1709. motive of the treaty for evacuating the Milanese, and of their perfifting fo obftinately in their defign upon Naples ; to be blamed for it. Secondly, Because, if he did infist, it was what he was obliged to: he had no authority to do otherwife. All the world knows, that both houfes of parliament did, the beginning of that year 1709, addrefs the queen, that no peace fhould be made with France, without an intire reftitution of the Spanish monarchy: and her majesty was pleafed to exprefs herself very well pleased with their addrefs, and that fhe was perfectly of the fame opinion. This addrefs being thus approved, no minifter had any power or authority to conclude a treaty upon other terms, without her majesty's command; nor could fuch a command be expected from her, without advice of her coun-cil: and I believe a council will not eafily be found, that will advife against the joint opinion of both houfes of parliament. If therefore the thirty-feventh article was infifted on, the duke is not to be blamed; he did but his duty, and could not juftify his doing otherwife; which, if he had, would as certainly have been made a high crime and mifdemeanor, as his not doing it is now made a matter of complaint against him. There is no room for any objection here, unless it could be pretended, that this addrefs was of his procuring; the contrary to which is as well known, as the addrefs itself. But though it is plain, that the duke of Marlborough had no hand in making this addrefs, it is as plain, that when it was for made, he was bound by it; and,, fince that required the reftitution of the whole Spanish monarchy, he was obliged to infift upon it. So the thirty-feventh article was unanimously adhered to as it is, by all the minifters ; and their doing fo, I fhall now fhew you, was very right in itfelf, and neceffary in order to a good peace. Firft, it is right in itself, that is, juft and reafonaable, not hard, or infolent, or inhuman, as thefe advocates of France would have it thought, For what is the point in dispute, but to rettore to an injured perfon what has been unjustly taken from him has not the injured party, by the fundamental laws of justice, a right to this? or is not the party, that does the injury, obliged to reftitution, where it is poffible? and is not this the cafe of the Spanish monarchy ? I defpair of ever proving any ufurpation unjuft, if this is not. But if it be unjust, does it alter the cafe, because the king of France has not ufurped it for himself, but for his grandfon ? am I the lefs obliged to restore what I have unjustly seized, be cause I have given it to a third perfon, provided it be in my power? does not the duke of Anjou know, as well as his grandfather, that it is a violent ufurpation? can he of right keep, what the other had no right to give? is it not kept plainly for the ufe and benefit of the giver? has not the giver power to take it from him? is it not plain, that his grandson has not kept therefore fent to Holland with general offers of peace, defiring them to propofe what they infifted on; and he offered with no option in the cafe. He would certainly keep Spain and the Indies, and give the other part to his competitor. And if that be accepted, what becomes of England, which is fo much interested in the recovery of Spain? and if it be not accepted, what fhall hinder the French king from affisting his grandfon after one year, more openly, and taking upon him to mediate a peace; that is, to force fuch a one as he pleases upon us? for how can we help ourselves? fhall we be in a condition to quarrel with him, when we have been exhaufted two years more with fuch an expenfive war, while he has been enjoying all the advantages of peace, to repair the breaches the war had made in his affairs; to reftore commerce, retrieve the public credit, remedy the ill ftate of his finances, look into the condition of his fleet, and put himself into the best pofture he can for a new war, if the fupport of the duke of Anjou makes it neceffary? no, fure; we shall never think ourselves in a condition to break with him; nor fhall we be able to perfuade our allies to it. No part therefore will be left us, but to fubmit to fuch a peace with his grandfon, as he fhall in his pleasure think fit to prefcribe. need not inlarge upon the difficulties of making war with Spain, after what I have faid in my first letter. It is easy to see how the duke of Anjou may find us work enough for two or three years, if he do but avoid coming to an I them action. Sieges will cost time, as well as men and money; and many must be made before fuch a kingdom can be reduced; and that will give the king of France opportunity enough to do what he will, to fupport his grandfon fecretly or openly, or to prescribe a peace, or begin a new war, which it is always easy to find a pretence for; and we are fure he cannot want inclination to do whatever is in his power, which fuch a caufe calls for. Nor is he fo little known, as to leave us the leaft room to think, that any treaties or engagements can bind him, when inclination and power tempt him to break through them. His whole reign is one continued proof of this. I have faid fomewhat of it already, and therefore fhall add but one instance, which is a little parallel to the cafe before us; and that is, the manner, in which he kept the promise he made the Spaniards at the Pyrenean treaty, not to affift the Portuguese, who were then at war with them. Never was treaty made with more folemnity; and yet what did thofe engagements fignify? all the time the treaty was making, France was concerting meafures to fupport the Portuguese; and the king, the prefent king, who was then but young in perfidy, had fo little regard to cover or palliate what he did, that he fent, in the face of all the world, an army to the affiftance of thofe, whofe defence he had renounced, commanded by a marfhal of Françe. And can we, after fuch an 1709. 