Practically, however, it is not possible to attain to anything like a perfect equality of taxation; and provided no tax be imposed in the view of trenching on this principle, or of making one class or order of people pay more in proportion to their means than others, the equality of taxation is of less importance. In this, as in most other departments of politics, we have only a choice of difficulties; and what is absolutely right must often give way to what is expedient and practicable. It is the business of the legislator to look at the practical influence of different taxes, and to resort in preference to those by which the revenue may be raised with the smallest inconvenience. Should the taxes least adverse to the public interests fall on the contributors according to their respective abilities, it will be an additional recommendation in their favor. But the salus populi is in this, as it should be in every similar matter, the prime consideration; and the tax which is best fitted to promote, or least opposed to, this great end, though it may not press quite equally on the different orders of society, is to be preferred to a more equal but otherwise less advantageous tax. Were Smith's first maxim restricted to taxes laid directly on property or income, it would be quite as true in a practical as in a theoretical point of view. Equality is of the essence of such taxes; and whenever they cease to be equal, they become partial and unjust. But in laying down a practical rule that is to apply to all taxes, equality of contribution is an inferior consideration. The distinguishing characteristic of the best tax is, not that it is most nearly proportioned to the means of individuals, but that it is easily assessed and collected, and is, at the same time, most conducive, all things considered, to the public interests. ·

The truth is, that the greater number of taxes, including, we believe, every one that is least injurious, are imposed without any regard to the equality of their pressure. They consist of duties payable by those who use certain articles or exercise certain privileges, and by those only. Taxes of this sort, though not proportioned to the abilities of the consumers, are neither partial nor unfair; and provided they be imposed on proper objects, and kept within reasonable limits, they do not appear to be open to any good objection.

We may refer, in illustration of this statement, to the duties

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on malt, spirits, wine, and tobacco. These produce a very large annual revenue; and though some of them might, perhaps, be advantageously reduced, they appear-supposing them to be properly assessed to be, in all respects, unexceptionable. Other duties of this description, such as those on saddle horses, carriages, and livery servants, fall only on the more opulent classes. But this is not the case with the more productive duties; and it must be admitted that the largest portion of the revenue derived from them is paid by the lower and poorer orders. This, however, is not, as has been often alleged, a consequence of the latter being overtaxed, but of their being so very numerous that the produce of taxes to which they generally contribute invariably exceeds the produce of heavier taxes falling exclusively on the richer classes. The duties now under consideration act, in fact, as a species of improved sumptuary laws, having all the useful with few or none of the injurious influences of these regulations.

But though it will, perhaps, be generally admitted that reasonable duties on spirits, tobacco, and such like articles, cannot be justly objected to, it may be contended, with some show of reasoning, that duties on necessaries, or on bread, butchers' meat, salt, tea, sugar, etc., are unjust and unfair, because of their being indispensable to the consumption of the poor as well as the rich. The injury, however, which is done to the poor by moderate taxes on necessaries is more apparent than real; for, as will be afterward shown, wages are, in most cases, increased proportionally to the amount of such taxes. And it commonly, also, happens that the quantity of an article used previously to its being burdened with a moderate duty, may be diminished, or something else be substituted in its stead, or the duty be defrayed by the exercise of greater economy or industry, without entailing any very serious privations on the consumers.

Without, however, insisting on these considerations, we deny that taxes on necessaries can be fairly objected to on the ground of their being unjust. They may, if carried to too great a height, be oppressive, and they may sometimes, perhaps, be inexpedient; but the charge of injustice is not one that can ever be truly made against them. Government has nothing to do with the means of the parties who buy taxed articles. It has

'done its duty when it has imposed equal and moderate taxes on the articles best suited to bear taxation. Providence has not been charged with injustice because the corn and other articles used indifferently by the poor and the rich cost the one class as much as they cost the other. And, such being the case, how can it be pretended that governments, in laying equal duties on these articles, commit injustice? A rich man will, of course, pay taxes, and everything else, with less inconvenience than one who is poor. But is that any reason why he should be unfairly treated? or mulcted of a part of his fortune, by being subjected to peculiarly high rates of taxation? Riches are an evidence of superior good conduct; for, in the vast majority of cases, they are the result either of their possessors having themselves been, or of their having succeeded to progenitors who were, comparatively enterprising, industrious, and frugal. The distinction of rich and poor is not artificial. It originates in, and is a consequence of, the differences in the character and economy of individuals. A government which should attempt to obliterate this ineradicable distinction by varying duties so as to increase their pressure on the more opulent classes would be guilty of flagrant injustice. And it would, by discouraging the exercise of those virtues which are most essential to the public welfare, do its best to sap the foundations and weaken the springs of national prosperity and civilization.

