is sovereign in respect to the rights committed to the other. Since Marshall's time the complexity of our political system has been increased under the Fourteenth Amendment through the extension of the Federal power to the protection of the rights of the citizen against impairment by State authority.

It needs only a statement of the labor problems which have been detailed, to show that the solution in the main must depend upon the legislation of the several States. The only direct legislative power of the Federal government in dealing with the relation of employer and employee, apart from its control of the District of Columbia, the Territories and dependencies, is in its right to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations. The difficulty growing out of this complexity of our Federal system in the enactment of wide-extended and far-reaching social legislation is inherent in the very nature of our government. It is in signal contrast with the facility with which such legislation can be enacted by Parliament of Great Britain, where there are no constitutional restraints upon legislation imposed by rigid fundamental law. The contrast is far greater now than it was at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, as the authority of the House of Commons, as the controlling power of English legislation, subject to an appeal to the people, is far more distinctly established now in what we may term the constitutional law of England than it was in 1787.

This difficulty is still more complicated by the tendency in our recent constitution-making to expand our rigid State constitutions far beyond the range of fundamental laws, limiting the scope of legislative power. They have become, in fact, in some cases veritable codes of laws, dealing in many cases with the detailed subjects of legislation. These constitutional restraints, by the shortening of the legislative session and otherwise, have had the effect of making any kind of progressive legislation, particularly where public opinion is not effectively educated, very difficult of enactment.

Our rigid State constitutions with these detailed provisions, designed to impede the enactment of laws, have made the problem of effective labor legislation difficult in another point of view, in that they develop in some cases what may be termed an over-subtlety in lawyers and courts in the construction of

these constitutional provisions. This is illustrated by the frequency with which labor and other reformatory legislation has been held violative of State constitutions, while under the broader provisions of Federal Constitution such judicial annulment of Congressional legislation has been far less frequent. In this connection, however, it should be observed that the legislative measures which are thus annulled in the courts are sometimes carelessly prepared, without observance of constitutional limitations, and therefore are peculiarly vulnerable to judicial criticism. In this country personal property rights and liberty of private contract and protection against class legislation are secured both by the Federal and State Constitutions, so that a twofold constitutional question under our dual form of government is presented in testing the validity of this class of legislation.

Commerce and business are not limited by and do not recognize State lines, and this fact must be recognized in the enactment of legislation of this character, as a manufacturer is confronted with competitors from other States who may be subjected to very different legislation. Where the legislation looks only to the elevation of the plane of competition by controlling the employment of children and women, such objections may be met, as like objections to the Factory Acts of Lord Shaftesbury were met in England, by the suggestion that the increased burden to industry would be more than compensated by the increased effectiveness of labor. In a broader point of view, however, irrespective of any economic or even humanitarian considerations, the enlightened public opinion of the present day would not tolerate such conditions in our industries as would menace the future citizenship of a self-governing country. In its constitutional aspects there is an obvious difference between legislation which seeks only to remedy abuses in industrial conditions which directly affect the public welfare, as in the labor of children and women, and the imposition upon the employer, as in the recent legislation in England, of distinct burdens which add to his cost of production, with the expectation of his shifting the burden upon the consumer. These considerations are so far-reaching that their proper discussion would require much more time than the present occasion permits. It is sufficient to say, however, that they

illustrate the care and wise discrimination with which such legislation must be prepared, not only that it may not violate the constitutional guaranties against class legislation and may conform with other constitutional requirements, but also that it may not disturb the delicate balancing of the factors of our business life, and thus embarrass the prosperity of our industries, whereon the employment of labor depends.

Under these complex conditions, in our community of federated sovereign States it is, of course, very desirable that we should have uniformity of legislation by the States on matters relating to the conditions of labor. This, however, is very difficult of realization for the obvious reason that there is a vast difference in local conditions which must be studied and to which such legislation must be adapted; and, therefore, there is a difference in the local public opinion which is necessary to secure such legislation and make it effective. The extension of manufacturing industries throughout the country has developed the fact that public opinion in the States which are newer in industrial growth is not yet prepared to enact and enforce the legislation which has been enacted and is being enforced in the older States, even in the correction of the recognized abuses.

