Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

1709: since the point in dispute could not be adjusted by letters,

that passes might be granted for some ministers from France

to

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

6

• be on the defensive; as ap command in Spain. Which

peared upon the duke of An shews us, how the, duke of jou's coming to his army upon Anjou might have officers as

the surprize of Balaguer by the well as men from France, if • allies, and expoftulating with • he had any want of them. If * marshal Bezons for not joining " therefore the king of France

upon that occafion the Spanish 6. withdrew his troops, it was not army; for which he justified with a design to leave his

himself by producing the king's grandson to himself, but upon * orders. By this' middle way, very different views : it was to

the king thought he could de - make the allies and his own *ceive the allies, without aban people believe he was fincere,

doning the Spaniards; and, in • and that he was willing to re

the mean time, the duke of move, as far as he could, all “ Anjou, according to the di - the difficulties in the way of < 'rection of French councils, peace; and yet, at the fame « made his utmost efforts to put i time, and by the same action, « Spain into a condition to de « increase the difficulties he would * fend itfelf, as if they were in • seem to remove, by rendering * earnest to expect no farther af • by this means the most reason

fistance from France; which « able demand of the allies im• had fo good an effect on the · practicable : besides that he

Spaniards, that they exerted “really wanted these troops him• themselves beyond what could • self against another year, the « be expected of them. They danger he was threatened with compleated in a little time in Flanders obliging him to • their old regiments, and raised • have a more numerous army « befides a great many new ones;

on that side. This was all he « and the most vigorous measures ' meant by withdrawing his

taken to find money, and troops from Spain, and there• erect magazines, as if they fore he did not do it, till he

were to stand for the future, on had put the duke of Anjou's their own bottom, though the affairs upon a pretty good foot, king of France was far from • and he was sure there could be intending they should want his

no immediate want of them, • asliftance, when their affairs • the campaign there being at « called for it. And that his end. And, that this re* grandson might not want a ge moval of his troops might be • neral for his army, it was pub • of the least prejudice poffible to

licly talked at Paris, before • his grandson, he contrived, that « monsieur Rouillé's return, that, as many of his own troops • in case of a peace, the duke of < should desert as would make « Berwick had desired leave to • seven or eight battalions; and,

relign his Baton of marshal of " to supply the place of the rest, France, that he might go and as far as he could, he sent his

grandson

were

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

an

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

to come to Holland, and renew the conferences ; or that Petkum might be permitted to go to France, to try if his

prefence

1709.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

grandfon all the Walloon regiments from Flanders ; from 'whence they began their march

for Spain the beginning of the • February following, which was « 'as soon as money, arms,

and cloaths could be provided for them. And not content with

giving the duke of Anjou this « affiftance, and supplying him < with great stores of ammuni« tion, because new-raised troops « could not be much depended con, the king kept many of the • troops he withdrew in Rouffillon upon the borders of

Spain, to be ready to return; - when his grandson's affairs « should make it necessary. And i is not this very like the con« duct of one, who means in ear

neft to abandon Spain, and 6 would restore it to the house of · Austria, if he could? But poor « man! he cannot do impossibi«lities. It is a pretty way to < facilitate the reduction of a • kingdom, to make it as diffi« cult as possible; a great sign of • fincerity to put things out of • our power, which we cannot,

without discovering our infin« cerity, keep in it; and mighty

reasonable to create impossibi« lities, and then complain of « them. Who can help believ

ing such a man, when he tells you,

he would with all his • heart, to procure a peace, give

the Spanish monarchy, if he « could, but that he really can• not; and that this is the only • hindrance ? Or what pledge of « his good-will is there, one may * not expect from him, as a cau

« tion, that he will not, dire&tly • or indirectly, hinder your do

ing what he cannot possibly • himself do for you! To expect i'a valuable pledge from a man, ! to be returned to him when

that is done, which he intends never shall be done, is a great jest. And therefore, since the - French king has fo plainly difi covered his intention, you must ( not wonder he makes such dif• ficulties in settling an expe • dient, as you could not expect « in a man, who means not one • word of what he says.

• The first and only good expedient, you fee, is made impracticable, on purpose that it may not be insisted on. The

next best was to put into the í hands of the allies Tome French ' towns on the frontier of Spain, • such as Bayonne and Perpig

nan, which would have inabled « the allies to send forces to Spain • with infinitely less

expence

and • trouble, and in a quarter of • the time they can now; and,

at the same time, have obliged • the French pretty effe&tually to

keep their promise not to assist • the duke of Anjou, by cutting " off in great measure the como munication between France and

Spain. This was an expedi' ent, which the king could not

fay it was not in his power to

comply with. But when one • has not a mind to do a thing,

nothing is so easy as to find out

a reason for not doing it. If " this could not be said to be an

impossible expedient, it was easy to pretend, that it did not

« fuit

up

1709. presence could help to find out an expedient, that had hitherto been in vain endeavoured by letters. The first the

states

« fuit either with the safety or work enough? Or is there any • dignity of France, to put the room to fear an inyasion from • keys. of his kingdom into the

Spain afterward? No sure ; & hands of the allies, since he • however significant Spain may

could not be sure what use they o be in French hands, it will not • might make of them, or when • in hafte be very formidable out - he should get them again. And of them. They would have • this was very right arguing for themselves too much business a man, who never intended

in looking to themselves, to • that should be done, which is * think of disturbing fo powerful • made the condition on which

• a neighbour. And there would • the caution he

deposits shall be « be a thousand times more rear • restored. If the king does not « son for them to be afraid of • design Spain should be quitted « France, than for France to ap, • by his grandson, it must be o prehend any thing from them. i owned it would not be very « Nor can there be the least pre. • prudent in him to give the al. • tence for a fufpicion, that the

lies such important places under « allies, if these towns were once i the notion of cautionary towns, « in their hands, would never • which muft either defeat his part with them, fupposing the • design of supporting his grand • 'end answered for which they • fon; or, if that design succeed, 6 were intrufted with them; for, • could never of right be de .. besides that such a breach of « manded back of them : not « faith is without example on the • but that a prince of his known • fide of the allies, they cannot, « abilities would, we may be sure, « for the reasons I gave you in « foon find a pretence to ak for ( my last, act a false part in this

them; and that pretence he matter, if they would, espe, « would justify, if not readily • cially not on this side of France ; • fubmitted to, the fame way

he 6 where, if the allies had ever fo • has so many others no less « much justice on their fide, they

groundless, by force and arms, could not long fupport them. · which with him have always ! selves under the mighty disad. • been the measures of right and vantages with which they muf wrong.

