' war,. 6bftructions from those, who would willingly break the conferences, he believes the best way to difappoint their defigns would be, for the queen of Great Britain to propose immediately a fufpenfion of arms; for they grounded their hopes upon the events of a campaign. Mr. St. John, in his anfwer to this letter, treats this propofal as liable to all the objections of the former, and argues thus upon it: "Although "the king of Spain fhould at this inftant declare his choice, "What greater fecurity will Europe have, if the execution "of that choice be deferred to another time? In offering, "that he fhall be obliged to declare his choice at this present "time, you agree, that neither the ftipulations of a treaty, "nor the guaranty of the powers engaged in the present would be fufficient to fecure that the choice fhall be made. How then can we conclude, that they will be fuf*ficient to fecure, that, when the cafe fhall happen, he shall quitone crown to accept of the other, according to the choice "which he fhall now make? The queen has often declared, that it will be impoffible for her to be content with any expedient, which shall not be very folid, upon an article of fo great an importance as the union of the two monarchies. This would be to lose the fruit of all the blood, which the allies had fpilt in the courfe of this war. This would be to betray the common cause of Europe, and to expofe both the prefent age and pofterity to greater dangers, than it is poffible to imagine." In fhort, he infifis, that they must take care, that the time fhall never be, when the fame prince fhall have the crown of Spain upon his head, and the fucceffion to the crown of France open to him. He at laft proposes, "That, if the king of Spain મંદ prefers the expectation of the crown of France to the pre"fent poffeffion of Spain, in fuch cafe he fhall withdraw "forthwith with his family out of Spain, the poffeffion of "which, and the Indies, fhall be given to the duke of Sa66 voy that king Philip should have the kingdom of Sicily and the hereditary dominions of the duke of Savoy, to"gether with the Montferrat and Mantua, all which domi"nions he should remain possessed of, tho' he became king "of France, excepting Sicily; which, in that cafe, should return to the houfe of Auftria." 1712. Monfieur de Torcy, ftill feeming to comply with the May, 18. meafures of England, thews the great hardship, which the N. S. king of Spain muft undergo, in facrificing his own and the intereft of his family for the eftablishing a general peace. However, the king of France would fend to him to know his mind upon the two alternatives. In the mean time, the king Kk4 1712. king of France promises, that the treaty of peace shall be made upon the foundation of one of these two propofitions ; either that the king of Spain fhall renounce his right to the crown of France, and keep Spain and the Indies; or, if he prefers his expectation upon France, he fhall quit Spain and the Indies to the duke of Savoy, in exchange for the present dominions of the duke of Savoy, &c. as proposed by Mr. St. John. He hopes, by this promise of the king of France, all uncertainties are removed; and fubmits to the queen's wifdom, to confider what method will be most conducive to the general good. "It will (fays he) be very unhappy, if any event, during the campaign, fhall fall out to disturb "the good difpofitions, that are feen at prefent, for establishing the public repofe." Remarks on ation. This correspondence between the two fecretaries, for prethis negoti- venting the union of the two kingdoms, carried on from about the middle of March to the 18th of May, 1712, ended at last, just as it began; and king Philip chofe to make the renunciation. Torcy giving the British ministers fuch early notice, and telling them fo very plainly, that what they asked was utterly infufficient, and would be for ever deemed, by the unalterable laws of France, null and void, is very remarkable. His dexterity in managing that part of the negotiation, in feeming always to comply, and defirous to come as near as poffible to the propofals made from hence, and fubmitting at last, fince Great-Britain would have it fo, to the renunciation fo peremptorily infifted on, is no lefs obfervable. But it is unaccountable, how the English ministry, when they were exprefsly told, thofe would deceive themfelves, who should accept of a renunciation, as a sufficient expedient to prevent the union of the two monarchies; when they laid it down as a principle never to be departed from, that the union of the two monarchies would be the greatest mifchief, that could poffibly happen to all Europe, and to Great-Britain in particular; fhould ftill perfevere in relying upon this expedient of a renunciation. Befides, no care was taken to render effectual the two only expedients, that were ever proposed for adding any degree of real fecurity to the renunciation; which were, to have it folemnly accepted by the states of France; and to have it confirmed by a general guaranty of all the powers of Europe engaged in the prefent war. The firft was afked indeed; but, upon the refufal of France, was intirely given up by the British ministry. The fecond, by their method of negotiating, and their treatment of the allies, was from that very time rendered impracticable, practicable, as the French could not but forefee. It must be 1712. remembered, that, a few days after this answer of monfieur de Torcy was received, Mr. St. John fent orders to the British plenipotentiaries to declare to the ftates-general, that the queen was now under no farther obligations whatsoever to them, who, with the rest of the allies, were to be guarantees of this treaty. To this may be added a paffage, in a letter from the plenipotentiaries to Mr. St. John, acquainting him, that in fome difcourfe with the marfhal d'Uxelles, upon occafion of the death of the dauphin, they defired to know of him, what those measures are, which France offers to take, in order to prevent the union of the two kingdoms; and whether they were to confift in real or verbal fecurities upon which the French minifter pretended to know of no other but verbal. They then fuggefted to Mr. St. John, that an obligation upon king Philip to renounce the regency as well as the crown of France, for himself and his pofterity, would amount to fome degree of real fecurity. But no endeavours were used to obtain this, nor any mention made of it, as far as appears. Torcy's letter of the 18th of May, N. S. was received by Mr. St. John the 9th