1709. wounded (y). Amongst the flain were feveral officers of diftinction, particularly general count Lottum, general Tettau, of the Pruffians; count Oxenftiern, lieutenant-general; the lord Tullibardine, eldeft fon of the duke of Athol, and -colonel of a regiment of foot in the fervice of the states. Among the wounded were prince Eugene of Savoy flightly on the head, as was alfo brigadier May on the fame place; lieutenant-generals Sparr, Wakerbaert, and Hamilton, and the firft mortally; brigadier Cronftrom, count Oxenstiern's adjutant, dangeroufly; and monfieur Duyts, adjutant to the prince of Orange. His highnefs himself had two horfes killed under him, but escaped unhurt; as did also the duke of Argyle, though he received feveral musket-shots through his clothes and perriwig. Brigadier Lalo, a French refugee, in great favour and esteem with the generals; Sir Thomas Pendergast, colonel of a regiment of foot; colonel Rivett, of the guards; colonel Cranftone, lieutenant-colonel Arundel, and lieutenant colonel Bethel, were also reckoned among the flain; lieutenant-general Webb, in the beginning of the action, received a very dangerous wound by a musket-ball, that lodged itself near the groin; lieutenant-colonel Ramfey, major Lafhley, and major Row died of their wounds; but lieutenant-colonel Farmer, major Chivers, and several others of inferior rank, furvived theirs. The French were very induftrious in leffening and concealing their lofs from the public. But fome private accounts from their army owned, that they had about five hundred and forty officers killed on the spot, and one thoufand fixty-eight wounded, befides three hundred and one taken prifoners; and the number of their private men killed, wounded, or taken, was modeftly computed at fifteen 17.09. thousand (z). moirs. This was the moft defperate and bloody attack, that had Remark. been fought in the memory of man; and both our generals Kane's mewere very much blamed for throwing away fo brave many men's lives, when there was no occafion. It was the only rafh thing the duke of Marlborough was ever guilty of, who it was generally believed, was preffed to it by prince Eugene (a). (z) Among their flain were meffieurs de Courfillon, de Chemerault, Palavicini, de Lautree, de Greberges, de Moret, and Sheldon, lieutenant - generals; count de Beuil, meffieurs de Rouleau, de Rochebonne, and de Tournefort, major-generals; count d'Agennes, meffieurs de Coafquin and de Stekenburg, brigadiers; the duke de St. Agnan, and meffieurs de Schaweftein, de Salis, de Seignelay, the chevalier de Croy, de Teleconde, de Molezum, Fitzgerald, de Barentin, St. Laurent, and the duke of Charoft. Amongst the wounded was the marshal de Villars himself, who, in the heat of the battle receiving a fhot in the knee, was obliged to leave the command of the French army to marshal de Boufflers; the duke of Guiche, the chevalier de St. Toris; meffieurs de Conflan, de Beaufremont, de Savigne, de Craufat, de Mornefiers, de Opeide, de Refuge, d'Albergotti, the princes de Lambeffe and de Monthafon, meffieurs de Brillac, de Tournemine, de Renty, de Berville, d'Autel, and de St. Hilaire. (a) Bishop Burnet obferves, that military men have always talked of this, as the fharpeft action in the whole war, not without reflecting on the generals for beginning fo defperate an attempt. The French thought it a fort of The victory, that they had animated their men to fight fo well behind the intrenchments, and to repulfe our men fo often, and with fo great lofs. They retired to Valenciennes, and fecured themfelves by cafting up ftrong lines, while they left our army to carry on the fiege of Mons, without giving them the least disturbance. Monfieur Rouffet's remarks are as follow: in the opinion of the whole world (fay he) our generals were guilty of an irreparable fault in not attacking on the 9th, but delaying it, in expectation of fix and twenty battalion, and fome fquadrons; while, by giving the enemy time to intrench themselves (which was what we had infallibly to expect from a general fo accuftomed to it as the marshal de Villars) we weakened ourfelves, in propo:tion as the enemy grew more formidable. Befides, we thereby gave him all the time he could wifh to penetrate into our difpofition, to recal feveral detachments, ⚫ which did not join him till the 10th, and in fhort to render all thofe places impenetrable, through which only our troops could break into the plain. In the council of war, which was held the 9th, the deputies of the ftates-general were Sof 1.709. The action being over, the confederate army was ordered to incamp a little beyond the field of battle; and, on the of opinion, that the fiege of Mons fhould be immediately ⚫ undertaken, without giving the enemy battle; but that, if they • fhould come to attack us, in that cafe, we fhould retreat ⚫ from them; and of this opi⚫nion were most of the generals. Prince Eugene and the duke ⚫ of Marlborough were of opinion to attack the enemy, be⚫fore they began the fiege, and they brought over the deputies to be of the fame mind; but then, as well they, as the duke of Marlborough, infift⚫ed, that the attack ought to be • made immediately, not to give the marfhal de Villars time to 12th Father Daniel afferts, that the field of battle coft the allies thirty thousand men killed or wounded, while the lofs, which the French army fuffered, was not two thirds of that number. Dr. Hare, in his fecond let⚫ter to a tory member upon the management of the war, p. 24, 'observes, that in this battle the enemy were fo defeated, that they, who had hazarded a battle to prevent the fiege of • Mons, did not dare to venture any thing for the relief of it, towards