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have been proposed, now in one state, now in another, but the legislatures of the older states have not been able to rectify even the most glaring inconsistencies. The only states that have attempted any reform or solution of these problems are a few Western commonwealths, which are less hampered, and freer from the influence of old customs, traditions, and institutions. These have succeeded apparently in taking some decided steps in advance of any Eastern state.

Colorado, by an act passed in 1891, divided the counties of the state according to population into six classes, the first class containing all counties having a population of over 50,000, and the sixth class all those of less than 3000. The fees of all county or court officers were graded according to the class in which the county happened to be. It was further provided that all county officers should be paid salaries fixed by law, and that all fees or emoluments of office of every kind should be accounted for and paid into the treasury. Idaho passed an act in 1887 based on a somewhat similar scheme. Here the counties were divided into five classes according to the assessed valuation of property in each, the lowest being $500,000 and the highest, $3,250,000. A maximum and a minimum salary for the several county officers of each class was fixed by law; and provision was made that the fees collected by each, with the exception of those of justices of the peace, should be accounted for and paid into the county treasury. Montana has divided the counties into eight classes, and adopted provisions similar to those already mentioned. Nevada in 1885 fixed by law the salaries of some of the county officers and provided that all fees should be paid into the county treasury. Arizona has still another system. Here the counties are classified according to the number of registered voters in each. Officers in those counties having less than 750 voters receive fees and salary which together shall not amount to more than $600. Counties having less than 1500 voters may remunerate their officers by means of fees and salaries; while officers of counties having more than 1500 voters are, within certain maximum limits, to be allowed the fees of office only. California has a much more elaborate system. An act passed in 1891 divided the counties of the state into fifty-three classes based on population. In the

first class were all counties of over 400,000 inhabitants, while the fifty-third class contained all having less than 2000. The salaries for the county clerks, sheriffs, auditors, recorders, treasurers, tax collectors, assessors, and district attorneys were fixed for each class, and provision made that the fees collected should be paid into the county treasuries. The other officers,

coroners, justices of the peace, constables, and so on― are allowed to receive fees; but it is required that an account be kept, and any excess over the maximum allowed must be paid into the county treasury.

The only one of the older states which has as yet attempted to deal with this question in this way is Kentucky. A law, passed in 1895, fixed certain maximum amounts which might be retained as salaries by the county officers; and provided that all sums received above such amounts should be paid into the treasuries, and heavy penalties were prescribed for false reports by any official. An attempt was made a year earlier to limit the amount which might be retained by city officials out of the fees received.

It would appear as though some one of the above schemes, if thoroughly carried out, would furnish an adequate solution for this grave problem. One thing, however, seems certain ; and that is, that the experiments which these Western states are carrying on will be of interest and value to every state in the Union, whatever their result may be. The problem is one which confronts almost every locality, although the abuses are more manifest in some states than in others. Thoughtful men and wise legislators are beginning to take more and more interest in the legislative reforms which are attempted, not only within the Union, but in other countries. If the reforms outlined above should at all meet the expectations of the reformers, it will only be a question of time until the movement will spread over the entire West and even overcome the inertia and conservatism of many Eastern commonwealths. But the reform is bound to come in course of time, even if it is not accomplished by such legislation at a single stroke. It requires no great power of observation to see that a change is gradually going on in every one of the states in the Northwest. One official after another is transferred from the fee to the salaried list. Scarcely

a session of a legislature closes without having accomplished one or more changes in this respect.

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25. The Fee System as a Social Force. Some of the important social effects of our fee system are thus described by Professor Urdahl:1

1. The fee system and the tramp question. - Tramp life is made possible and even agreeable by private charity and alms, or by state aid and relief. A great deal has been said, and a great stress has been laid, upon the evils of indiscriminate charity and outdoor relief, while scarcely a voice is heard against the direct premium placed upon vagrancy, as a result of the use of the fee system to remunerate certain public officers. The average tramp would be forced either to work or to starvation if he could find no comfortable or convenient county jail in which to spend the long cold winter. Under existing conditions, however, he is often a welcome visitor at these public lodging houses; for both the jailer and sheriff are financially better off for each extra "knight of the road" whom they can induce to accept their hospitality, because the county pays the bill at so much per head, and the larger the number, the greater the profits for the keeper.2 What wonder that some of our county jails. are known far and wide among the vagrant classes for their accommodations! Is it surprising that instances repeatedly occur, where the tramp commits some misdemeanor before the very eyes of the sheriff or constable, with the express purpose of securing a commitment to jail for a period of time?