of May, O. S. and the promise of the king of France, to oblige his grandfon to accept the alternative of the two kingdoms, had so good and fudden an effect, that the day following, without waiting the return of the courier from Madrid, to know whether king Philip did confent or not to the proposal, orders were fent, on the 10th of May, to the duke of Ormond, by Mr. St. John, to avoid engaging in any fiege, or hazarding a battle till further ofder. And, the fame day, that these orders were fent, with directions to difguife them, which was to conceal them from the confederates, they were communicated to the queen's enemies." Abbot Gaultier will give you an account (fays Mr. St. John to Torcy) of the orders I have just now "difpatched to the duke of Ormond." What Mr. St. John himself thought of the importance of this order, is to be learned from his letter to Mr. Prior, September 19, 1712: "The moment I read the queen a letter from monfieur de "Torcy, by which it appeared, that the king of France would oblige his grandfon to accept of the alternative of "quitting one of the two monarchies, her orders were dif→ "patched to the duke, to engage in neither fiege nor bat"tle; and fhe prevented the French from even making the "demand. I will not say, that this order faved their army "from being beat; but I think, in my confcience, that it did." On 1712. The On the 24th of May, 1712, Mr. St. John writes agairi to Torcy, that although they had yet received no aniwer from Madrid concerning the renunciation, but being preffed in time, and finding it neceflary for the queen to make the communication she had promised, to the parliament, of the terms, on which a peace might be made, he acquaints him with the fteps, which the queen was refolved to take, provided the most chriftian king would render them practicable for her. And in a memorial of the fame date, he specifies the conditions, upon which the queen consents to make such important steps and decifive declarations to her parliament : "First, That she had fettled with France the intereft of "Great-Britain. Secondly, That the looks upon the inshe "terefts of the other powers engaged with her in the war, "as easy to be adjusted, fince the king offers to the greatest part of them very near what they have demanded, and "to all a just and reasonable fatisfaction. Thirdly, That "fhe will fet about accommodating the affairs of her allies ; " and, that to prevent all the obstructions, which the events of "the campaign might occafion to the negotiations of peace, "fhe agreed with the king to a fufpenfion of arms." conditions specified in the memorial were demands relating to North-America, to commerce, and the fufpenfion of arms. In the article concerning commerce, it is faid, "That several points relating to trade requiring a longer "difcuffion than the prefent crifis would admit; and the <6 queen being much more intent upon fecuring the general "peace, than any particular advantages, demands at pre"fent only the two following conditions: First, That com"miffaries fhould be named on both fides to meet at Lon"don, there to examine and settle the duties and impofiti"ons to be paid refpectively in each kingdom. Secondly, "That no privileges or advantages, relating to commerce "with France, shall be yielded to any foreign nation, which "fhall not at the fame time be granted to the fubjects of "her Britannic majesty; as likewife no privilege or advan«6 tage, in relation to the trade of Great-Britain, shall be "yielded to any foreign nation, which fhall not at the same "time be granted to the fubjects of France." As to the fufpenfion of arms, "her majefty will confent, it shall be "made for two months, provided, firft, that within the "said term the king of Spain fhall either make the renun"ciation demanded, or fhall yield Spain to the duke of "Savoy, upon the conditions mentioned in Mr. St. John's "letter. Secondly, That the French garrison fhall evacuate "Dun "Dunkirk, and the queen's troops be admitted the fame ¿¿ day that the fufpenfion of arms thall commence. Thirdly, "That, in cafe the ftates-general fhall at the fame time "confent to the fufpenfion of arms, it feems reafonable they "fhould have the liberty of putting a garrifon into Cam"bray." It may be remarked upon thefe conditions, that although it was daily inftilled into the minds of the people, that the great advantages in trade and commerce secured to Great-Britain were the chief inducements to the miniftry to engage in these measures with France, it is here declared, that they were more intent upon the general peace than any particular advantages. And whereas it was laid down as a principle, from which the queen would never depart, that the interefts of Great-Britain fhould in the first place be adjufted, and the great advantages, ftipulated for these nations before the conclufion of the peace, were to justify the peace, and all the fteps that were taken to procure it; it is now evident, that no mention was made of our trade in Spain; and, as for our commerce in general, the fettling of that was poftponed, and all points in difpute betwixt Great-Britain and France were to be referred to commiffaries; which propofition was not demanded, but voluntarily offered by Mr. St. John. On the 8th of June, 1712, N. S. Torcy fent an account, "That the king of Spain, of the two pro"pofitions, had chosen to keep Spain and the Indies, and "to renounce for himself and his defcendants the right to "the crown of France. That, this principal obftacle to "the peace being removed, the king of France expected, "that the queen would now clear on her fide the rest of the difficulties, which might obftruct this great work, by "making fuch declarations, as had been premifed upon the "return of the courier from Madrid, and were neceflary " for this end. That the king thought the firft and most "urgent was to fettle a fufpenfion of arms, either general, "or at least between the two armies in the Low-Countries, "which may continue till the conclufion of the peace.' On the 10th of June, N. S. Torcy acknowledges the receipt of Mr. St. John's letter of the 24th of May, Ŏ. S. together with the memorial; and fends another memorial in anfwer to it, containing the king of France's anfwer to these laft demands of the queen. He takes notice, "That the let"ters from the army mention a defign to invest Quesnoy, "in order to besiege it; but, that the king could not think, "that the queen approved of fuch an undertaking, much "lefs that her troops fhould be employed to render it fuc "eefsful. 1712. |