appointed by the prefect from a list presented by the municipal council. In this work the officials do not follow the law, which prescribes pro rata assessment of rental values. In 1884 it was ascertained that in 2340 communes, representing 1,733,000 contributors and 24,305,000 francs of the principal of the tax, the mobilier was based upon rental values, in accordance with the law. In 1657 communes, representing 238,000 taxpayers and 732,000 francs of the tax, the assessment was based upon rental value, but without precise rules and without always following the rule of proportionality. In 18,664 communes, representing 2,684,000 taxpayers and 8,351,000 francs of the tax, the officials assessed the tax according to the rental value and the supposed ability of the taxpayers. Finally, in 13,446 communes, representing 1,981,000 taxpayers and a tax of 6,280,000 francs, the assessment was based upon the supposed ability of the taxpayers as estimated by various indicia such as the area of cultivated land, the amount of live stock owned, the number of teams of horses, or such other indications as accorded with the conditions of the regions and the habits of the people. Thus there were only 3997 communes out of 36,107 which conformed to the requirements of the law; and in over 32,000 communes the assessment was according to the discretion of the officials. In the same locality one could find some of the rentals taxed at double the rate imposed on others. The conditions have not changed since 1884. It is known that in most of the rural communes, where the dwellings are much the same whatever the wealth of the occupants may be, the assessors, struck by the fact that often two taxpayers of very unequal ability are housed in about the same manner, have made the tax progressive by increasing the assessed valuation.

The progressive character of the tax has also been sanctioned by the law, through exemption of a certain minimum rental. (Then follows an account of certain provisions of laws enacted in 1846, 1900, and 1903, which sanction in certain cases a departure from a proportional rate of taxation.1)

1 One other fact concerning the practical working of the tax is emphasized by Leroy-Beaulieu. When the quota of the personnel-mobilier due from a commune is apportioned among the taxpayers, it is clear that, the lower the value placed upon a day's labor, the smaller the amount raised by the personal tax, and the larger the

53. The Theory of the Impôt Mobilier.-Interesting to American readers, on account of various proposals which have been made in the United States, is Leroy-Beaulieu's discussion of the merits of the impôt mobilier. He says:

When the legislator abandons the idea of taxing directly the entire income of the taxpayers because he does not wish to resort to arbitrary official assessments and apprehends the deceptions which result from calling for personal declarations of one's income, the best method of taxing citizens according to their abilities is to impose a tax upon the rental value of dwellings. The house rent that a man pays is the least deceptive index of the size of his property or income. Among people who love material comforts and luxuries the first use generally made of wealth is to enlarge and to embellish one's dwelling.

The opponents of this tax (the mobilier), who are usually advocates of a general tax on property or income, find many objections to it. Certain persons, they say, by their natural tastes, for reasons of family convenience, or by professional necessity, expend for house rent a larger portion of their income than is ordinarily devoted to that purpose; while others, on account of simpler tastes, or for economy's sake, spend but a small part of their income for rent. The first class will be overtaxed, and the second undertaxed, by the mobilier. This objection is specious. It proves that the tax on rentals is not perfect; and persons who are sanguine of attaining absolute perfection in fiscal affairs, can reject this tax as not realizing their ideals. But though specious, the objection is not well founded. In the first place, the law can permit a taxpayer to furnish proof that the income which his lodgings indicate that he has is larger than his real income. There would be nothing unjust in demanding that a person in an unusual situation should demonstrate the fact. As for the demands which a profession, like that of the doctor or lawyer, make upon one's income, it would be possible to take this element into account in assessing amount to be raised by the mobilier, will have to be. Since the valuations of a day's labor range from 50 centimes to 1.50 francs, it is clear that the rate of the mobilier must vary considerably. - ED.

1 Traité, Pt. I, Bk. II, ch. 7.

the tax. In this way the tax could be reduced for taxpayers whose profession obliges them to occupy dwellings that are more expensive than those occupied by most persons having the same income. Yet these deductions and allowances do not seem very necessary since the rate of the tax ought always to be moderate. It is probable that after a time, and just because of the tax, every one will spend for rent just about the proportion of his income which the law assumes that he spends. Few people would care, through ostentation or negligence, to place themselves in a position where they would have to pay a disproportionate tax. As for misers who wish to cheat the government by occupying lodgings far less expensive than they could afford, it is evident that it is difficult to prevent them from doing so in any case. . . .