Counties using this system find the number of tramps increasing year after year, in spite of the fact that the jail or prison is crowded the greater part of the time. This has continued, in many cases, until the expense of maintaining tramps has become unbearable, and a demand is made for a new system. As a result the jailer and sheriff, or both, are given a fixed allowance out of which to feed and support all prisoners, and a certain amount of labor is required of these to relieve the monotony.

1 The Fee System in the United States, 211-230.

2 Tramps are often furnished with liquor, tobacco, and newspapers, to induce them to return. 8 This system is now in force in several counties in Wisconsin.

The conditions become changed. The sheriff is no longer interested in having as large a number of tramps as possible within his county. Life within the prison walls is made less attractive; and as a result the stream of vagrants takes another route, through more hospitable districts. A change like the one above described took place in Dane county, Wisconsin; and in four years the cost of maintaining tramps was reduced from $15,000 to $3000. This amount represents the taxes annually levied and actually paid by the public in a single county to support the tramp during that season of the year in which he cannot depend on private charity. In one sense it may be looked upon as a standing bribe to encourage shiftlessness, in the same way that the poor laws of the last century put pauperism at a premium in England.1

The jailer and keeper are not the only public officers who are interested in the existence and presence of the tramps. Where the fee system is fully applied, we find every judicial officer more or less interested in having as many tramps brought up for trial as possible. It means, as a rule, a fee for the judge, a fee for the sheriff,2 and a fee for every other officer who takes part in the trial. It is but natural that inducements should be made for the vagrant to return and be rearrested,3 to be perhaps again committed to jail for a short time. Indeed, to such an extent have these frauds been carried, that it has been found necessary in some states to pass laws prescribing heavy penalties for conspiracy between tramps and judicial officers to defraud the counties."

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1 A member of the Wisconsin State Board of Charities estimates that the tramps, through the fee system, cost the state over a quarter of a million dollars a year.

2 The fees of the sheriff for each tramp are said to run from four to six dollars, while those of the judge vary from two to three dollars.

3 Tramps are often induced to appear before the justice in the forenoon under one name and in the afternoon under another, so as to earn extra fees for each official.

4 Laws of Wisconsin, 1889.

5 Some cases have been found where the same tramp was serving three different terms at one time, by being discharged and rearrested and recommitted to jail, so as to earn fees for the sheriff and magistrate.

This state of affairs is not confined to a few states. Inquiries in the different states show that the same frauds have been, or are at present, prevalent in New York, in New England, in the South, in the Middle states, and in the far West.

2. Fees in police courts and crime. - Until quite recently both the police force and the municipal courts in most of our large cities were supported more or less by fees and fines, under the mistaken idea that the main function of police officers was to catch criminals, and the function of courts was to pronounce sentence on them when caught. It was also supposed that these public officials would perform their duties more efficiently if impelled by self-interest. This conclusion seems reasonable enough at first blush, but the trouble is that it is based on absolutely false premises. The great and primary function of a police officer is not the apprehension of criminals, but the repression of crime. Paying a police officer according to the number of arrests made is about like paying a teacher according to the number of floggings he has inflicted.

Not only that, but we have a large body of men whose bread and butter depends on having the law violated, although they are themselves its ministers. The idea never seems to have occurred that there was any danger of overofficiousness on the part of any official. The more criminals caught, the better, it is said. True! - but have we any guarantee that the policeman will catch only actual criminals? What is to prevent him from making arrests on slight suspicions, or for trifling and unwarrantable reasons? The same self-interest impels him in the latter as in the former case. As a rule, hungry men are not overscrupulous about the means and methods which will secure them bread. There is every reason to believe that they would sacrifice their most important function, that is, that of repression, to the more profitable employment of making arrests. Indeed, this is amply illustrated by the experience of every city which has changed from fee-paid policemen to salaried officers. An act of the Maryland legislature abolished the fee system in Baltimore in 1862, and as a result the number of arrests for minor offenses decreased from twelve to seven thousand. The decrease in the number of arrests did not result in more lawlessness or more petty offenses, but can be accounted for by the fewer uncalled-for and unnecessary arrests.

3. Fees and justices of the peace. - There is, perhaps, no part of the American judicial system which exists with such uniformity in all states as the justice of the peace. And every

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