late trial of Dr. Sacheverel, would be fo induftriously fo- 1710. mented and improved by their friends, as to produce a fa and lay fiege to his capital. • What could the unhappy prince ⚫ do in these circumftances? He is in the utmost danger; his allies neither do, nor can fup• port him. There is no fafety for him but in a peace. Thus • a member was brought off from the laft confederacy; and the fame play they want to be again at. This is fo certain, that we are fure they were trying this very trick with the fame prince. While the mar • quis de Torcy made at the Hague fuch mighty difficulties in complying with the terms • demanded for the duke of Savoy, whom he pretended his mafter had great reason to be • diffatisfied with, this falfe per• fidious court was at that very time tempting him with better ⚫ offers at Turin; but that prince ⚫ understood his interests too well to hearken again to them. This is the use the ministers of France hoped to make of ⚫ this demand of their's, if the • allies had been weak enough to have agreed to it. But they were not to be fo imposed on, • nor would they act in fo arbi· trary a manner, as to force any of their allies to fubmit to ⚫ terms made against their con. fent, or without their know<ledge; and therefore could not, by all the artifice of France, be prevailed with to preclude • them from making fuch further demands, as they fhould ⚫ think reasonable. But to shew they were fincere, they were willing to defift from all further vourable demands for themselves, according to the 31ft article. . This they could do; more injustice they could not. And, had the French been in earnest on their part, they would, without difficulty, have trusted the allies in this point; for they could not, with any colour of reafon, believe, that when the maritime powers and the emperor were satisfied, they would renew the war at the end of <two months, or what other time fhould have been agreed on, ⚫ for the fake of any further de• mands on the part of the other allies, which it would not be ‹ very reasonable for France to grant them. And therefore it cannot be thought they meant any thing else by urging this * point, but to make mifchief, and, draw the allies, if they could, into a fnare; and, if ⚫ that did not fucceed, that they might always have it in their 'power to go off. To reduce the whole ma nagement of the French in this • affair under one fhort view: 1710. vourable turn. On the other hand, the ftates-general were fo exafperated by the late evafive conduct of the court of then the conferences are again • defired to be renewed, upon • repeated assurances of agreeing to all the other preliminaries, except the 37th. Then, as what would folve all difficulties, a partition is propofed, which is at laft reduced to Sicily and Sardinia. And what is all this for? Will they fign the preliminaries, if this partition be agreed to? By no means; they take the very asking of this question for a plain defign in the allies to break off the conferences; and they who would have given you before all the preliminaries, except the 37th article and three cautionary · towns, now take it very ill you will not accept the prelimina<ries, not only without that arti cle, but without any cautionary ⚫ towns, or other expedients, tho' • Sardinia and Sicily be taken out of them, without having for this any more fecurity given ⚫ than before, that Spain and the Indies fhall be restored, though the propofing a partition could not poffibly have any other meaning in it. For it was pro'posed as an expedient, but for France, the reft, and yet not tell them, which way the reft is to be had? • What is more ridiculous than to prefs the states to all the in‹ conveniencies, which the confenting to a partition might be attended with, without allowing ⚫ them the least advantage from it? How can one reconcile the afking a partition at the beginning of the conferences, and then breaking them off, because the allies defire to be fecured of the effect proposed from it? Now after all that has ⚫ been faid upon this fubject, can there be any doubt, which fide is in fault, or at whofe door it lies, that thofe conferences did • not fucceed? It is plain they broke off, because the French ⚫ would not fecure to the allies ⚫ the reftitution of Spain and the • Indies. And it is as plain the • French ought to have done this: it is what they promised from the beginning, and undertook for at the opening of those conferences, the propofal of a partition being incapable of any other fair conftruction. And therefore the blame of the rupture can lie only upon the French, or on those who have encouraged them to act thus, by discovering the mighty hafte they were in for peace. For < whether the French, when they first began these conferences, intended they should end as they did, may poffibly be at queftion. I must own, when I heard they had propofed a partition, I thought the neceffity of their affairs had at laft forced 6 them France, that on the 27th of July, N. S. they came to another vigorous refolution, in confutation of the letter from 6 And perhaps, even after this, they might balance with themfelves, and were fome time ir• refolute with intention to confent, or not confent to the allies, as they found themselves preffed by the war. And, <could the duke of Marlborough ⚫ have either beat their army, or befieged Arras, I believe they would have thought the king might with honour have aban<doned his grandfon, after he had facrificed fo much for the fupport of him; and the safety of France would have excufed to all the world his quitting Spain. And it was with this view principally they kept their minifters fo long at Gertruydenberg, that they might be upon the spot, to clap up a peace immediately, if there fhould be occafion. By this they were fure to have an advantage in cafe of a battle, which ever way it turned; for, if they loft it, they would have been able to prevent the fatal confequences of a great defeat by clofing with