But if he were sincere, « make war on this frontier. But • if he really meant that Spain • there is no need of faying more,

should be restored, what in " to shew you how ridiculous it convenience could there be in

' is to pretend any fear of the complying with this expedienti allies, if these towns should be What ill use could the allies

' put into their hands. The • make of it? Could they, by • supporting of Spain has cost • the help of these towns, hurt • France too dear, not to know • France, before they had re o the low.condition it is in; and • duced Spain? Can it be ima that nothing could be greater gined, that would not find them I madness in king Charles, or his

: alliesa

6

fates refused, till they knew precisely what they were to come for, since, under the appearance of some good, the

presence

1709

[ocr errors]

• allies, than not to fit down • were very much in earnest. • quietly in peace the minute • But, had they been so, it is • that kingdom is reduced to his very hard to give a good rea. « obedience, without seeking for • son, why an expedient should

new pretences to continue the • be looked for here, rather than war needlessly.

• in any other part. The allies, • Nothing therefore can be though they were fenfible what • thought to be the true reason, ever could be given on this

why the king of France re < fide, was but a poor expedient jected this expedient, but that • at beft; yet they were so fin. he never intended the allies cerely disposed to put an end to • should obtain the end, for • the war, that they would not « which it was asked, as you will abfolutely reject it. Whatever • see more plainly in what fol • towns France could put into • lows. On the side of Alsace, • the hands of the allies on this • nothing was proposed, that I < fide, if they were not such as • know of, but Thionville, a « lie nearest to those that are to • place of great consequence to • be given up by the prelimina• France, were they in any dan « ries, their tenure would be ger from the empire." But,

very precarious ; and it would considering the feeble low con • be very difficult to keep them, 6 dition of that enervated ex o when France had a mind to • haufted body, one cannot but • have them again. This you • think the strong places on that may easily judge of by the im. fide are of no other use but to • posibility the allies were under • enable the French to invade the

·lalt campaign to make the fiege empire, and not to secure them

• of Arras, while they left Doway against invasions from it. And behind them; and the difti• what should be deposited as a • culty Ypres gave them in the • pledge, would be to be restored • fiege of Aire. But if thefe • long before the empire could • cautionary towns were to be ef • be in a condition to make any • those that lie neareft, they could « use of it, that would be either « not be of so much importance • unjust in itself, or troublesome • to France, as that they fhould

to France. But France never • not be willing to part with • intending to fulfil the condi « them to keep Spain, since this « tion on which the town should (would only be making a little • be restored, this proposal was « farther addition to the barrier • rejected upon the same pretence • of the Netherlands; which as the former.

would secure them more from Nothing now was left, but

France. But, as bad an equi• to seek for an expedient in (valent as this was at the best, • Flanders, which was what the the French refused to make it • French offered from the first, • as good as they could, by, ex.

and all along pressed, as if they . cepting fuch. towns as were of

« mort

[ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

1709. presence of French ministers in Holland gave them an op-
in portunity to do a great deal of harm, by fowing feeds of

jealousy among the allies, poisoning the minds of the
people against their governors, and retarding the great
preparations for another campaign, which can never be
pushed with the vigour they should, while the people are
amused with the specious appearances of an approaching
peace : for so the French endeavoured to make it every
where thought, when they meant nothing less. For these
reasons the Itates refused to give passes for any ministers' to
come from France, till they knew more of their inten-
tions. But, to shew their readiness to hearken to any rea-
sonable proposal, they consented, that Petkum Mould go
to France, which he did about the latter end of Novem-
ber.

While these negotiations were carrying on by letters with
France, king Philip did not only take all the proper mea-
sures he could to maintain himself in the monarchy, which
his grandfather was, in appearance, treating to give up, but
published a notable manifesto, wherein he protested against
all that should be transacted at the Hague in his prejudice,
as void and null, and declared his resolution to adhere to his
'faithful Spaniards, as long as there was a man of them that
would stand by him ; and was so far from quitting Spain
and the Indies to his competitor, that he would not consent
he should have those parts of the monarchy, which he was
then poffessed of; and, in pursuance of this manifesto, he
named the duke of Alba and count Bergheyck for his ple-
- nipotentiaries, with orders to notify it to the maritime

1

" most consequence, such as • them a right to ask for it
• Doway, Arras, and Cambray, again.
• which would lay them open to • This being the design of

an invasion from the allies; • France, all these negotiations
• which, if the allies were able - by letters came to nothing;

to make, they knew their own and one side would never offer
• designs would give but too juft • what the other could accept,

a handle for ; besides, they unless the allies would be cons
were unwilling to part with, tent with the name of an expé-

under the name of a caution, - dient instead of the thing,
• what they could not be willing which they were beforehand

with for good and all, * sure could by no means answer
* since they intended to forfeit - the end it was given for; which
• the condition, and not do them " the allies were too wise to
• felves, or rather not suffer that
' to be done, which would give

powers

« to part

[ocr errors]
« AnteriorContinuar »