1709. wounded (y). Amongst the flain were several officers of
i distinction, particularly general count Lottum, general Tet.

tau, of the Prussians; count Oxenstiern, lieutenant-general;
the lord Tullibardine, eldest son of the duke of Athol, and
-colonel of a regiment of foot in the service of the states,

Among the wounded were prince Eugene of Savoy slightly
on the head, as was also brigadier May on the same place;
lieutenant-generals Sparr, Wakerbaert, and Hamilton, and
the first mortally; brigadier Cronstrom, count Oxenstiern's
adjutant, dangerously ; and monsieur Duyts, adjutant to the
prince of Orange. His highness himself had two horses
killed under him, but escaped unhurt; as did also the duke
of Argyle, though he received several musket-ihots through
his clothes and perriwig. Brigadier Lalo, a French refugee,
in great favour and esteem with the generals; Sir Thomas
Pendergast, colonel of a regiment of foot; colonel Rivett, of
the guards; colonel Cranitone, lieutenant-colonel Arundel,
and lieutenant colonel Bethel, were also reckoned among
the fain ; lieutenant-general Webb, in the beginning of the
action, received a very dangerous wound by a musket-ball,
that lodged itself near the groin; lieutenant-colonel Ram-
sey, major Lashley, and major Row died of their wounds;
but lieutenant-colonel Farmer, major Chivers, and several
others of inferior rank, survived theirs.

The French were very industrious in lessening and con,
cealing their loss from the public. But some private ac-
counts from their army owned, that they had about five
hundred and forty officers killed on the spot, and one thou-
fand fixty-eight wounded, besides three hundred and one
taken prisoners; and the number of their private men killed,

wounded, or taken, was modestly computed at fifteen 1709. thousand (2)

This was the most desperate and bloody attack, that had Remark, been fought in the memory of man; and both our generals Kane's mewere very much blamed for throwing away so many brave moits. men's lives, when there was no occasion. It was the only rash thing the duke of Marlborough was ever guilty of, who it was generally believed, was pressed to it by prince Eugene (a).

The

ance.

(z) Among their flain were victory, that they had animated messieurs de Coursillon, de Che- their men to fight so well behind merault, Palavicini, de Lautree, the intrenchments, and to rede Greberges, de Moret, and pulse our men so often, and with Sheldon, lieutenant - generals ; so great loss. They retired to .count de Beuil, messieurs de Valenciennes, and secured them, Rouleau, de Rochebonne, and selves by casting up strong lines, de Tournefort, major-generals; while they left our army to carcount d’Agennes, messieurs de ry on the fiege of Mons, withCoasquin and de Stekenburg, out giving them the least disturbbrigadiers ; the duke de St.

Monsieur Rouffet's reAgnan, and messieurs de Schaw- marks are as follow: ' in the eftein, de Salis, de Seignelay, the opinion of the whole world chevalier de Croy, de Teleconde, (say he) our generals were guil. de Molezum, Fitzgerald, de • ty of an irreparable fault in Barentin, St. Laurent, and the • not attacking on the gth, but duke of Charoit. Amongst the delaying it, in expectation of wounded was the marshal de fix and twenty battalion, and Villars himself, who, in the heat « some fquadrons; while, by of the battle receiving a shot in giving the enemy time to in. the knee, was obliged to leave • trench themselves (which was the command of the French ar • what we had infallibly to exmy to marsal de Boufflers ; the 'pect from a general so accufduke of Guiche, the chevalier o tomed to it as the marshal de de St. Toris; messieurs de Cons • Villars) we weakened ourlan, de Beaufremont, de Savigne, • felves, in proportion as the de Crausat, de Mornesiers, de

enemy grew more formidable. Opeide, de Refuge, d'Albergot • Besides, we thereby gave him ti, the princes de Lambeffe and de « all the time he could wish to Monthafon, meflieurs de Brillac, penetrate into our disposition, de Tournemine, de Renty, de Ber to recal several detachments, ville, d'Autel, and de St. Hilaire. which did not join him till the

