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after the battle of Ramillies, the elector of Bavaria gave 1709. out hopes of a peace, and that the French king would come

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having stated this whole affair in a clear and full light, it will be proper to tranfcribe his account of it. He begins his letter with fome reflections on the general conduct of the French in all the treaties they had made for fifty years before, to fhew the neceffity there was for the allies to refufe entering into any conferences for a general peace, till fome preliminaries were firft fettled, as a foundation, on which it should be built. But before we come, fays the docter, p. 7. to confider the preliminaries themselves, that you may the better judge of the fincerity of France, I muft obferve to you, that they had previoufly, by their emiffaries, been feeling the pulfe of the Dutch; and, by the mighty profeffions they made of the fincere defires of the king to put an end to the war, they obtained fome private confer ences the beginning of the year 1709, in which the reftitution of Spain and the Indies to king Charles, was always fuppofed as the firft ftep towards a treaty; and, for the reft, they hoped the Dutch, for their part, would not be very difficult, fince they, were affured, that in other points they might have their own terms, and not only be fecured by a good barrier, in which the French were pleafed to be very liberal, but likewife be made very eafy in relation to trade. The Dutch, who, on this occafion, fhewed they understood the French, as well as the French thought they did them, appeared to be very well pleased to hear of overtures of peace, and expreffed great

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readiness to enter on a treaty; but that they could do nothing without the concurrence of their allies, to whom they communicated what had passed; and, in order to a treaty, gave leave to the minifters of France to come to Holland; firft to monfieur Rouillé, and afterwards to the marquis de Torcy, who both timed their coming thither too remarkably, not to be taken notice of. The duke of Marlborough made two voyages that fpring to England; one in the beginning of March, N. S. which was the fooneft the affairs of the war would admit of his return after the campaign of Lifle; the other about the end of April, when he went to communicate to the queen what had paffed, and to receive her inftructions. Now monfieur Rouillé came to Hol-land, almoft as foon as the duke was gone from thence the first time; and the marquis de Torcy followed foon after the duke's leaving it the fecond: by which it fhould feem, they thought they might make fome advantage of his abfence; and that it was for their master's fervice, to have the Dutch as much as they could to themselves, as the likelieft way to procure fuch a peace as they had a mind to.

Monfieur Rouillé and the mar quis de Torcy came neither of them into Holland, till the duke of Marlborough had left it which was a plain proof, that they had fome designs, which they feared he would not come into; and, that in his and prince Eugene's abfence, they hoped the

ftates

1709.

to a treaty of partition, by allowing Spain and the WeftIndies to go to king Charles, provided the dominions of Italy

ftates, by the great inclination they expreffed for peace, might be drawn in to confent to fome points, which might either produce a treaty to their minds, or divide the allies among themfelves. This they hoped to do these two ways; firft, by gaining their confent to a partition, which they had never abfolutely declared againft; and next by offering to them, in confideration for that, a greater barrier than they thought confiftent with the intereft and honour of the house of Auftria. The firft of these. they knew the emperor would not agree to; and neither the emperor nor England to the latter. And from this occafion and ground for divifion they promised themselves great fuccefs. But, to their furprize, the firmness of the ftates was fo great, that, as they would abfolutely reject nothing, fo neither would they agree to any thing separately from the rest of the allies, nor enter into any treaty, but jointly with the queen and the emperor, who, to fhew their readiness to hearken to any reasonable terms of peace, that would anfwer the end for which they went into the war, immediately upon notice of the proposals the French had made, fent to the Hague the duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene; the firft was attended by my lord Townshend, and the other was foon followed by count Zinzendorf. And both these minifters distinguished themselves in these negotiations very much to the fatisfaction of all the reft. My lord Townshend particularly has,

by his good fenfe, integrity, opennefs, and affability, acquired the universal esteem of the ftates, and all the rest of the allies, beyond what could be hoped from fo young a minifter, and to fuch a degree, as will always be remembered to his honour in that country, however it may be denied or forgot in this. If therefore you do not meet with his and count Zinzendorf's names in what follows, 1 muft defire you would fuppofe of them what I fay of the two generals, fo far at leaft, as to think they did not in any thing of moment ever differ from them.

