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it thus long, but by the fupport he receives from him? and if it be thus manifeftly unjust, and the ufurper has it in his power to make reftitution, is it ill manners to demand it? is the Spanish monarchy fuch a trifle, as not to be worth infifting on? hall we compliment the king of France, or his grandfon, with giving up what fo many princes and fates have fpent fo much blood and treasure to regain? can that now be thought confiftent with the fafety and commerce of Great-Britain, with the intereft and welfare of our allies, or with the liberty of Europe, which we ventured to begin a war for, under the most unpromising appearance of ever feeing a good end of it? but it was nonfenfe not to risk all, when all was at ftake: here was not room left but to appeal to heaven, and take arms; which gave us a chance for escaping the ruin, which was otherwife inevitable. This is the truth of the matter, this the point in difpute. What then do people mean by all their fenfelefs clamour of the hardship and barbarity of the allies, in obliging the king of France to recall his grandfon? they, who think the causes of this war fuch indifferent things, as not to be worth infifting on any longer, though we have fo long ftruggled for them, that we have at laft got faft hold; thefe men, I fear, will in a little time think the fame of the causes of the revolution too; nay, they already tell us fo; they are grown fo in

conftant

fenfible to the fears they were once in, that they begin to think popery and arbitrary power innocent and harmless things; they now plainly infinuate, that there were no danger of the government in church and state being overturned, and that therefore the revolution was not neceffary; and, in virtue of these foolish fentiments, when the revolution is upon the point of being unalterably fixed, they truly are grown weary, and, after twenty years labour, do not think it worth a little more pains to finish the work, and put an effectual stop to the return of those evils, which they were once, as well as their neighbours, fo heartily frightened with. And it is no wonder if men, who have contracted fuch a ftupid indolence, and are fo indifferent for the civil and religious rights of their own country, cannot fee what fenfe there is in infifting upon the reftitution of the Spanifh monarchy, and are fupinely willing to think (if nonfenfe can be called thinking) that the demand of the allies is either unjuft, or at beft very rude and unmannerly.

But further; this demand of theirs is not only right in itself, but neceffary, in order to a good peace; and the best way to fet this in a clear light, is to confider what would have been the confequence, fuppofing the allies had not infifted on it. Now to fhew what this would have been, I will fuppofe, for the prefent, that the French were in

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carnett;

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the duke of Anjou any affiftance for that fummer (not that I can by any means grant it) how long would that have held? or what ufe would the allies have made of it? could the troops we had then in Spain have over-run the kingdom without further help, or have driven out the duke of Anjou in one campaign? That, I prefume, will not by any body be pretended. Or could a fufficient reinforcement have been fent time enough to them, either from Italy or England, to do any great matters that year that, I fuppofe, will be pretended as little by those, that confider, it was June, when these preliminaries were finished. It is plain then, Spain could not have been gained that year, unlefs the duke of Anjou had confented to relinqnifh it. Let us then, in the next place, fuppofe the fummer spent, and the armies gone out of the field, and fee what we are to expect then. A peace is made with France; the allies have got each of them their respective shares, and have nothing more to hope for. They renew, perhaps, the grand alliance, with great expreffions of mutual zeal; the emperor at least, and the maritime powers; but fome of the leffer princes might poffibly fhew themselves difgufted, and think they have been neg, lected for, as the preliminaries are now fettled, it is certain more than one of them are not fatiffied. Suppofe the king of Pruffia or duke of Savoy, for example, had thought due care had not

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been taken of them, it is plain, in that cafe, their alliance is no longer to be depended on; and either of thefe, falling off, would very much weaken the confederacy; especially the laft, whom the French would be very glad to draw into their interefts. But fuppofe none of the allies have any of these refentments, or at leaft ftifle them, and all confent to renew the grand alliance; what becomes of the armies upon leaving the field? is it not certain, that they will on all fides difmifs great part of their forces? will not the maritime powers fend home the foreign troops in their pay, except fuch as Holland keeps for the defence of their new frontier? fhall we hear of any more armies upon the Rhine, or in Savoy, when they have made peace, when the articles of the treaty have been all executed, and there is no more ány enemy to moleft them, no caufe of complaint, or pretence for a new campain left? I think nothing can be furer, than that this would have been the case: the allies would have thought no more of war in the places, that have been hitherto the feats of it, nor have made any preparations for taking the field another year. All fides would have made what hafte they could to have leffened the burthen, which, during the war, they had been oppreffed with. Holland particularly would have had full work to take care of their new frontier, to provide fo many towns with fufficient garrifons and magazines, and

