1712. "the difficulties which had arifen in the course of this ne"gotiation; and that the confidence they placed in her "would enable her better to finish this great work, for the "advantage of her own people, and the fafety and intereft "of her allies." Several lords entered a protest against the rejecting the guaranty claufe, and figned their reafons for it, which were foon after published in print (d). But this gave fo (d) The proteft was in thefe terms: We think it necessary to have the fecurity propofed of a general guaranty; and the rather, becaule we conceive the terms of peace, that are offered, have proceeded from a separate negotiation, carried on by the minifters with France, without any communication thereof to the principal allies, particularly the ftates-general, as they fay in their letter to her majefty (whofe intereft, her majesty was pleased to declare to this parliament, fhe looked upon as infeparable from her own); and we conceive this negotiation to be contrary to thofe orders, which her majefty declared to this houfe, in anfwer to their address, that he had given to her plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, to concert with thofe of her allies; and the refolution expreffed in her message of January the 17th, of a strict union, in which the propofed to join with them, in order to obtain a good peace, and to guaranty and fupport the fame,' as fhe had before declared in her fpeech at the opening of the fef fion, that she would unite with them in the ftricteft engage⚫ments for continuing the alliance, in order to render the general peace fecure and lafting; and, contrary to the eighth article of the grand alliance, which exprefly obliges all the allies not to treat, unless jointly, and with the common advice of the other parties. And we conceive, that the refufal of these words, propofed to be added, may be looked upon by the allies, as if this houfe approved this method of tranfacting with France, which may feem to them to tend to a separate peace, of which her majefty has declared her diflike, and which was acknowledged in this houfe to be foolish and knavish, and would be of pernicious confequence to this kingdom, by preventing that guaranty of peace by the allies, which is fo abfolutely neceffary for their mutual fecurity, and leave us expofed to the power of France, there being little reafon to expect their future help, after fuch a grofs breath of trust. And we further conceive, that fuch a feparate proceeding may create in the allies fo great a diftruft, as may tempt them to take the like measures, and fo give the French opportunity to break that union, which has hitherto been so useful to us, and formidable to them; any appearance whereof muft encourage France, either to delay the conclufion of a peace, or to impofe upon the allies in the further progress of the treaty. A perfect To great offence to the majority of the peers, that, on the 1712. 13th of June, the question being put, "Whether the pro A perfect union among the allies feems to us to be more neceffary in the prefent cafe, becaufe the foundation, upon which all the offers of France, relating to Great-Britain as well as to the allies, are built, viz. A renun⚫ciation of the duke of Anjou to that kingdom,' is, in our opihion, fo fallacious, that no reafonable man, much lefs whole nations, can ever look upon it as any fecurity. Experience may fufficiently convince us, how little we ought to rely upon the renunciation of the houfe of Bourbon and though the prefent duke of Anjou should happen to think himself bound by his own act, which his grandfather did not; yet will his defcendants be at liberty to fay, That no act of his could deprive them of their birth-right;' and efpecially when it is fuch a right, as, in the opinion of all Frenchmen, ought inviolably to be maintained by the fundamental conftitution of the kingdom of France. And we humbly think it unfafe to depend upon this principal part of the treaty's executing itself, by fuppofing it will be the intereft of France to fupport it, fince, on the contrary, it is manifest by the French endeavours, ever fince the Pyrenean treaty, to unite the monarchies of France and Spain, they look upon that union to be their greateft intereft, and the moft effectual means of establishing the univerfal monarchy in the houfe of Bourbon. "test France and Spain fhould remain in diftinct branches of the house of Bourbon; yet this is contrary to the grand alliance itself, which recites the ufurpation of the Spanifh monarchy by the French king for the duke of Anjou, as the principal caufe of this war. And if it were reasonable to imagine, that the two crowns of As to Port-Mahon, Gibraltar, the Affiento, and the other advantages to Britain proposed by France (befides that they are all precarious, and in the power of France and Spain, to take from us when they pleafe) confidering the fituation of those kingdoms, and the vaft wealth and ftrength, which will be left to them, we conceive it impoffible for any man to look on thofe as a compenfation to Britain in any degree; for the leaving Spain and the Indies in the poffeffion of the house of Bourbon, besides other manifeftly fatal confequences, must be extremely prejudicial to our woollen manufacture, if it does not intirely ruin it. As to the demolition of Dunkirk, though we own it will be a great fafety to our home-trade, yet we have reafon to apprehend by what was faid in the debate, that it is not yet agreed to be demolished, without an equivalent for it to the French king's fatisfaction. And in all the particulars relating to the allies, though they are not perfectly adjufted, yet, by what does appear concerning them, the allies are likely to be left in such a state of infecurity, as is abfolutely inconfiftent with our own fafety. 