But to proceed; upon the arrival of thefe minifters at the Hague, conferences were daily held with thofe of France, to fettle preliminary articles. In treating of which their infincerity foon discovered itself, and great reason was given to fufpect their chief aim was to amufe and divide those they seemed fo much in hafte to agree with; that, if they could not get fuch a peace for themfelves as they defired, the campaign at least might be loft to the allies. For it was vevery obfervable, that they eafily agreed, and, in a very little time after, thefe conferences were begun, to all the demands of England and Holland for themselves, though fome articles were contained in both, which the French never dreamt of being asked, when the first overtures of peace were made; fuch as the demolifhing of Dunkirk, and the giving up many towns, which were no part of the Spanish Nether

lands

Italy were given to king Philip. They hoped, that England and the states-general would agree to this, as less concerned

lands at the time of king Charles's death, nor had in the courfe of the war been taken from them. When the first steps of a treaty were made, the French fo little thought of thefe demands, that the quitting even Lifle and Menin was refufed. But now thefe extraordinary points on the part of England and Holland were by the minifters of France readily agreed to; and yet, at the fame time, great difficulty was made with refpect to what was asked for the emperor and the duke of Savoy, though there was nothing in those articles, but what was extremely reasonable and neçeffary to fecure the dominions of thofe princes from the invafions they would otherwife be expofed to. There was an interval of feveral days, before the French minifters would treat about these articles; nor did they at last consent to them, but with a reserve and a declaration, that this was beyond their inftructions; and that therefore they muft fufpend a full affent, till the further pleafure of the king was known. Now what could be the meaning of this management, but to infnare the maritime powers, if they could, and draw them into a bafe defign of facrificing the intereft of their allies to their own? and what ufe can any body imagine they would have made of this, but to engage the allies in a quarrel among themselves, and to take advantage of their differences; to break the confederacy, and to intice fome of the members of it by large offers to come into feparate mea

fures with them; but, this fcheme failing by the firm adherence of the maritime powers to the rest of the allies, there was one article ftill remained to be adjusted, which in effect included all the reft, and which would afford the French a fpecious pretence for breaking off the treaty, whenever they had a mind to it; and that was to fetthe terms, on which a perpetual fufpenfion of arms should be agreed. No body had ever doubted, but that there was fuch an understanding between the French king and his grandfon, that the former could oblige the latter to refign the Spanish monarchy whenever he pleased, fince he not only gave it king Philip at firft, but had hitherto fupported him in it. Accordingly every thing about him was intirely French; and the restitution of Spain at least, and the Indies, had, as I obferved before, been always fuppofed. And as this was the point, that occafioned the war, the first thing fettled in the preliminaries was a perfect

and intire ceffion of the whole

Spanish monarchy to king Charles III, to be made within two months from the firft of June following. And, in cafe the duke of Anjou should make any difficulty to comply with this, it is exprefsly covenanted in the fourth article, ⚫ that his most chriftian majesty ⚫ and the allies fhall take in con

cert the proper measures to oblige him to it.' What was to be understood by taking proper measures, both fides were content fhould not be then explained. Thus far looked well; and one

1709.

1709. cerned in Italy; but they knew, that the court of Vienna would never hearken to it; for they valued the dominions in Italy,