1 1709. them as good a barrier for themselves, as they could ask. The ftates, contrary to the expectation of France, refolved an inftance, depend upon his word? has he not much greater temptation to affift Spain against us, than he had then to fupport the Portuguese against Spain? is not the honour of his grandfon, the intereft of his family, and the acquifition of fo great a monarchy of infinitely more concern to him, than the defence of Portugal could be? a man must be blind, not to fee there is no comparison between the two cafes; and it is inexcufable, when we are fenfible of this, to think, that a prince, who has been fo falfe in one inftance, can be ever true in the other. The fum of this argument is, that if a separate peace be made with France upon the foot of the preliminaries, without the 37th article, nothing can hinder France from affifting the duke of Anjou: and, if he be affifted by France, we can never be able to drive him out of Spain: and confequently, if Spain be ever had, it must be by treaty. If therefore no peace can be a good one without Spain, then the 37th article is neceffary in order to a good peace: which is the point I was to prove. I know but one thing can be faid against what I have advanced upon this head; and that is, That the allies, though they make peace with France, fhould ftill keep up their armies, and then France will not dare to give the duke of Anjou any great affiftance. But, firft, I have already fhewn, that this is a very unreasonable fuppofition; the to allies moft certainly would not continue to keep up their armies, were a peace with France once made. But let us now suppose they would, how would this mend the matter? if we keep on foot as great armies, as we have now, we should be no more at liberty to fend men into Spain, than we are now. And, if we fent any confiderable number to Spain, they would be wanted elsewhere; and the king of France would have nothing to fear from us, for want of a fufficient ftrength to act offenfively, in cafe we should think ourselves fufficiently provoked to it by any thing he does in violation of the treaty; nay, confidering the number of towns given up to the allies, which all must have garrifons in them, and those not very small ones, to keep their new subjects in awe, we should want a greater army in Flanders than before, to be in a condition to act offenfively. And, if fuch armies must be kept up, I cannot fee why they should not be employed; that is, why we may not as well continue the war, or to what purpose we fhould make peace. To me continuing the war seems much more eligible than fuch a peace, for this plain reafon, that France would certainly make a great advantage of peace, while we muft, under the name of peace, continue in a flate of war, `without the fruits of it. For example, all we have done, this campaign, would upon that fuppofition have been undone; and to adhere firmly to their confederates, and to enter into no separate treaty but in conjunction with their allies. However upon the arrival of monfieur Rouillé at Antwerp, they appointed monfieur Buys, penfionary of Amfterdam, and monfieur Vanderduffen, penfionary of Gouda, to have a conference with him at Moerdyke. Upon the report of what passed in this interview, the ftates permitted Rouillé to come to Woerden, a place between Leyden and Utrecht, that he might be nearer at hand for the intended negotiation: and then the deputies of the ftates had another conference with him, in which he made fome loose proposals towards a general peace, which, however, he refused to give in writing. The ftates general, being ftill cautious of making any advances in fo important an affair, without the participation of their allies, gave immediate notice of what had paffed, to the courts of Vienna and Great-Britain. Prince Eugene, who, during this interval, was gone to Vienna, returned from thence to Bruffels, on the 27th of March, N. S. with full powers from his imperial majefty; and, on the 8th of April, came to the Hague, where the duke of Marlborough likewife arrived the next day from England. These two great men had a long conference with the grand penfionary Heinfius, monfieurs Buys and Vanderduffen, and other deputies of the states, where they debated the overtures made on the part of France; which being thought infufficient to be the ground of a treaty of peace, orders were given for carrying on the warlike preparations with all posfible application and diligence, in order to open the cam and we should have been fo much farther off than we are, from putting France under a neceffity to give us Spain. For though the fucceffes of this year [1710] have been fo flighted, as to be thought not worth mentioning, where one would have most expected it; I can tell you, Doway alone is in the opinion of France of that mighty confequence, that in all the negotiations, that have been carried on, fince the refufal of the preliminaries, to find an expedient for the thirty-feventh article, Doway has been always excepted out of the number of 1709.. 1709. paign, as foon as the backwardness of the season would permit, and pursue the late advantages with the utmost vigour. The deputies of the ftates having informed Rouillé, that h ́s overtures were not fatisfactory, that minister sent an exprefs to Paris for new inftructions. This threw the French court into great uneafinefs; for as, on the one hand, they were refolved not to comply with the demand of the confederates, in giving up the whole monarchy of Spain; fo, on the other hand, the great difficulties they laboured under, which were much increafed by the general fcarcity of corn, and other povifions, occafioned by the great feverity of the preceding winter, laid them under a neceffity of keeping up the finking fpirits of the people with hopes, at least, of putting a speedy end to the war, by a peace. Rouillé's exprefs was therefore immediately sent back, with directions (as appeared in the fequel) to that minifter, to amufe the allies with a feeming compliance with all their demands, but not to fign any thing, that should be drawn up in writing. The penfionary having, by order of the ftates, made a report to to the duke of Marlborough, of what paffed at the conference, which had been held by Buys and Vanderduffen, with the French minifter, after the return of the courier from France, the duke resolved to return to Great-Britain, to acquaint the queen with the progrefs of this important negotiation. The duke therefore imbarked the 13th of April, and arrived three days after at London. During this second abfence of the duke, the French court, to cover their artifices with an air of fincerity, fent the marquis de Torcy, fecretary of state for foreign affairs, to Holland, thinking the prefence of fo great a minifter might have fome influence on the states. Upon his arrival at the Hague, the passport, by which he came, having been fent blank by Rouillé, he was there two days before his quality was known. After this he paid a visit to the penfionary, and offered to communicate the proposals, which he had to make; but that minifter told him, he could not confer with him, nor fee his propofals, without leave from the ftates. However, the states having confented, that he, together with the deputies, who had been appointed to receive the propofals of Rouillé, fhould meet the marquis, and hear what he had to offer, they had an interview with him the next day. The refult of this conference being communicated to the ftates-general, the penfionary had orders to inform the French minifter, that they could not give him any refolution, till they were informed |