1708. ritories of the enemy. The French thought this beyond the power of man, and therefore boafted, that without ftriking a blow, they would oblige the allies to abandon the fiege. And, indeed, the difficulties, which the allies had to ftruggle with, were fo many and fo great in themselves, that the confidence of the enemy did not appear altogether unreasonable. But what would have been impracticable by the duke of Vendofme and other French generals, was accomplished by prince Eugene and the duke of Marlborough, who, after the reduction of the town and citadel of Lifle, were refolved to crown their conquefts, before the end of the campaign, with the recovery of Ghent and Bruges (s). (s) The marquis de Feuquieres in his memoirs gives the following account of the errors committed in the defence of Lifle. Marshal de Boufflers, fays he, governor-general of French Flanders, and of Lifle in particular, defended this place againft the armies of the allies, who befieged it. The place was ftrengthened with a garrifon of near fixteen thousand men; and yet the befiegers only attacked it on the fide of Magdalen-gate, before a front of fortification, that comprehended near a thoufand fathoms in extent; and even this attack was feparated by the Deule; and confequently the enemy approached the fame front by two attacks, interfected by the river, which afforded them the only communication they had with each other. This conduct of the enemy might have induced the befieged to think it very practicable to make fallies under the protection of the works, either on one fide of the attack or the other; by which means they might have deftroyed the works of feveral days; and yet they only made one fally, with above five hundred men, The which did not produce any confiderable effect. The befiegers, in the conduct of their works, committed a greater error, and of which the befieged neglected to take the advantage. The error was this: their comprehenfion of this great front ceafed in proportion as they approached the place; fo that, when they advanced to the glacis, their grand front was fo contracted, that it only equalled the extent of the two faliant angles before the tenaille of the counterfcarp; by which means the front of the attacks was more extensive than that of the affailants. As the befiegers therefore were under no neceffity of forming fuch a difpofition, but committed this effential error in confequence of mere incapacity in the conduct of works, it feemed reasonable to chaftife them for their proceeding; and yet the befieged wanted refolution to attempt it, though they easily might have opened their glacis, under the protection of the counterfcarp, and those works, that were not comprehended; and they might have made fuch lodgments on the glacis, as would The French generals not imagining, that the confederates 1708.. would have attempted any thing after the last important conqueft, especially in fo advanced a season of the year, sepa have conftantly inabled them to gaul the flanks of the befiegers contracted front of the attack. The advantage was so much in favour of the befieged, as the befiegers made but one attempt to ftorm the counterfcarp at the two faliant angles before the tenaille, where they only appeared with five or fix hundred men, because they could not march a greater number in the fmall front they had formed. Moft of these men were killed in their advance upon the pallifade; and this fingle experiment fhould have convinced the befieged, that their capital operation for the defence of the place was to make fuch lodgments on the glacis, as were above-mentioned, in order to multiply the fires against the attack, and to take thofe, who approached, in flank, and to greater advantage, than in the covered way, which was not comprehended within the befiegers works. Though the want of power frequently filenced the befiegers cannon, and confequently fufpended the fire of the bombs; yet the befieged did not improve that favourable opportunity in any reparation of the breaches during the night, or clearing away the ruins in the day, tho the inhabitants of Lifle were numerous and loyal, and might have been employed in this work, while the befiegers artilJery ceafed to batter the breaches. The guard even of the attacked work was kept with fo little viVOL. XVII. The French army fepa rated rates. gilance, that only one centinel was awake, and the poft was surprised, while all the foldiers were asleep, after the desertion of that treacherous centinel, fo that the work was carried without the least oppofition on the part of the befieged. It would have been a very eafy affair however to have doubled the centinels in every place, where the negligence or infidelity of one expofed them to the befiegers. But the moft furprising circumftance of all is, that marshal Boufflers capitulated for the city, almost as foon as that half-moon was loft, and without waiting ten or twelve hours, to fee the befiegers fill up the ditch, which would have employed them, at leaft for that time, on account of its breadth, depth of water, and quantity of foft foil on its bottom. For of what particular importance could it be to marfhal de Boufflers, whether the reft of the provifions and ammunition were consumed in the defending the city fome time longer, or in a new defence of the citadel? it was, however, a very effential point, to prolong the defence of the city, as much as poffible, fince the furrender of it to the enemy would afford excellent accommodations to an army, who greatly needed them in that advanced feason, when the rains are fo fiequent in Flanders, that, if they had happened during the fiege of that city, they would certainly have rendered that great enteprize unsuccessful. E The Ghent invefted. 1708. rated their army, and returned to Paris. But, all neceffary preparations being made for the fiege of Ghent, that city was invested on the 20th of December, N. S. in the following manner count Lottum, with thirty-nine battalions, and thirty-fix fquadrons, were pofted between the UpperScheld and the Lys: the hereditary prince of Heffe, with forty fquadrons, and twenty battalions, between the Lys and the canal of Bruges, and from thence to the canal of Sas : the duke of Wirtemberg between Muleftein and the Lower Scheld, with twenty-five fquadrons, and twenty-fix battalions count Tilly with thirty fquadrons, and thirty battalions, between the Upper and Lower Scheld: and the duke of Marlborough incamped at Meerlebeck, that he might be near the center of the feveral attacks. On the 14th, in the evening, the trenches were opened at the attack commanded by general Lottum; and two thoufand workmen, covered by feven battalions, and two more in referve, with fix hundred horfe, were ordered for that fervice, under the command of lieutenant-general Fagel, major-general Wecke, The difpofitions