These difficulties and complexities have led many earnest reformers, who are impressed with the facility with which such progressive legislation is enacted by a sovereign parliament of a single government under the flexible constitution of Great Britain, to deplore the restraints growing out of our complex form of government, and we have a demand not only for legislation from the Federal government which would involve a strained construction of the Federal power to regulate interstate commerce, but some go further, and ask for an amendment of the Constitution of the United States so as to give the Federal government control over all conditions of labor.

It should be observed that this disposition of reformers to look to the Federal government as the most convenient agency in securing desired reforms illustrates how little the old-time jealousy of the invasion of State rights by the enlargement of the Federal power avails against the current trend, demanding Federal action wherever it is deemed that a desired end can be more effectively secured thereby. This impulse also affects

capitalists who control great corporate interests, who are beginning to prefer one regulating master to forty-six; and also the great labor organizations, who are struggling for the betterment of their own conditions, regardless of old-time constitutional theories of the limitations of Federal power. The traditional dread of its extension carries little weight in this practical age, when the ends, commercial or philanthropic, can be best secured by the exercise of such power.

PUBLIC OPINION IN SOLUTION OF LABOR PROBLEMS.

The contrast, however, between the facility of legislation in the way of social reform under the flexible constitution of Great Britain and the delay and difficulty encountered under our Federal system of rigid constitutions, is less important when the underlying power of public opinion essential for the enforcement of any social reform is considered. It has been wisely said that legislation is the final agency by which the law is brought into harmony with social needs. Those needs must, however, exist and be recognized by prevailing public opinion before legislation, particularly in regard to such relations as employer and employee, master and servant, can become effective. More than a generation passed away before the labors of Lord Shaftesbury in the English Parliament developed a public opinion which demanded his reforms, and the so-called factory legislation was accomplished. Nearly a century passed since Bentham first advocated his reforms in law procedure, and, though recently enacted in England, public and professional opinion in this country is only recently beginning to realize the necessity for their adoption. The anti-saloon or prohibition agitation in this country is an effective illustration of the dependence of social legislation upon local public opinion. Such legislation is easily enforced in rural communities where the local opinion is favorable; but in cities, where such supporting opinion is lacking, it is necessarily a failure. In view of the continental extent of our country, with its varied climatic and geographic conditions from the lakes to the gulf and from ocean to ocean, it is obvious that no form of free government other than a federated government of independent States, with the widest extension of local control of local needs, could be successfully administered.

As I read the "Review of Labor Legislation of 1900," published by this Association, I am impressed not only with the wide scope of subjects included, but also with the indications of wide-spread interest and substantial progress in the different States in all parts of the Union. It may be true that States where manufacturing interests are comparatively new and few in number should be backward in developing a public opinion which demands an effective regulation of the conditions of employment. While information and discussion will in time develop the public opinion which will remedy existing abuses by appropriate local legislation, this gradual progress will be

a sure one.

INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

On the other hand, the influence of the Federal government is being effectively, if not so directly, exercised. Thus the opinions of the Supreme Court in sustaining the Utah eighthour law in mining, and later the upholding of the Oregon regulation of the hours of woman employment, carry a weighty influence in developing a public and judicial opinion in all parts of the country. Also in legislation, as in the employer's liability acts of 1906 and 1908, irrespective of any constitutional questions involved, the abolition of fellow-servant rule, and the introduction of the comparative negligence rules have, doubtless, a wide-extended influence in directing State legislation.

A still more effective illustration of the indirect influence of our Federal power is found in the Act of May 30, 1908, wherein the United States government, as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, employer of labor in the country, adopts the principle of compensation to its own employees killed or injured in the course of their employment. As the government was not subject to an enforceable employer's liability, this act was a declaration of the essential justice of the principle of compensation. No official report is yet obtainable as to the operation of the act, but I am informed that the law covers some 75,000 in the government service, and that for the eleven months ending June 30, 1909, there had been paid as compensation some $33,000, and $115,000 for other injuries.

The enactment and enforcement of this statute has promoted among employers the agitation of this subject of com