(a) Bishop Burnet observes, that ( 10th, and in short to render military men have always talked of • all thofe places impenetrable, this, as the sharpeft action in the through which only our troops whole war, not without reflect could break into the plain. ing on the generals for begin. • In the council of war, which ning fo desperate an attempt. was held the gth, the depuThe French thought it a sort of ties of the states-general were

1709

The action being over, the confederate army was ordered to incamp a little beyond the field of battle; and, on the

12th

• of opinion, that the fiege of Father Daniel asserts, that the • Mons should be immediately field of battle cost the allies thirty • undertaken, without giving the thousand men killed or wounded,

enemy battle; but that, if they while the loss, which the French • should come to attack us, in army suffered, was not two thirds • that case, we should retreat of that number. • from them; and of this opi Dr. Hare, in his second let• nion were most of the generals. ' ter to a tory member

upon the « Prince Eugene and the duke management of the war, p. 24, • of Marlborough were of opi s observes, that in this battle the onion to attack the enemy, be

enemy were so defeated, that . fore they began the fiege, and ' they, who had hazarded a bat

they brought over the deputies tle to prevent the fiege of * to be of the same mind; but « Mons, did not dare to venture • then, as well they, as the any thing for the relief of it,

duke of Marlborough, infift • towards which they did not • ed, that the attack ought to be • make the least step, though

made immediately, not to give the allies had neither river nor 6 the marshal de Villars time to • intrenchment to cover them.'

fortify his camp. Prince Eu- He afterwards, p. 32, takes nogene was not, however, to be tice of a question asked by the dissuaded from the resolution author of a piece, intituled, Ar

he had taken, to wait for the lus and Odolphus, viz. If the • detachment from Tournay. • bloody battle of Taniers or

A fatal delay, which occasion Malplacquet was so well con• ed the ruin of the whole body certed, as it might have been; • of the Dutch infantry, which 6 and if there was an absolute < alone loft near ten thousand ' necessity to wait two days withmen, more than seven hundred

. in sight of the enemy for a few of whom were officers, at the troops, that never engaged • attack of the intrenchments." « when they came, and give

Monsieur du Mont likewise < them so much time to throw up says, that it was a misfortune < such unequal fortresses before

to the allies, that they did not we attacked them?" In answer fight on the gth, for then pro to which Dr. Hare writes thus: bably the victory would have ' I little thought to have seen been more compleat, and have o the battle of Taniers instanced

been obtained with less loss of • for a counter-stop designed to · blood. The enemy was then hinder the effect of our former

on the other side of the wood successes, when it was itself so ' in the plain; there was room great a one: but it shews the

to come at them through the absurdity of their cause, when " intervals. They had not time « victory itself is made a crime 3 ¢ to intrench themselves; and the " and they attempt to prove &

advantage of the ground would general's design to prolong the have been pretty near equal.'

war, because he has endeavour

(ed

12th of September, they returned to their old camp at Belian. 1709 The same day, the allies were employed in burying their

dead;

ance.

wars

sed to force the enemy to put • foon, that in fix weeks time

an end to it by a new defeat. they had a better army than « This is a strange way of argu s before the battle ; and all the • ing indeed, peculiar to the cause, « use the French made of their • and its worthy defenders. It • victory was to take Charleroy, • is a known faying, « victoriæ • though the battle was fought « ratio non redditur:" but, it • in June; a conquest one may « feems, it now must not be al. easily suppose they might have * lowed. A general has been • made without the purchase of fo & often called to give an account, · dear a victory, as they made « how he came to lose a battle; • those of Mons and Namur, * but to be accountable for win places of much more importning one is something new ;

Now let us fee, whether « and, if victories had not been • the victory of Taniers be on • fo common, we should hardly any account inferior to that of

have been so difficult ; we Landen. That it exceed it in

should have understood the honour, Arlus himself allows; ç value of a single victory, and ! for he grants, “ that in all the • been thankful for it. But the

of immemorial time, number, it seems, has made us " there never was a battle fought, « so nice, that we had rather not « where mortal men gained such

have them, if they are not just « immortal honour.” And, whe

to our minds ; if they are not «ther he will allow it or not, it
! of as much consequence as ' is as certain, that it was more