the terms of ⚫ the allies, before a victory could be pursued; and, if they had < won it, they would have made ufe of the first confternation, which the lofs of a battle would have put the Dutch into, to prefs them to a peace on their · terms. That this was the most ⚫ the French meant by these con d'Uxelles ferences, is evident from what was doing at the fame time in Spain. I have obferved before, that either the Spaniards or we • must have been deceived; and therefore the French kept it in their power, by the most artful ways they could, to do either as they found' most con⚫venient; but that the king's <inclination and intereft were too well known to leave room to doubt, that he would keep his promife to the Spaniards, if he could. Accordingly we fee, he did not only enable his grandfon, as I have observed before, to put Spain into the best posture of defence it was capable of, and fupply him with every thing that was neceffary; ⚫ but promised to make the fiege ⚫ of Gironne early in the spring, and was making a new offenfive and defenfive treaty with him during these very conferences. And the affiftance and afsurance, the duke of Anjou had given him, made him think of nothing less than quitting Spain. In the fpring he pretended to have an army of one hundred and twenty-two battalions, and one hundred and forty-five fquadrons, befides the troops that were coming to him from Flanders. 'Before the conferences begun, the king received an express from his grandfon, to acquaint him with the zeal the Caftilians exprefs for him, and his refolution to ftand by them; and the French minister at Madrid in April gave out, that the ⚫ conferences were broke off. At 1710. 1710. d'Uxelles and Polignac to the penfionary, and in particular to fhew, that the enemy had departed from the founda• tion, At the fame time the duke of Anjou was haftening to put ⚫ himself at the head of his ar my, but was ftopped by the af fair of the duke de Medina ⚫ Celi; which, as great a mystery as it was, was probably at • bottom a French trick. It was very natural for the Spaniards to take umbrage at the conferences, and to think it was time to take care of themfelves; and that, if the king fhould in earnest abandon them, it was to no purpose for them to adhere to his grandfon. To feel their pulfe upon this point, • it is probable the French minifters, either Blecour or Ibberville, or fome others of their emiffaries, had pretended to treat with fome of the grandees upon this foot, and acquainted them, that the king's affairs would not permit him to fupport his grandfon any longer, and that the king did not expect they should ruin • themselves to maintain him on the throne, fince in that cafe it would be impracticable: but that, if they would dispose him to refign, the king would ⚫ endeavour to get fome partition ⚫ for him. It is extremely probable, this trick was tried at Madrid, to find how the grandees were inclined to act on this occafion; the duke of Medina in particular, who was the first minifter; and that, ⚫ when they had got out of him ⚫ the fenfe of him and his friends on this nice fubject, the use they made of it was to betray him to the duke of Anjou. tion, on which the negotiation had begun, and ftudied 1710. pretences to evade the execution of the capital points, him. This alliance was framing while the minifters of by an exception a general peace, France were at Gertruyden-while he pretended all the while berg? which place they left but' the 25th, and the 8th of Auguft, or before, the articles of this new treaty were known publicly at Paris : which < makes it plain to a demonftra⚫tion, that this treaty was forming before the conferences · were broke off. • From this account, it is exceeding evident, that the French were taking the most effectual methods to fupport the duke of Anjou, and make the Spani<ards faithful to him, while · they were perfuading the allies, the king would in earnest abandon him, and give him no affiftance directly or indirectly: nay, while they were making terms for him, upon which they would oblige him to refign. And, if this be not infincere in the laft degree, I ⚫ would be glad to know what is. If he was fincere, why did he ⚫ treat for a general peace, when either he would not, or could not make the neceffary conditions of it practicable? why, when he meant nothing but a feparate peace, did he not frankly from the beginning ⚫ tell the allies, that he was willing to make terms with them for himself, but that he could • make none for Spain? was this for any thing else but to amufe the allies, who, he knew, ⚫ would flatly have refused entering into any negotiations, if he had spoke out plainly what • he meant ? did not he intend, VOL. XVII. to be for it? as old managers fometimes do with a bill in parliament, which they contrive fhould be loft by an a'mendment, while they would "be thought zealous for it; which they would not have been able to effect, had they openly declared against the bill • itself. Thus they gain the point they would have, by feeming to be for what in truth they would not have : and the fame part the king of France has acted with refpe&t to peace, but not with the fame fuccefs. He has not got yet what he wants, I mean a feparate peace, by affecting to treat for a general one, which • he would of all things keep ' off. A man muft fhut his eyes • very hard, not to fee the French meant nothing by these conferences but to amufe the allies, and keep it in their power to make what ufe of them they fhould have occafion for; and, that they never defigned to confent to what was neceffary to make a general peace practicable. They meant either no peace at all, or only a feprate one for themselves; which they hoped from the temper of the Dutch, the nature of the r government, and the experience they have formerly had of them, they might be frigh⚫tened into., To which end they • affected from the very first con⚫ference to let nothing fall from them, that might look like a • defire |