which they did not make the leaft ftep, though the allies had neither river nor intrenchment to cover them.' He afterwards, p. 32, takes notice of a queftion asked by the author of a piece, intituled, Arlus and Odolphus, viz. • If the bloody battle of Taniers or Malplacquet was fo well concerted, as it might have been; and if there was an abfolute ⚫ neceffity to wait two days within fight of the enemy for a few troops, that never engaged ⚫ when they came, and give them fo much time to throw up fuch unequal fortreffes before · we attacked them?" In anfwer to which Dr. Hare writes thu's: I little thought to have seen the battle of Taniers inftanced for a counter-ftop defigned to 'hinder the effect of our former 'fucceffes, when it was itself so great a one: but it fhews the abfurdity of their cause, when victory itself is made a crime; and they attempt to prove a 'general's defign to prolong the war, because he has endeavour • ed 12th of September, they returned to their old camp at Belian. The fame day, the allies were employed in burying their dead; ed to force the enemy to put an end to it by a new defeat. • This is a strange way of argu❝ing indeed, peculiar to the cause, and its worthy defenders. It is a known faying, "victoriæ “ ratio non redditur:" but, it feems, it now must not be allowed. A general has been ⚫ often called to give an account, ⚫ how he came to lose a battle; but to be accountable for winning one is fomething new; and, if victories had not been fo common, we should hardly have been fo difficult; we fhould have understood the value of a fingle victory, and • been thankful for it. But the number, it seems, has made us • so nice, that we had rather not have them, if they are not just to our minds; if they are not of as much confequence as Blenheim, or as cheap as Ramilies or Oudenard. I would be glad to know, if ever any one French writer treated the battle of Landen with that contempt, that these gentlemen do that of Taniers; or thought the fighting it a crime in a general, because it was ⚫ dear bought, and had little other confequence than the gaining what Arlus calls unprofitable honour. On the contrary, never victory was fo much magnified, the tongues and pens of that nation were for many years full of nothing else; and yet thofe, who were at that battle, will tell you, that the French • did not only lose as many men as the confederates, but double sor treble their number; and the f allies recovered that defeat so 6 foon, that in fix weeks time they had a better army than before the battle; and all the ufe the French made of their 'victory was to take Charleroy, though the battle was fought in June; a conqueft one may eafily fuppofe they might have 'made without the purchase of fo dear a victory, as they made thofe of Mons and Namur, places of much more importance. Now let us fee, whether the victory of Taniers be on any account inferior to that of Landen. That it exceed it in honour, Arlus himself allows; for he grants," that in all the "wars of immemorial time, "there never was a battle fought, "where mortal men gained fuch "immortal honour.” And, whe 1709 1709. dead; and, there having been a great number of French officers and foldiers left wounded in the field of battle, and in the fiege, in throwing up lines, ⚫ and drawing all the troops to⚫gether, that poffibly they could' ⚫ and was not the duke of Berwick fent for poft from Dauphiné, to join with marshal Boufflers in the command of them? what, I would fain know, was all this for? why fuch ftrong lines, fo vaft an army, fo many generals, fo 1 ⚫ much concern, in the middle • of October, when the ways ⚫ were impaffable, and the con• federate army was intirely ruined by their victory? if their lofs was fo unequal, as Arlus thinks it was, the French might have done what they would; might they not only have lain • ftill in great tranquility, without any apprehenfion of being difturbed by the allies, but ⚫ might have advanced to them, given them battle, and not only • faved Mons, but ruined their army, if they were so much fuperior to them, as their wri⚫ters would make the world believe. But, if we will allow the French to be better judges • of these matters than our paper-politicians, the difference, that was made by the battle between the two armies, was the to their disadvantage intirely; and the impreffion, which the lofs of that battle gave them, made them think themselves never fafe; as if neither weather, nor intrenchments, nor < numbers, could effectually stop the progrefs of this victorious army; though weakened by three fieges, and a battle equal to three more. They fhewed plainly by all their motions, they thought nothing impoffible to fuch an army, that could • beat an hundred thousand men, the best troops of France, through fuch intrenchments, or in the language of the learned Arlus, through fuch unequal fortrefies.' Dr. Hare, afterwards, p. 36, obferves, that without this battle, the reft of that campaign must have been spent without action, and perhaps this laft [of 1710] alfo. For we could not have carried ⚫ our arms into the Artois, while • Brabant was so much expofed, as it was before the taking of < Mons, which would confequently have thrust the work of this ' year one campaign at least backwarder. But, if the neceffity, the glory, and advantage of this victory cannot keep off thefe examiners, you may be • well affured it will bear exa⚫mination. I have heard a good deal of it, and, by all I can find, there never was a battle, for which there was a more ⚫ unanimous concurrence of all parties, than there was here. And the delay that happened, " was not only to wait for a few troops, but for bread, which |