An objection of greater weight is that the tax on rentals burdens large families more heavily than small; whereas the former should rather be favored than burdened by the taxgatherer. We may observe that this objection is equally valid against taxes upon consumption, although not against a general tax on property or income. But the difficulty is easily avoided. It would be removed if, in the assessment of the tax, allowance was made for the size of families. A bachelor could be taxed at a higher rate than a man with a family; and, further, the tax could be reduced in rate according to the number of children in a family. Thus, supposing that the rate of the tax were 12 per cent of the rent paid by a bachelor, it could be reduced to 10 per cent for a married man; and might be lowered by one per cent for each child living with its parents; so that a family with four children would pay but 6 per cent of the amount of rental, while a bachelor would pay 12 per cent. (The author then argues that the mobilier taxes funded incomes more heavily than unfunded, since, income for income, persons who draw revenue from property will spend more for rent than persons with temporary incomes.)

To this tax on rentals could be added, as the Constituent Assembly did in 1791, certain simple sumptuary taxes, such as taxes on pleasure carriages and servants. We shall discuss such sumptuary taxes later. Here we may say that if they are added to the mobilier, the rate should increase according to the

number of carriages or servants. The tax, for example, should increase 10 per cent if the taxpayer keeps horses and carriages, and should increase 5 per cent for each male servant.

*

The preceding discussion has shown that the tax on rentals, which is called improperly the mobilier, is one of the best that exists. It certainly is not perfect;1 but it can be made proportional to the income, or, rather, the ability, of the citizens as closely as is possible in fiscal affairs. It avoids arbitrary methods. And finally it can be made very productive. The rental value of all buildings in France may be estimated at not less than 2,000,000,000 francs. From this we must make some deductions in order to obtain the rental value of dwelling houses; shops, factories, and stores should, therefore, be left out of the estimate. The rental value of dwellings cannot be less than 1,800,000,000 francs. An average tax of 10 per cent, for state and local purposes, would yield 180,000,000 francs; whereas the present mobilier, with the personal tax included, yielded only 164,000,000 in 1896.

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54. Proposals for a Tax on Rentals in the United States. The New York Tax Commission, in 1871, proposed that the state should levy a tax on rentals, as a substitute for the existing tax on personal property; and similar recommendations have come occasionally from other sources. As lately as 1897 the Massachusetts Tax Commission, after recommending that the present taxes on intangible personalty be abandoned, proposed that a tax on direct inheritances and a tax on "the occupants of habitations" should be introduced as substitutes. In defense of the suggested tax on rentals, the commission said:2

We have said, when discussing the possibility of an income tax, that some contribution in proportion to income enjoyed

1 Elsewhere the author says: “The great fault of the mobilier is that it is an apportioned tax. The quota demanded from each political division is based upon old assessments, and the product of the tax does not keep pace with the increase of wealth. The only way to reform it is to change it into a rated tax."— Ed. 2 Report, pp. 104-109.

would be a desirable addition to the tax system of the commonwealth. In addition to the tax on inheritances and successions, something more in the way of immediate and direct contributions from present incomes seems to us desirable, both as a supplement to the inheritance tax and as an addition to the financial resources available for public expenditures.

For this end we recommend for adoption by the General Court a tax on presumed or estimated income, based on the expenditure of the taxpayer for dwelling-house purposes. We propose that a tax shall be levied on all persons occupying dwellings of an annual rental value of more than $400, at the rate of 10 per cent on the excess of rental value over that sum. We propose to levy no tax of this sort on persons whose incomes are so moderate that their expenditure for dwelling accommodation is not over $400 a year. Those whose income is such that they exceed this expenditure for their dwellings, are to pay, not in proportion to their total dwelling rental, but in proportion to the excess of rental over the exempted limit of $400. Thus, a person occupying a house whose rental value was $500 would pay a tax of $10 a year, this being 10 per cent on the excess of the rental value over $400. A person occupying a house whose rental value was $600 would pay a tax of $20; a house of $800 rental, $40; a house of $1200 rental, $80; and so on. The tax, it will be observed, is on the occupier of a dwelling, and of a dwelling only. Houses or parts of houses used for business purposes are in no way affected by it. The tax is to be levied on the occupier, whether he be owner or tenant. If owner, it is a tax on his general income, additional to the direct tax which he pays as owner of the house. If tenant, it is again a tax on his general income, separate from the direct tax which the landlord pays on the house. In either case, it is a tax on presumed or estimated income, proportioned (in the manner described) to the expenditure for dwelling accommodation.

In the bill which we submit for this tax, we have endeavored to make appropriate provision for the difficult cases which would need to be considered in its administration: for apartment houses, where the separate apartments or tenements may be above or below the exempted amount; for buildings occupied partly for trade and partly as dwellings; for boarding and