Anne. duke, the next day, ordered a ceffation of arms for two 1712. months to be proclaimed by found of trumpet. Remarks on of arms. Had the first defign taken effect, which was depended upon by France, and fo far prefumed by England, as to be undertaken for, that all the foreigners in the queen's pay, that compofed the duke of Ormond's army, fhould feperate and withdraw from the rest of the allies, it is notorious, that from that inftant prince Eugene's whole army, unless they fubmitted to the fame measures, had been left at the mercy of the French army to be cut in pieces, or made prifoners at the will of marshal Villars, which had left the queen's troops in no better a condition than to have the privilege of being laft deftroyed. Yet all the allies, whofe honour and confcience would not permit them to abandon their confederates, and leave them as a facrifice to France, were punished by England with the lofs of their pay and fubfidies, which was all that was in the power of the miniftry to do, to fhew their refentment at this great disappointment of the measures of France. This march of prince Eugene, the Earl of Strafford, in a letter to Mr. St. John, thought might be turned upon them; and he prevailed with the duke of Ormond, in a meffage to prince Eugene, to fay, that his marching without us, and all the queen's auxiliaries marching from us, expofed us fo, that we have been obliged to fend to the French to declare with us a ceffation of arms: nothing less could put the queen's troops in fafety. For though (fays the earl) matters fell out fo pat, that without this we must have declared for the ceflation, yet why should we not turn all this matter upon them?" Upon a thorough confideration of this fatal ceflation, it is the ceffation very evident, that it was of infinite advantage, and abfolutely neceffary to the affairs of France; and therefore infifted upon Rep. of the com. of fec. by them. And it is as certain, that the English miniftry gave early into it, if they were not the first advisers of it; for which no other account need be required, but that, as all their measures tended to advance the intereft of the queen's enemies, they could not fail to be zealous in a point, which contributed more to thofe views than any one occurrence during the whole negotiation; but, as they all along wanted appearances, and confulted them more than any real advantages to the kingdom, they thought it neceffary to annex fome conditions to this important article, that might pafs upon the deluded people, as a juftification of this unprecedented treachery. The demolition of Dunkirk was always fo fo popular a point, that nothing could strike the imaginations Anne. of the people more, than to be told, that this important place 1712. was delivered into the queen's poffeffion. This ftep, they thought, well improved, would recommend the peace itself, at least justify the ceffation. And as the nation had nothing more at heart than the difpofition of the Spanish monarchy, after the renunciation had been industriously cried up, and the queen had declared from the throne, that France and Spain were thereby more effectually divided than ever, these two articles were made the effential conditions of granting a ceffation of arms. For the renunciation, France eafily confented to it, having declared it to be null and void by the fundamental laws of France. For the other article, it is evident how unwillingly France was brought to surrender Dunkirk; but this the miniftry were refolved to purchase at any rate, as what would easily amuse and fenfibly affect the nation; and therefore, to obtain this, they engaged not only to grant a ceffation of arms, but to conclude a feparate peace. The prospect of concluding a feparate peace, and the obtaining immediately a ceffation of arms, which answered all the purposes of France almost as well as a feparate peace, by leaving the whole confederacy in their power, and, at their mercy, were fo great temptations to France, that the furrender of Dunkirk was agreed to. But, when it is confidered what England gained by granting this fatal ceffation, it will be found, that the demolition of Dunkirk has by no means anfwered the purposes pretended by it; and, for the renunciation, the English ministry were told by France, that they fhould deceive themselves, who received it as a fufficient expedient to prevent the union of the two monarchies (k). (k) Burnet obferves on this occafion: The withdrawing the English forces in this manner, from the confederate army, was cenfured, not only as a manifeft breach of faith and of treaties, but as treacherous in the highest and bafest degree. The duke of Ormond had given the States fuch affurances, of his going along with them through the whole campaign, that he was let into the fecrets of all their counfels, which by that confi In troops not Anne. In the evening of the fame day, the duke of Ormond had 1712. declared the fufpenfion of arms, Villars fent him word, he had likewife that day declared the fame, pursuant to their The British agreement. On the 18th of July, N. S, the British forces marched from Avefne le Secq to Flines, being joined in the pa's though way by two battalions and two squadrons of Great-Britain, Bouchain which made part of the feparate body posted at Denain under aid Doway. the command of the earl of Albemarle. Before the feparation Cond. of the of the confederate forces, the deputies of the States faid umered to D. of Or mozd. openly, That they hoped the duke of Ormond did not in- 1 Anne. 1712. or indirectly; and that they not only disavowed their pro- On the 21st of July, N. S. the earl of Strafford, accom- Nn 4 caution Anne, caution proceeded from an apprehenfion, that, if the English 1712. were poffeffed of any of their ftrong towns, they should be compelled to fubmit to the scheme of peace concerted between Great-Britain and France. On the 23d in the evening, the duke of Ormond's army purfued their march to Ghent, of which he took poffeffion, as he did alfo of Bruges. This done, he detached fix battalions to reinforce the garrison of Dunkirk, and sent thither a train of artillery, with fome ammunition; the French having drawn off moft of their cannon from the ramparts. of that place; which, together with the force they had ftill in it, rendered our poffeffion for fome time precarious (1). (1) That the taking poffef- It felves with the Hauteur they lately did. The thing was fo well and fecretly managed, that all preparations were made to march about to Warneton, between Lifle and Ypres, to have lived upon the French country; and, till we marched a day's march on this fide the Scarpe, the Dutch and their friends did not perceive our defign, which, as foon as they did, their furprize and uneafiness were equally great.' Rep. of the Com. of Secr. How agreeable to the queen and her minifters the duke of Ormond's conduct was, is plain from Mr. St. John's letter to him, acquainting him: That, though the orders, he tranfmitted to his grace in his laft, did appear to her majefly, at that time, to be the most proper, the methods he had purfued were fo rightly judged, and fo well adapted to the prefent conjuncture of affairs, that they answered, in every point, what she would have wifhed. That fhe was unwilling to reftrain his grace, by particular and pofitive inftructions, who made use of the dif cretionary power given him, fo much so |