Blenheim, or as cheap as Ra < valuable also in its consequence,
milies or Oudenard. I would • and the advantage the com-
be glad to know, if ever any mon cause reaped from it; for
one French writer treated the

« Mons was evidently a greater
* battle of Landen with that 6 conqueft in itself, and of more
contempt,

that these gentle • use to us, when Brabant had no men do that of Taniers; or other cover, than Charleroy ! thought the fighting it a crime could be to them. Besides • in a general, because it was • Charleroy might have been

dear bought, and had little other « had without Landen; but
o consequence than the gaining Mons could not have been had

what Arlus calls unprofitable 4 without Taniers ; and, though
honour. On the contrary, ne « that battle was not fought till
ver victory was so much mag • the last of August, Mons haď
nified, the tongues and pens

of not been the only fruits of it,
that nation were for many years

! if the weather would have per full of nothing else; and yet (mitted the allies to keep the

those, who were at that battle, field longer; and the success of ! will tell you, that the French the fiege was a plain discovery, • did not only lose as many men

• that the lofs of the enemy was as the confederates, but double “ not only as great as that of the $ or treble their number; and the allies, but much greater. Why allies recovered that defeat so • elfe ihould they venture ą

battle

1709. dead; and, there having been a great number of French of ficers and coldiers left wounded in the field of battle, and in

the

• battle to prevent the fiege; ' to their disadvantage intirely;
• and yet did not move a step to • and the impression, which the
• difturb it, when it was formed ? • loss of that battle gave them,
• is not this a confession, that o made them think themselves
• they, who thought themselves « never safe; as if neither wea-
6 a match for our army before « ther, nor intrenchments, nor
« the battle, did not think so af (numbers, could effectually stop
« ter it, though so many troops • the progress of this victorious
were employed and weakened

• army; though weakened by
« in the fiege i did they not spend • three fieges, and a battle equal
« the time the allies were making • to three more. They shewed
• the fiege, in throwing up lines, • plainly by all their motions,
• and drawing all the troops to • they thought nothing impoffible
* gether, that possibly they could? i to such an a:my, that could
« and was not the duke of Ber 6 beat an hundred thousand men,
« wick sent for post from Dau • the best troops of France,
• phiné, to join with marshal through such intrenchments, or
« Boufflers in the command of • in the language of the learn-
« them ? what, I would fain • ed Arlus, through such un-
• know, was all this for? why equal fortrefies.'

Dr. Hare, < such trong lines, so vast an afterwards, p. 36, observes, that

army, so many generals, fo without this battle, the rest of
' much concern, in the middle that campaign 'must have been
« of October, when the ways spent without action, and per-
• were impassable, and the con. • haps this last [of 1710) also.
• federate army was intirely ruin . For we could not have carried
• ed by their vietory? if their our arms into the Artcis, while

loss was so unequal, as Arlus B:abant was so much exposed,
thinks it was, the French might • as it was before the taking of
have done what they would ; « Mons, which would consequent-
might they not only have lain ly have thrust the work of this
ftill in great tranquility, with-

year one campaign at least back-
out any apprehension of being • warder. But, if the necessity,
A disturbed by the allies, but the glory, and advantage of
“ might have advanced to them, this victory cannot keep off

given them battle, and not only • these examiners, you may be • Javed Mons, but ruined their well assured it will bear exa

if they were so much • mination. I have heard a good • superior to them, as their wri · deal of it, and, by all I can

ters would make the world be find, there never was a battle,
“ lieve. But, if we will allow < for which there was a more
'* the French to be better judges • unanimous concurrence of all

of these matters than our pa ' parties, than there was here.
per-politicians, the difference, And the delay that happened,
that was made by the battle

was not only to wait for a few
between the two armies, was

troops, but for bread, which

« meni

army: