the main of the barrier; fome places on the Scheld were not 1711-12. neceffary for a frontier, but the states infifted on them, as neceffary to maintain a communication with the frontier. The king of Pruffia excepted likewise to fome places in the Spanish Guelder. The lord Townshend thought that these were fuch inconfiderable objections, that, though his inftructions did not come up to every particular, yet he figned the treaty, known by the name of the Barrier Treaty, on the 29th of October, 1709; by which the ftates bound themfelves to maintain the queen's title to her dominions and the proteftant fucceffion with their whole force; and England was reciprocally obliged to affift them in maintaining this barrier. The mercenary writers, who were hired to defend the That treaty peace then projected with Frarce, attacked this treaty with complained great virulence (h) and by arguments that gave just fufpi- of. (h) Dr. Swift in particular published a piece, intitled, "Some remarks on the barrier-treaty between her majefty and the ⚫ states-general; to which are added, the faid barrier-treaty, ⚫ with two separate articles; part ⚫ of the counter-project; the fentiments of prince Eugene and ❝ count Zinzendorf upon the faid treaty; and a reprefentation of the English merchants at Bruges.' He attacked likewife the fame treaty in his conduct of the allies and of the late ⚫ miniftry ;' but his remarks upon it were confuted in the fecond < part of Dr. Hare's allies and the late miniftry defended against France, and the prefent friends of France.' Ôn the fame fide was also published a piece in octavo, called, The Dutch barrier our's; or the in• tereft of England and Holland infeparable.' But the most confiderable treatife upon this fubject was published at London, in 1712, in octavo, under the title of The barrier-treaty vin cions dicated,' which is fuppofed to have been written by the lord Townshend, Mr. Stephen Poyntz, Dr. Samuel Clarke, and Dr. Hare. This piece begins with reprefenting the fatal confequences of fubmitting to a popish prince, and the neceffity of securing the proteftant fucceffion: that the proteftant fucceffion, under the circumstances of it at that time, could no otherwise be effectually fecured, than by a foreign affiftance; fince the French king's promife, of not fupporting the pretender, could not be depended upon, and fince England alone was not fufficient to defend herfelf against France. That no alliance was fo useful, in order to fecure the proteftant fucceffion, as that of the ftates-general, whether we confider their fituation, ftrength, religion, or intereft, and the nature of their trade compared with our own. That, with regard to the barrier, it is in itself, and apart from all other confiderations, the true interest of England, that there fhould be a good 1711-12. cions of black defigns. nation, to engage any They faid, it was a difgrace to this other state to fecure the fucceffion among good and fufficient barrier againft France on the fide of the Netherlands: that no barrier could be fufficient, that was not at leaft equal to that ftipulated in the barrier treaty: that the bar rier infifted on, in the preliminaries of 1709, was not fufficient for the defence of the Low-Countries, because it confifted but of one fingle line or chain of towns; whereas what might further be claimed, by virtue of the barrier treaty, was far from being more than neceffary for that end: that the defence of the barrier ought to be committed to the flates, fince it could not be preferved by treaties with France, nor by defenfive alliances against her, nor by the house of Auftria; nor by troops lent for the defence of the barrier, nor by England, but only by the states. That, for the defence of the barrier in the hands of the states, it was neceffary they should have a fafe and free communication with it, and reasonable, that the country of the barrier fhould contribute to wards the charge of maintaining it. That the Dutch had a right to a fufficient barrier, and to have themselves the defence of it, was acknowledged by the allies previous to the barrier treaty: that the states having a barrier purfuant to the prefent treaty, was far from expofing Great-Britain to any danger from them: that their barrier was granted them under fuch regulations and reAtrictions, that they could not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the trade of Great Britain, : : without a direct violation of the treaty, and an open rupture with our nation that they were to have only the military command in the barrier towns, without any power of impofing duties, prohibiting trade, or making any orders relating to commerce : that they were bound by the treaty to affift her majesty, in case any others should attempt to put our trade on a worse foot than that of the nations the most favoured: that, even in cafe of a rupture with us, the states could not obftruct our trade in the Netherlands, without breaking at the fame time with the emperor also that if the fear of obstructing our trade was an objection against trufting the ftrong towns in the Netherlands in the hands of the states, it was a strong objection against trusting them in any other hands whatfover. That, when the barrier was once put into the hands of the states, it would be more their interest than ever to avoid breaking with England. That fuppofing the ftates fhould be fo imprudent, as to break with England, their barrier would be fo far from making them more rich or formidable, that it would rather exhauft and weaken them, with refpect to England; because the whole revenue of the Spanish Netherlands had never been fufficient, fince the Pyrenean treaty, to keep them in a tolerable pofture of defence; and therefore much lefs can that portion, affigned the ftates by the treaty, be fufficient. That with regard among us, which perhaps we might fee caufe to alter; 1711-12. whereas by this treaty the ftates had an authority given them to interpofe in our counfels. It was alfo faid, that, if the ftates were put into poffeffion of all thofe ftrong towns, they might shut us out from any share of trade in them, and might erect our manufactures in provinces very capable of them. But it was answered, that this could not be done, as long as this treaty continued in force, unless the fovereign of the country fhould join with them against us. Some objected to the fettlement made at Munfter, as a tranfaction, when we were in fuch confufion at home, that we had no minifter there; but that treaty had only rendered the truce and the provifional fettlement made before, by the mediation of