for the defence of Lifle were very inconfiderate. The fiege from the beginning was rendered too fatiguing to the garrifon, which was divided into two bodies, alternately upon duty, for the fpace of twenty-four hours. This time was much too long. Half of the troops were pofted in outworks, and the reft were ftationed on the ramparts, and employed in the works; fo that the garrifon had never any flated hours of reft, which are fo abfolutely neceffary for the officers as well as the foldiers, both for the prefervation of their health, and to render them capable of defending the place for a greater length of time. The inhabitants of Lifle were numerous and wellaffected; and yet they were not employed in any fervice, either for the relief of the garrifon, or the prefervation of the place. It was reported, that marshal de Bouflers wanted provifions towards the clofe of the fiege, and could not fupply the citadel with a fufficient quantity for the garrifon. This indeed is true, but the fault muft be imputed to the diforder and want of œconomy in the diftribution of the provifions, which was always equal; fo that no care was taken to leffen the allotments in proportion to the lofs of men. A company, that had been greatly weakened in the progrefs of the fiege was allowed the fame fubfiftence, as it received when it was much ftronger; fo that at the lat ter end of the fiege the provifions were diftributed in almost double the quantity that was neceffary; and this irregularly a lone would have occafioned the lofs of the place, had it been accommodated never fo well. and and the lord North and Grey. The men worked about half 1708. an hour before the enemy discovered them, and then they made fuch a terrible fire, that the allies had near thirty men killed, and about feventy wounded. They carried on their works with good fuccefs from St. Peter's gate towards fort Monterey, and finished a parallel of a thoufand paces from the right to the left, within two hundred paces of the counterfcarp. On the 25th at night, the trenches were opened at the duke of Wirtemberg's attack, with four battalions. and fix hundred horfe, commanded by major-general Murray, who covered fourteen hundred pioneers, and this attack was directed against the caftle. The fame night they opened the trenches before the Bruffels gate, between the Upper and Lower Scheld, with four battalions and fix hundred workmen, commanded by brigadier Evans, who carried on their works with great fuccefs, and made a communication without any lofs. But, the works on the right being very difficult, and time as well as facines being wanting to finifh the fame, the garrifon made a fally with ten companies of grenadiers, who put the first troops into fome confufion; and, whilft brigadier Evans was bringing up the next battalions to fupport them, he was taken priioner with colonel Grove of the lord North and Grey's regiment. They had likewise about twenty officers and foldiers killed or taken; but the enemy retired upon the first firing of the troops, and had not time to level the works. On the 26th the batteries began to fire upon the Red Fort, and the garrifon, confifting of two hundred men, surrendered themselves prifoners of war. The following days the approaches were carried on with a great deal of fuccefs; and, the batteries being ready to fire, on the 30th at fix in the morning, with red-hot bullets, and the mortars to throw bombs and carcafes into the town, the count de la Motte fent out a trumpeter to the duke of Marlborough, and demanded an honourable capitulation, which was granted him; purfuant to which, one gate of the city, and another of the caftle, were delivered to the troops of the allies on the 31st of December, N. S. Ghent capiand two days after count de la Motte marched out with his garrifon, which confifted of above thirty battalions and fixteen fquadrons, in order to be conducted to Tournay. The duke of Argyle, with fix British battalions, immediately after took poffeffion of the town and citadel. tulates. The reduction of Ghent occafioned a great furprize at the The French French court, and was indeed in itself very wonderful, confidering the fituation and largenefs of the place, the nume E 2 rous abandon Bruges. 1708. rous garrison, the hard season of the year, and the fatigue which the troops had already undergone in this extraordinary long and difficult campaign. The confequence of furrendering that important city was the enemy's quitting of Bruges, Plafendale, and Leffinghen, and retiring into their own territories. The duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene, having thus gloriously finished this campaign, and settled the winter-quarters for the forces of the allies, fet out, the 9th of January, from Bruffels for the Hague, having left all the confederate troops under the command of count Tilly, general of the Dutch forces. A very hard winter. A campaign in Italy. If Ghent and Bruges had not furrendered when they did, it could not have been poffible to have kept them in the field much longer; for, within two or three days after, there was a great fall of fnow, and that was followed by a most violent froft, which continued the longeft of any in the memory of man and, though there were fhort intervals of a few days of thaw, we had four returns of an extreme froft, the whole lafting about three months. Many died in several parts by the extremity of the cold; it was fearce poffible to keep the foldiers alive, even in their quarters; fo that they must have perifhed, if they had not broke up the campaign before this hard feafon. ་ The mifcarriage before Toulon did not difcourage the duke of Savoy from meditating a new irruption into France, in return for the fiege of Turin. The preparations made by his command through Piedmont during the winter and the fpring, his affembling fo great a body of troops on his frontiers, and preparing, not only a train of field pieces, but a quantity alfo of heavy cannon, gave the French apprehenfions, not only of an incurfion, but of fome important fiege. And, according to the French writers, the duke never diffembled his intentions, which were to enter Dauphine, and to extort contributions as far as Lyons. But though the bad weather could not fuffer him to take the field till the month of July, yet the latenefs of the campaign was foon made up by the rapidity of his conquefts; which the vigilance and activity of the marfhal de Villars (whom the French used to call their fortunate general) could neither forefce nor prevent. The duke, the better to cover his defign, had firft, with great labour and fatigue, bent his march towards Savoy, over mount Cenis, as if he intended to penetrate into Dauphine through fort des Barreaux; but, having by this feint drawn the enemy's forces on that fide, he turned fhort towards Sezane and Oulx, prevented Vil lars's |