The Elements of PoliticsMacmillan, 1891 - 632 páginas |
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Página xiii
... distinction between the two is not quite so funda- mental as it is sometimes held to be ; because the primary aim of Punishment is Prevention , not Retri- bution , . 2. and the prevention of future mischief is an important -and ...
... distinction between the two is not quite so funda- mental as it is sometimes held to be ; because the primary aim of Punishment is Prevention , not Retri- bution , . 2. and the prevention of future mischief is an important -and ...
Página xiv
... distinction between the latter and directly individualistic interference is sometimes subtle , especially in cases of precautions against imposition . 4. There seems no adequate reason for condemning abso- lutely even " paternal ...
... distinction between the latter and directly individualistic interference is sometimes subtle , especially in cases of precautions against imposition . 4. There seems no adequate reason for condemning abso- lutely even " paternal ...
Página xix
... those of which the breach is commonly held to justify force , from those of which the breach is only held to justify disapprobation and complaint . • 272-274 · 2. But the distinction between the two is somewhat CONTENTS xix.
... those of which the breach is commonly held to justify force , from those of which the breach is only held to justify disapprobation and complaint . • 272-274 · 2. But the distinction between the two is somewhat CONTENTS xix.
Página xx
... distinction obscure , and the transition gradual and indefinite , between rules that are , and rules that ought to be , established . . · 4. Still , in respect of the process of changing it , International Law occupies a position ...
... distinction obscure , and the transition gradual and indefinite , between rules that are , and rules that ought to be , established . . · 4. Still , in respect of the process of changing it , International Law occupies a position ...
Página xxii
... distinction and separation of Governmental functions as Legislative , Executive , and Judicial , cannot be made complete . CHAPTER XX THE LEGISLATURE 1. Legal experts should have a large and responsible share in legislation ; but ...
... distinction and separation of Governmental functions as Legislative , Executive , and Judicial , cannot be made complete . CHAPTER XX THE LEGISLATURE 1. Legal experts should have a large and responsible share in legislation ; but ...
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Términos y frases comunes
action acts actually adequate admitted advantage applied bequest cause ceteris paribus chap chapter citizens civilised claim coercion compensation conceive consider consideration constitutional constitutional monarchy contract danger decision definite desirable determined difficult discussion doubt duty effect elected enforced executive exercise expedient extent freedom functions fundamental governmental interference habit human important imposed individualistic principle individuals industry inflicted interests international law intestacy J. S. Mill judges judicial kind labour land lative latter legislation legislature liable limits ment mischief modern monarch obligations obviously oligarchy opinion ordinary organ organisation Parliamentary Government particular party penalty persons political positive law practically prevent prima facie protection punishment question reason recognised regarded regulation relations render reparation representative right of exclusive rules secure seems sentiment social society supreme taxation tend territory tion utilitarian utility voluntary associations
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