England, perpetual; and we had fince acquiefced in that fettlement for above fixty years. By examining into the particulars of the treaty, it appeared, that in some inconfiderable matters, the lord Townshend had gone beyond the letter of his inftructions, in which he had fo fully fatiffied the late miniftry, that though, upon his firft figning it, fome exceptions had been taken, yet these were passed over, and the treaty was ratified in form. But the new miniftry had other views. They defigned to fet the queen at liberty from her engagements by thefe alliances, and to difengage her from treaties. The house to the great objection, founded on the fifteenth article of the treaty, that it was highly prejudicial to the commerce of GreatBritain, to fubmit our trade in the Spanish dominions to an equality with that of Holland and other nations; this is confuted by these confiderations: that the trade of England and Holland to the Spanish dominions had always flood upon an equal foot, not only by virtue of their refpective treaties with the crown of Spain, but likewife in fact; and that the crown of England had been fo far from not fubmitting to the advantages granted the Dutch by the treaty of Munfter, that it actually firft procured them for the ftates, and, by a particular exprefs treaty, became of 1711-12. of commons went now very haftily into feveral refolutions that were very injurious to the ftates. They preRefolutions tended the ftates had been deficient in their quota's for feainjurious to the ftates. fervice, fome years two thirds, and generally more than half Pr. H. C. their quota. That the forces fupplied by the ftates for the Feb. 4. service of Spain, from 1705 to 1708, were no more than twelve thousand two hundred men, and they had since sent thither no forces at all. That the states, during the course of the war, had furnished less than their proportion in Flanders, twenty thousand eight hundred and thirty-feven men. That the queen had paid in subsidies more than her proportion three millions one hundred and fifty-five crowns. Then The barrier they fell on the barrier-treaty: they gave out, that the treaty con- old miniftry defigned to bring over an army from Holland, demned. whenever they fhould, for other ends, pretend that the proteftant fucceffion was in danger; whereas it was urged, that there was no need of any foreign affistance to maintain it. In the debate it was infifted on, that it could be maintained fafely no other way: it was not to be doubted but the king of France would affift the pretender. England was not inclined to keep up a standing army, in time of peace, to refift him; fo that we could not be fo fafe any other way, as by having the ftates engaged to fend over their army, if it fhould be neceffary. But reason is a feeble thing to bear down refolutions already taken, so the commons voted, I. That in the treaty between her majefty and the statesgeneral, for fecuring the fucceffion to the crown of GreatBritain, and for fettling a barrier for the states-general against France, under colour of fecuring the protestant fucceffion, and providing a fufficient barrier to the ftatesgeneral against France, there were several articles deftructive to the trade and interest of Great-Britain, and therefore highly dishonourable to her majefty. II. That the lord viscount Townshend had not any orders or authority for negotiating or concluding feveral articles in that treaty. III. That the lord viscount Townshend, who negotiated and figned, and all those who advised the ratifying of that treaty, were enemies to the queen and ' kingdom.' Thefe votes were carried by a great majority, and were looked on as ftrange preludes to a peace. When the ftates heard what exceptions were taken to the barrier treaty, they wrote a very refpectful letter to the queen, setting forth their juft claim to, and the neceffity of the barrier for the fecurity of England as well as Holland; concluding, That if there were fome articles, which, without affecting the 1711-12. • effentials of the treaty, might be thought to want explana tion, her majefty fhould find them willing and ready to < treat thereupon, and with all the facility and condefcenfion that could be required of them, whatever should not <be of the last importance for the fecurity and preservation of their state. Intreating, withal, her majefty to continue * towards them that very precious friendship and good-will, with which fhe had hitherto honoured them.' How much foever difinterested people might be affected with this letter, it made no impreffion on the miniftry; and the managers of the house of commons got all their votes to be digefted into a well-compofed inflaming representation, which was laid before the queen * by it all the allies, but most particu- * See Pr. of larly the ftates, were charged with having failed in many commons, particulars, contrary to their engagements. They alfo laid Vol. IV. before the queen the votes they had made, with relation to 263. the barrier treaty; and that they might name a great fum, that would make a deep impreffion on the nation (which was ready to receive all things implicitly from them) they faid, England had been, during the war, overcharged nineteen millions, beyond what they ought to have paid; all which was caft on the old ministry. the house of The ftates The states, refenting these proceedings, drew up a large justify memorial, in which every particular in the representation themfelves, was examined and fully answered. The two first heads of this memorial, which related to the service at sea and in Flanders, were printed here, and published in English in the Daily Courant, of April 7, containing a full answer to all that was charged on them, as to those matters, to the ample conviction of all who examined the particulars. The house of commons faw the effect this was like to have; and therefore they voted the pretended (as they called it) memorial, to be a falfe, fcandalous, and malicious libel, reflecting upon the refolutions of the houfe; and that the printing of it was a breach of privilege. And, to ftop the printing of the other heads, Mr. Samuel Buckley, the writer and printer of the Daily Courant, was taken into cuftody. This was a confutation, to which no reply could be made; yet it seemed to be a confeffion that their reprefentation could not be justified, when the answer to it was fo carefully ftified. It was then generally reported, that the chief handle for this cenfure was a fuppofition that the memorial was not genuine; which appeared foon after to be entirely groundlefs; for the memorial had not only been, printed |