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one would have thought the a compliance; but that to force
French meant in earneft, that the him to it, and that within fo
duke of Anjou fhould immedi- fhort a term, was not in his pow-
ately quit Spain to his competi- er: that it would therefore be im-
tor. But all hitherto was words poffible for the king to consent to
only, and would fignify nothing, this article; and to confent to the
unless the execution of this effen- reft of the preliminaries, unless
tial point was effectually provided an abfolute fufpenfion of arms
for and there was but one way were agreed to, would be to
of doing this, which was to make leave himself at the mercy of the
this ceffion one of the conditions allies, and put himself into a
of continuing the fufpenfion of much worfe ftate than before.
arms, agreed to in the thirty- And these pretences, you may be
fourth article, to the conclufion of fure, wanted no art to fet them
a general peace; which was ac- off. But to all this it was easy to
cordingly done in the thirty-fe- anfwer, that they were fully per-
venth article, which declares, that fuaded, that, if the king was
this fupension shall continue till a really in earneft in this matter,
general peace, provided the king he might certainly recal his
of France executes all that is grandfon without any difficulty;
promised on his part in the fore-
and provided he acted the fair
going articles, and the whole part, and did all he could to-
Spanish monarchy be reftored, wards it, according to the fourth
rendue & cedée, to king Charles, article, he might depend upon it,
as is fettled in these articles. the allies would take no advan-
This article touched home, and tage of any words in the thirty-
discovered plainly, that all the feventh, to begin the war again
French pretended to confent to in upon him, when he had faithful--
this fundamental point was merely performed the other parts of
grimace; and they meant nothing it, and furrendered the places a-
elfe, but to draw the allies into a
greed to be delivered up to them
separate peace, and leave them to in the thirty-fifth. That fuppof-
get Spain as they could. This ing what they objected to this ar-
was the most they meant; and I ticle, where not a pretended but
am apt to think, for reafons a real difficulty, which could hard-
I will give you by and by, they ly be believed, the confequence
'did not mean fo much ; but, then would be, that the allies
whether they did or not, they did muft either truft to the fincerity
not want a fpecious cover for their of France, or France to that of
oppofition to this article; they the allies. As the king, fuppof-
made greater profeffions of the ing it not in his power to oblige
fincerity of their king's inten- the duke of Anjou to refign,
tions; that he would punctually would, by executing the reft of
execute all that depended upon the treaty, be at the mercy of
him; and that he would endea- the allies; fo, on the other hand,
vour to perfuade his grandfon to if the allies made a peace with

the

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Italy, with the Iflands near them, much more than all the 1798. reft of the Spanish monarchy. But, at the same time that

Lewis

unneceffarily; they are fufficient

the king without this article, they
would be at his mercy for the re-ly weary; the burthen of the war
covery of the Spanish monarchy; has laid fo heavy upon them,
which was the great point, for that they would be glad to have
which they entered into the war ;
a little refpite, and to be at lei-
but which they could never hope fure to cultivate the arts of
to gain, if he did not abfolutely peace, and enjoy, as fast as they
abandon his grandfon, which they can, fome fruits of it. Thus
could by no means depend on, they have always done; they
while they had nothing but his have hardly had patience to keep
bare word for it. Now in this
cafe, which is more reasonable
for France to truft the allies, or
the allies of France? this can-
not be a very hard question, fince
France had been guilty of the
breach of public faith on fo
many occafions, that it is hard to
find an inftance to the contrary.
This very war will make two
notorious inftances of this re-
membered to all ages; the fcan-
dalous violation of the partition
treaty, almoft as foon as made
and the ufurpation of the Spanish
monarchy, notwithstanding the
moft folemn and repeated renun-
ciations, that had been made of
it. It would be endless to enter
into a detail of all the complaints
of that kind against France, fince
the Pyrenean treaty. And there-
fore it cannot be reasonable for
the allies to truft to thofe, by
whom they have so often been de-
ceived. But it is not fo with them;
they never have been guilty of
the breach of public faith in any
flagrant cafe; at least, I know
of none. But I will venture to
add further, that they neither
would, nor, if they would, can
they act a falfe part in fuch a
cafe as this. They would not,
they do not think it for their in-
terest to continue or renew a war

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up
their armies till a peace was
figned. And it is this humour
of the allies has made the French
have fo little regard to execute
their treaties with them. Befides,
it must be owned, there is a great
probity, plainness, and honesty,
both in the Dutch and Germans,
which appear in all the affairs of
common life, and have been very
obfervable in their dealings with
the French all this war, in which
the allies, notwithstanding the
many provocations they have re-
ceived, have, in no instance, re-
taliated, when they could not do
it without breach of faith. The
war in Flanders affords many in-
ftances of this, that they have
always punctually performed what
ever articles they have figned, and
not made reprisals, where even
honeft men have thought they
might have done it without any
violation of justice. But the
greateft inftance, and the only
one I fhall name, is their exact
performance of the treaty of the
evacuation of the Milanefe, when
the French had just reason to fear
their troops would have been de-
tained against the letter of the
articles, in revenge of the in-
juftice and infolence, with which
they had difarmed and feized a
confiderable body of the duke of

Savoy's

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