would be entirely consonant to your sentiments, that I should state it to Lord North, as drawing an outline for negotiation of peace. However, to avoid all errors, I read the bill through to him, and explained the view of each clause, viz. the style of provinces of North America-a genera! phrase to avoid any term denoting dependence or independence. The truce for an indefinite term. The articles of intercourse for ten years certain to restore an amicable correspondence, and to abate animosities. The suspension of certain acts of parliament-to avoid every possible question of dependence or independence. And to finish the work by a ratification of each article of intercourse as agreed to, thereby to prevent all possible return of war. I compared the articles of intercourse for a short term, and their ratification into a permanent peace, to a well-known mode of proceeding in the laws of England, by lease and release, from temporary to perpetual amity and peace. Upon these grounds I took my commission

before mentioned, between Great Britain and the aforesaid provinces of North America.

And be it further enacted, that in order to establish perpetual reconcilement and peace between Great Britain and the aforesaid provinces of North America, it is hereby required, and be it enacted, that all or any article or articles of intercourse and pacification, which shall be entered into, and ratified, for the certain term of ten years as before mentioned, shall from time to time be laid before the two houses of parliament, for their consideration, as the perpetual basis of reconcilement and peace between Great Britain and the aforesaid provinces of North America; and that any such article or articles of intercourse and pacification as before mentioned, when the same shall have been confirmed in parliament, shall remain in full force and effect for ever.

And be it further enacted, that this act shall continue to be in force until the thirty-first day of December, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one.

VOL. II.

D

from him for Lord North, viz. the question of dependence or independence sub silentio a separate treaty with America, and to state the conciliatory bill of June, 1780, as the outline of negotiation. I saw Lord North in the evening, and stated the foregoing propositions to him, as I have now stated them to you. After having stated the compromise sub silentio and the separate treaty, I left with Lord North the copy of the bill of June, 1780, together with a paper intitled Conciliatory Propositions, as explanatory of that bill (both enclosed with this). The next morning (viz. Saturday, December 22), I saw Mr. Alexander and reported to him what I had stated to Lord North, and showed him a copy of the paper intitled Conciliatory Propositions. He told me that I had executed my commission perfectly to his intelligence of the matter. I should tell you, that at the conclusion of my conversation with Lord North, we both settled jointly the result thus: "I recommend to your Lordship the propositions which I have had the honor of stating to you, as the general grounds of a proposed negotiation leading towards peace, under liberal constructions. Lord North said in answer, "So I understand them."

Upon this footing matters rested for some days. On Sunday last (December 30), I received a message from Lord North through the means of Lord Guildford, requesting an explanation on this point, viz. "Who is authorised to treat on the part of America? whether you or Mr. Adams, or both jointly? and whether the propositions above stated would be acknowledged as general grounds of negotiation towards peace, by the person or persons authorised to treat, because it was necessary before

he could lay a matter of so great importance before the cabinet council, that he should be entitled to say, "These propositions and general outlines come to me from responsible and authorised persons?" The moment I received the request of Lord North I agreed entirely with the necessity of an explanation on that head. I had partly expected such an inquiry, and it gave me satisfaction when it came, as I thought it the first reply towards a parley. If the propositions had not gained some attention, it would have been of very little importance to have inquired whence they came. As to the caution itself, it appears to me not only prudent but indispensable. The forms of caution in such cases are the essentials of caution. I had determined on my own account before this message to have writ to you, that I might have received your sentiments directly from yourself without any other intervention, that we might proceed with caution and certainty in a matter of such infinite importance. This message has only quickened my dispatch. The two points of explanation requested, I take to be these; whether the outlines above recited are properly stated, always considering that they imply no farther than general grounds of negotiation towards peace, under liberal constructions; and secondly, by what authorised person or persons any answer on this subject would be accepted; in short, a requisition of credentials preparatory to a formal answer, which is so much the more necessary on the supposition of a favorable reception of the first hint towards negotiation.

When I last saw Mr. Alexander, about four or five days ago, he had met with some desponding impressions, as if the ministry were indisposed to peace,

and that things would not do, &c. He did not tell me upon what ground he had formed such apprehensions however, lest he should have imparted any such by letter to you, I will state that point to you, because it may have infinite ill consequences to be too touchy on such suspicions. A premature jealousy may create the very evil it suspects. The ministry in this country are not every thing. The sense of the people when really expressed and exerted, would be most prevalent. Suppose then it were a proved point that every man in the ministry were in his heart adverse to peace. What then? withhold all overtures? By no means. I should advise the very contrary in the strongest manner. I should say, let the overtures be made so much the more public and explicit, by those who do wish for peace. It is the unfortunate state of things which has hitherto bound the cause of France to any possible treaty with America, and which has thereby thrown a national damp upon any actual public exertions to procure a negotiation for peace with America. I have the strongest opinion that if it were publicly known to the people of England that a negotiation might be opened with America upon the terms above specified, that all the ministry together, if they were ill disposed to a man, would not venture to thwart such a measure. But why should it be supposed that the ministry to a man are ill disposed to a peace? Suppose them to be half and half, and the public wish and voice of the people in favor of negotiation, it is evident on which side the balance would incline. But why should we seek to throw a damp prematurely upon any chance? Why presume even against any individual? I grant

that it would be a bitter trial of humility to be brought to a formal recognition of independence at the haughty command of France, and I believe every part of the nation would proceed to every extremity before they would submit to that. But if that touchy point can be provided for sub silentio, and if the proposed treaty with America may be carried on free from control by France, let us give the cause of peace a fair trial; at the worst, we should but be where we were if we should fail. But why should we expect to fail when the greatest rub is removed by the liberty of entering separately into a treaty? I think it a most favorable event leading towards peace. Give us a truce with its concomitants, and a little time so given for cooling will have most excellent effects on both sides. Eternal peace and conciliation may then follow. I send this to you by the quickest dispatch, that we may bring this point to a fair issue before the meeting of parliament. God prosper the blessed work of peace! I am ever yours most affectionately, D. H.

In the title and preamble of the bill the words provinces of North America are used as general words, neither implying dependence or independence.

Clause 1. The truce is taken from the conciliatory act of 1778, and is indefinite as to the proposed duration of the truce. Under this clause it might be proposed to negotiate three points, viz. the removal of the British troops from the thirteen provinces of North America, and connectedly with this article a stipulation for the security of the friends of the British government. The third article might be a stipulation that the respective parties during the con