me, remembering the adage, that they who threaten are afraid.

The next morning, when I had written the above letter to Lord Shelburne, I went with it to Mr. Oswald's lodgings, and gave it him to read before I sealed it, that in case any thing might be in it with which he was not satisfied, it might be corrected; but he expressed himself much pleased. In going to him, I had also in view the entering into a conversation, which might draw out something of the mind of his Court on the subject of Canada and Nova Scotia. I had thrown out some loose thoughts on paper, which I intended to serve as memorandums for my discourse, but without a fixed intention of showing them to him. On his saying that he was obliged to me for the good opinion I had expressed of him to Lord Shelburne in my letter, and assuring that he had entertained the same of me; I observed, that I perceived Lord S. placed great confidence in him, and as we had happily the same in each other, we might possibly by a free communication of sentiments, and a previous settling of our own minds, on some of the important points, be the means of great good, by impressing our sentiments on the minds of those with whom they might have influence, and where their being received might be of importance. I then remarked that his nation seemed to desire a reconciliation with America; that I heartily wished the same thing; that a mere peace would not produce half its advantages if not attended with a sincere reconciliation; that to obtain this the party which had been the aggressors, and had cruelly treated the other, should show some marks of con

cern for what was past, and some disposition to make reparation: that perhaps there were things which America might demand by way of reparation, and which England might yield, but that the effect would be vastly greater if they appeared to be voluntary, and to spring from returning good-will; that I therefore wished England would think of offering something to relieve them who had suffered by its scalping and burning parties; lives indeed could not be restored nor compensated, but the villages and houses wantonly destroyed might be rebuilt, &c. I then touched upon the affair of Canada, and as in a former conversation he had maintained his opinion, that the giving up of that country to the English at the last peace had been a politic act in France, for that it had weakened the ties between England and her colonies, and that he himself had predicted from it the late revolution: I spoke of the occasions of future quarrels that might be produced by her continuing to hold it; hinting at the same time, but not expressing it too plainly, that such a situation, to us so dangerous, would necessarily oblige us to cultivate and strengthen our union with France. He appeared much struck with my discourse; and as I frequently looked at my paper, he desired to see it. After some delay, I allowed him to read it. The following is an exact copy.

NOTES OF CONVERSATION.

"To make a peace durable, what may give occasion for future wars, should, if practicable, be removed.

The territory of the United States and that of Canada by long extended frontiers touch each other.

The settlers on the frontiers of the American provinces are generally the most disorderly of the people, who being far removed from the eye and control of their respective governments, are more bold in committing offences against neighbours, and are for ever occasioning complaints, and furnishing matter for fresh differences between their states.

But

By the late debates in parliament, and public writings, it appears that Britain desires a reconciliation with the Americans. It is a sweet word. It means much more than a mere peace, and it is heartily to be wished for. Nations make a peace whenever they are both weary of making war. if one of them has made war upon the other unjustly, and has wantonly and unnecessarily done it great injuries, and refuses reparation; though there may for the present be peace, the resentment of those injuries will remain, and will break out again in vengeance, when occasions offer. Those occasions will be watched for by one side, feared by the other; and the peace will never be secure; nor can any cordiality subsist between them.

Many houses and villages have been burnt in America, by the English and their allies the Indians, I do not know that the Americans will insist on reparation. Perhaps they may. But would it not be better for England to offer it? Nothing would have a greater tendency to conciliate. And much of the future commerce and returning intercourse between the two countries may depend on the reconciliation. Would not the advantage of reconciliation by such means be greater than the expense?

If then a way can be proposed which may tend to efface the memory of injuries, at the same time that

it takes away the occasions of fresh quarrels and mischief, will it not be worth considering, especially if it can be done not only without expense, but be a means of saving?

Britain possesses Canada. Her chief advantage from that possession consists in the trade for peltry. Her expenses in governing and defending that settlement must be considerable. It might be humiliating to her to give it up on the demand of America. Perhaps America will not demand it. Some of her political rulers may consider the fear of such a neighbour as a means of keeping the thirteen States more united among themselves, and more attentive to military discipline. But in the mind of the people in general, would it not have an excellent effect if Britain should voluntarily offer to give up that province; though on these conditions, that she should in all time coming have and enjoy the right of free trade thither unincumbered with any duties whatsoever; that so much of the waste lands there shall be sold as will raise a sum sufficient to pay for the houses burnt by the British troops and their Indians, and also to indemnify the Royalists for the confiscation of their estates?

This is mere conversation matter between Mr. O. and Mr. F. as the former is not empowered to make propositions, and the latter cannot make any without the concurrence of his colleagues."

He then told me that nothing in his judgment could be clearer, more satisfactory, and convincing than the reasonings in that paper; that he would do his utmost to impress Lord Shelburne with them; that as his memory might not do them justice, and

it would be impossible for him to express them so well, or state them so clearly as I had written them, he begged I would let him take the paper with him, assuring me that he would return it safely into my hands. I at length complied with this request also. We parted exceeding good friends, and he set out for London.

By the first opportunity afterwards, I wrote the following letter to Mr. Adams, and sent the papers therein mentioned, that he might be fully apprised of the proceedings. I omitted only the paper of notes for conversation with Mr. Oswald, but gave the substance as appears in the letter. The reason of my omitting it was, that, on reflection, I was not pleased with my having hinted a reparation to the Tories for their forfeited estates; and I was a little ashamed of my weakness in permitting the paper to go out of my hands.

SIR,

Passy, April 20, 1782.

I hope your Excellency received the copy of our instructions which I sent by the courier from Versailles some weeks since. I wrote to you on the 13th to go by Captain Smedley, and sent a packet of correspondence with Mr. Hartley. Smedley did not leave Paris so soon as I expected: but you should have it by this time. With this I send a fresh correspondence which I have been drawn into, viz. 1. A letter I sent to Lord Shelburne before he was minister. 2. His answer by Mr. Oswald since he was minister. 3. A letter from Mr. Laurens. 4. My letter to M. de Vergennes. 5. My answer to Lord Shelburne. 6. My answer to Mr. Laurens. 7. Copy of Digges's report. These papers will inform you