1712. teft be expunged out of the books of the house ?" It was carried in the affirmative by a majority of fixty-fix voices The Rhine is propofed for a barrier of the empire, which leaves Strafburg and Hunninghen in the hands of the French; the former of which has always been looked upon as the key of the empire. The propofals of France, relating to the barrier for the ftatesgeneral, not only deprive them of all the places taken fince the year 1709, but also of two cr three places more, included in the demand made by the states in that year; which will render their barrier wholly infufficient, and confequently very much weaken the fecurity of Britain. Portugal feems to be wholly abandoned to the power of Spain; notwithstanding the great advantage we have received du ring this war by our trade with that kingdom, which might fill be extremely beneficial to us. Upon the whole, there is fo very little and inconfiderable a difference between thefe offers of France and thofe made at Utrecht, February the 11th, N. Ş. and figned d'Uxelles (as appeals to us upon comparing them together) that both feem to be the effect of a fecret and particular negotiation with France; and, this houfe having unanimoufly concurred in expreffing to her majefly their utmoft refentment at thofe terms offered to her majefty and her allies, by the plenipotentiaries of France; and her majefty having graciously accepted that our addrefs, and reward. ed that duty and zeal with her hearty thanks, we cannot, in refpect to her majefty, or justice to our country, retract that opinion, nor think the terms now good for us or the allies, or giving any feeming app:obation of them, which then were received by this houfe, and all the allies, with fcorn and deteftation. For thefe reafons we are of opinion, that the offers of France are fallacious and infnaring, no way proportioned to the advantages, which her majefty (from the great fucceffes with which it has pleafed God to bless her and her allies during the whole course of this war) might justly expect for her own kingdoms and for them; very infufficient for preferving a balance of power in Europe, for the future fecurity of her majefty and her allies, though they fhould be never so exactly performed; and yet even fuch as they are, there is no effectual fecurity offered for the performance of them; which makes it abfolutely neceffary, as we conceive, that fuch measures fhould be taken, in concert with the allies, as may induce them to join with her majefty in a mutual guaranty, against thirty-one prefent, and of ninety voices against fixty 1712, four, proxies included. The next day, upon a complaint made in the houfe of lords, that both this proteft, and the former concerning the orders produced by the duke of Or-, mond, were in print, a committee was appointed to inquire who were the printers and publishers of the fame; but, this committee not having been able to make any discovery in that matter, the lords applied themfelves by addrefs to the queen for that purpose. But neither an order of the queen in council, nor a hundred pounds reward, had any effect. The commons were no lefs offended than the lords at fe- Bishop veral papers published about this time, particularly bishop Fleetwood's preface orFleetwood's preface to four fermons which he had formerly dered to be preached, and now reprinted (e). The bishop concludes burnt. (e) The four fermons were, 1. On the death of queen Mary, 1694. II. On the death of the duke of Gloucester, 1700. III. On the death of king William, 1701. IV. On the queen's ac ceffion. Among the reafons alledged by the bishop for publishing thofe fermons, he gives the following: this ⚫ contemptuously. I have lived to see our deliverance from ar⚫bitrary power and popery, traduced and vilified by fome, who formerly thought it was their greatest merit, and made it part of their boast and glory to have had a little hand and fhare in bringing it about: and others, who, without it, muft have lived in exile, poverty, and mifery, meanly disclaim ❝rious inftrument thereof. Who Another reafon of my pubing it, and ufing ill the glolifhing these fermons, at this time, is, that I have a mind to ⚫ do myself some honour, by doing what honour I could to the memory of two moft excellent princes, and who have very highly deferved at the hands of all the people of these dominions, who have a true value for the proteftant religion, and the conftitution of the English government, of which they were the great deliverers and defenders. I have lived to fee their illuftrious names very rudely handled, and the great benefits they did this nation, treated flightly and a Pr. H. CA The fourth fermon was preached upon the queen's ac: ceffion 1712. this preface with faying, 'Never did seven fuch years together pafs over the head of any English monarch, nor < cover it with fo much honour. The crown and scepter feemed to be the queen's least ornaments. Thofe other • princes wore in common with her; and her great perfonal virtues were the fame before and fince. But fuch was the fame of her administration of affairs at home; fuch was the reputation of her wisdom and felicity in chusing minifters; and fuch was then efteemed their faithfulness and zeal, their diligence and great abilities in executing her commands; to fuch a height of military glory did her great general and her armies carry the British name abroad; fuch was the harmony and concord betwixt her and her allies; and fuch was the bleffing of God upon all her counfels and undertakings, that I am as fure as history can make me, no prince of our's was ever yet fo profperous and fuccessful, fo loved, efteemed, and honoured by their < fubjects and their friends, nor near fo formidable to their enemies. We were, as all the world imagined then, just entered on the ways that promifed to lead to fuch a peace, as would have anfwered all the prayers of our religious queen, the care and vigilance of a most able ministry, the payments of a willing and obedient people, as well as all the glorious toils and hazards of the foldiery: when God, for our fins, permitted the spirit of difcord to go forth, and by troubling fore the camp, the city, and the country (and oh that it had altogether fpared the places facred to his worship!) to fpoil, for a time, this beautiful and pleafing profpect; and give, in its ftead, I know not what Our enemies will tell the reft with pleasure.' The complaint against this preface was made by Mr. Hungerford, feconded by Mr. Manley, and fupported by the court-party. But Sir Peter king, Sir Jofeph Jekyll, Mr. Lechmere, and other gentlemen, were very ftrenuous advocates in its behalf, but to no purpofe; for the commons, by |