So long, therefore, as duties are imposed on proper objects, and not carried to too great a height, we have yet to learn on what grounds they can be fairly objected to. A revenue must be raised by one means or other; and we are sanguine enough to believe that it will be sufficiently demonstrated in the sequel that such portion of it as may be raised by consumption duties will be the least onerous.

And, elsewhere,1 McCulloch turned his guns upon Say's arguments in favor of progressive taxation:

It has been contended by Say, and some other economists, that taxes on income should be imposed on a graduated scale, and made to increase according to the increase of the incomes subjected to their operation. And the countenance which has been so frequently and cordially given to proposals for the intro1 Treatise on Taxation, 139-141 (second edition).

duction of property and income taxes by the more dangerous class of politicians has originated in their supposing that they might be made to embrace a plan of graduation. And, though in the last degree objectionable, it is not to be denied that there is something exceedingly plausible in this plan. A tax of £10 is said to be more severely felt by the possessor of an income of £100, or of a property of that amount, than a tax of £100, or £1000, by the possessor of an income or of a property of £1000 or £10,000; and it is argued that, in order fairly to proportion the tax to the ability of the contributors, such a graduated scale of duty should be adopted as should press lightly on the smaller class of properties and incomes, and increase according as they become larger and more able to bear taxation. We take leave, however, to protest against this proposal, which is not more seductive than it is unjust and dangerous. No tax on income can be a just tax unless it leaves individuals in the same relative condition in which it found them. It must of course depress, according to its magnitude, all those on whom it falls; and it should fall on every one in proportion to the revenue which he enjoys under the protection of the state.1 If it either pass entirely over some classes, or press on some less heavily than on others, it is unjustly imposed. Government, in such a case, has plainly stepped out of its proper province, and has assessed the tax, not for the legitimate purpose of appropriating a certain proportion of the revenues of its subjects to the public exigencies, but that it might at the same time regulate the incomes of the contributors; that is, it might depress one class and elevate another. The toleration of such a principle would necessarily lead to every species of abuse. That equal taxes on property or income are more severely felt by the poorer than by the richer classes is undeniable. But the same is true of every payment which does not subvert the existing relations among the different orders of society. The hardship in question is, in truth, a consequence of the inequality of fortunes, and to attempt to alleviate it by adopting a graduated scale of duties would really be to impose taxes on the wealthier part of the community for the benefit of their less opulent brethren, and

1 That is, of course, supposing all revenues reduced to the same denomination, or to perpetuities.

not for the sake of the public revenue. Let it not be supposed that the principle of graduation may be carried to a certain extent, and then stopped.

Nullus semel ore receptus

Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.

The reasons that made the step be taken in the first instance, backed as they are sure to be by agitation and clamor, will impel you forward. Having once given way, having said that a man with £500 a year shall pay 5 per cent, another with £1000 10 per cent, and another with £2000 20 per cent, on what pretense or principle can you stop in your ascending scale? Why not take 50 per cent from the man of £2000 a year, and confiscate all the higher class of incomes before you tax the lower? In such matters the maxim of obsta principiis should be firmly adhered to by every prudent and honest statesman. Graduation is not an evil to be paltered with. Adopt it and you will effectually paralyze industry and check accumulation; at the same time that every man who has any property will hasten, by carrying it out of the country, to protect it from confiscation. The savages described by Montesquieu, who to get at the fruit cut down the tree, are about as good financiers as the advocates of this sort of taxes. Wherever they are introduced, security is at an end. Even if taxes on income were otherwise the most unexceptionable, the adoption of the principle of graduation would make them about the very worst that could be devised. The moment you abandon, in the framing of such taxes, the cardinal principle of exacting from all individuals the same proportion of their income or of their property, you are at sea without rudder or compass, and there is no amount of injustice and folly you may not commit.

1

31. The Views of John Stuart Mill. In his Principles of Political Economy 1 Mr. Mill considers at some length what constitutes equality in taxation:

For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all affairs of

1 Bk. V, ch. 2, §§ 2-4.