The Elements of Politics

4. An extensive devolution of legislative powers on local

governments has some advantages; but they are out-

weighed by the attendant drawbacks at least in the

case of a tolerably homogeneous community, of which

the parts are in active mutual communication

5. Local Governments should be constructed on the

general principles before laid down for the organisa-

tion of the central government, but with important

differences in their application.

6. In some cases governmental powers may properly be

entrusted to sections of the community not locally

defined; but such cases are exceptional.

CHAPTER XXVI

FEDERAL AND OTHER COMPOSITE STATES

1. If the powers of local Governments are-for historical or

other reasons-extended beyond a certain point, the

State becomes practically composite; if the component

parts are politically co-ordinate and constitutionally

separate, it becomes Federal

2. Federality implies a constitutional division of powers

between the Governments of the part-states and the

Government of the whole, by which a substantial

autonomy is secured to the former; and some expres-

sion of the separate political existence of the part-states

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in the structure of a federal Government is natural,
though not essential. A federal Constitution will tend
to be stable; but there should be some legal process
of changing it.

3. The distinction between a Federal State and a Confedera-

tion of States having a common organ of Government

may be variously drawn; the consideration here re-

garded as decisive is whether the common Govern-

ment does or does not enter into important direct

relations with individual citizens.

4. Points of peculiar importance in the construction of a

Federal Government are (1) the appointment of the

organ that decides disputed questions of constitutional

interpretation; and (2) the provision of adequate

security for the divergent interests of the part-states.

This latter presents a specially difficult problem where

the parts are few and unequal.

5. A Federal Union enables its members to enjoy most of

the military and economic advantages of large states,

with the minimum sacrifice of local independence and

individual freedom; the inconveniences of a federal

state are chiefly weakness of internal cohesion and

diversity of localised legislation.

507-512

512-514

514-516

516-519

6. The relation of dominant states to dependencies has

usually a partial resemblance to one or other of the

forms of federal union, with the fundamental distinction

that the members of any dependent part-state have no

control over the common Government of the whole.

Such dependencies chiefly arise either through (1) Con-

quest in which case the form of government will

reasonably vary with the amount of coercion required— 519-521

7. or (2) through Colonisation. In this latter case the

most expedient relation between mother-country and

colony will partly depend on the character and future

destiny of the colony; but in any case the Colonial

department of the Central Government has a difficult

task, and should be very carefully organised.

CHAPTER XXVII

. . 521-525

THE CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE OVER GOVERNMENT

1. In West-European States generally, the share of the

people at large in Government is confined to the

election of legislators; it is therefore very important

to ascertain precisely the relation which is or ought to

be thus established between electors and elected. A

common view of representative government is, that the

"people govern through their representatives."

2. If this view is sound, it would be desirable to give the

electorate a more direct and complete control over their

representatives than is attempted in any European

country except Switzerland; but I think, on the

contrary, that it should be the constitutional duty of

the elected legislator to act on his own judgment.

3. I think, however, that the direct intervention of the

citizens at large is desirable in certain special cases;

chiefly (1) to settle a disagreement between two legisla-

tive chambers, or (2) when changes are required in a

rigid constitution, not alterable by the ordinary process

of legislation.

4. A rigid constitution, if the rigidity be not excessive, is a

useful barrier against hasty fundamental changes; but

it has some drawbacks-especially the difficulty of

finding an unexceptionable organ for deciding con-

stitutional disputes .

5. The rules included in such a constitution- -under what-

ever heads they may be classed-should be either of a

simple and fundamental character, or based on special

reasons for distrusting the judgment of the ordinary

legislature..

6. Constitutional rules other than structural may be needed

to protect the freedom of individuals from legislative

encroachment; but it is difficult to make such rules

very precise without hampering the legislature unduly.

Examples of this class are rules protecting free speech

and freedom of the press.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE STATE AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

1. Political Government-of the coercive association called

the State is only one species of government. The

voluntary associations found in modern political

societies have a kind of government, distinguished

from political government by its very limited power

of inflicting penalties.

2. A special danger of obstinate disobedience to Government

arises in the case of such associations, when their aims

conflict with those of Government, through the con-

sciousness of strength which association gives; this

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danger may constitute an adequate ground for special
repressive intervention. Similar reasons for special
intervention are applicable in the case of political
meetings.

3. Moral coercion-by acts not illegal apart from their

coercive purpose--may be exercised by such an associa-

tion to an extent gravely mischievous; but it is difficult

to lay down a legal rule that will effectively prevent

the mischief, without too severely restricting freedom.

This applies especially to industrial associations;

which may also be economically mischievous to the

community as a whole, through monopoly.

4. Churches perform a function useful to the State, which

seems likely to be better performed if they are kept in-

dependent of the State. How far the danger of conflict

between Church and State justifies a permanent inter-