without an evil difpofition. Our free and moral actions, are, and must be, as invariably guided and dictated by our own minds, as they are limited and bounded, by our natural power. That is, every one muft act his own nature, and choice, otherways he don't act himfelf, he is not the agent. And if, when we would Express

I

express this fort of neceffity, we should not use the fame phrafes as are made use of in cafes of natural neceffity; but for fear of a misunderstanding, fhould carefully avoid faying a man cannot, when ever we mean only that he has not fuch a heart as is neceffary, and only say that he will not, in all fuch cafes; our language would often found odd, being out of common cuftom, which governs the propriety of words; and not only fo, but it would not be fufficiently expreffive. Should we be afraid to fay, it is impoffible for a man to love God, or come to Christ, while his heart is altogether, wicked, and full of enmity against God and Chrift; people would be ready to think we immagined this might fometimes happen, and that there was no real impoffibility in it of any kind. Whereas there is as real, and as abfolute an impoffibility in this cafe, as in any fuppofable one whatever. To be more guarded therefore, than the fcripture is, in this matter, would be to be unguarded. The apoftle demands," can the figtree, my brethren, bear olive-berries? either a vine "figs" and the prophet," can the Ethiopian change "his fkin? or the Leopard his fpots? then may ye alfo "do good, who are accustomed to do evil." And our Saviour fays, "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; "neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. A "good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bring"eth forth good things. And an evil man out of the e"vil treasure, bringeth forth evil things. There is as certain and never-failing a connection in this cafe, as any natural connection whatever. Which ought by no means to be diffembled, but openly maintained. But then it is certainly of a quite different, and even a directly opposite nature, to all intents and purposes of moral agency. And it is of the laft importance, in my apprehenfion, that this alfo fhould be maintained, and manifefted to every man's confcience.

ἐσ

BECAUSE a man must act according to his own heart, or as he pleases; does this destroy his freedom! it is the very

thing