fettle

fettle what foot the feveral parts of their new acquifitions should be put upon, with respect to war, trade, and fubfides; and, befides the great expence this would for the present put them to, they would be at a very great charge to pay the arrears due to the foreign troops, without which they could not be difmiffed. Add to this the extraordinary allowance, which, upon their difmiffing, is to be made to carry them home. This would put the states under a neceflity of retrenching, as much as poffible, the expences of the next year. And this laft article England would be proportionably affected with. Now I would be glad to know, what should hinder the king of France, from the minute the allies difmifs their troops, to give what affistance he will to Spain, provided it be not too grofsly, but gradually, by infenfible fteps; and by those many ways of artifice, which the French are mafters of? if they make a peace, they may disband fixty or eighty thousand men, or more. And what should hinder thefe men from going into Spain to feek their bread? what fhall hinder the king of France from giving fecret orders for this? and, when it is complained of, from pofitively denying, and perhaps feemingly forbidding it? and may not the duke of Anjou, by this means, against the next fpring, have a greater army, than the allies can bring against him? and how then are we to get Spain will the allies raife

therefore

new armies, and make a new war upon France in Flanders, upon the Rhine, and in Savoy, because fome men have infenfi. bly ftole out of France into Spain, against the express order of the king, which you are fure will be pretended? you do not know the sweets of peace, or how unwilling people are, who have once laid down their arms, to take them up again. If you think the allies could be brought to this, or that any armies would take the field against France, after a peace was once made ; what then is to be hoped for? why, I think nothing more than this, that the Dutch and the emperor would contribute for a little while, perhaps for one campaign, fome money and troops, to act in conjunction with England against Spain; in which no great fuccefs can be expected, confidering the numerous army, I have fhewn you the duke of Anjou might and would have. Now if this, upon the trial of one campaign, were found to be the cafe, I am afraid Holland would not be very willing to continue the profecution of fo expenfive a war; and the whole weight of it another year would lie upon England, except a very little, that might be expected from the emperor. And what could this end in, but in the ruin of England, and the lofs of Spain for the most, that could be expected from this war, would be, that the duke of Anjou would offer a petition, fuch as I have mentioned in my first letter, but

rals, but to try to do by the fword what they could not do by treaty, and to make their way to peace by a good campaign.

fo

This, I can affure you, from what I have obferved myself in the progrefs of this affair, and the molt exact information I could get from others, is a plain and true account of these negotiations thus far; in which one fees, on the part of France, violent fufpicions of infincerity thro' the whole treaty, working its way by all the methods of addrefs and artifice, which they are great mafters of. But in the allies, plainnefs, unanimity, and an unfhaken confidence: every thing is open and above-board, without any divifions in their conferences with the French, or any violent heats among themfelves; even in the great point of the barrier, which the French had hopes might make a breach between the Dutch and imperial minifters but by the prudence of the contending parties themfelves, and the firmnefs and temper with which the duke of Marlborough calmly inte: pofed, this difficult point was amicably adjusted, and the difputes upon it produced no effects, that the French could take any advantage of. I believe you have not forgot, I am fure I have not, how people here in Engand reafoned upon thefe conferences. While thefe preliminaries were like to take effect, fome men were by no means fatisfied; they thought care enough was not taken of Eng

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land; which fhould make us hope, that they will fome time or other obtain better terms for us; and that, in the next treaty, more regard will be had to the trading intereft of Great Britain, than the late minifters have fhewn. And yet no fooner were the preliminaries rejected, but the men, who thought but juft before there was too little in them, would have pe.fuaded us, that there was a great deal too much; and that it was unreafonable to infiit on fuch demands, especially to oblige a great king, whom they have always admired, to dethrone his grandfon, though all fuch invidious expreffions were purpofely avoided in the articles; and no body, as I have obferved before, doubted but the king, if he were in earnest disposed to fatisfy the allies, could do it without difficulty.

Dr. Hare then proceeds to fhew, in oppofition to the clamours, which had been raised against the duke of Marlborough in particular, or the conduct of the allies in general, with relation to the preliminary articles, firft, That, if to infiit on the thirty-feventh article was a fault, the duke of Marlborough was not to be blamed for it; and, fecondly, That to infift on that. article was in itfelf right and neceffary, in order to a good peace.

Firft (fays Dr. Hare, p. 30.) I fay, That, if to infift on the thirty-feventh article was a fault, the duke of Marlborough is not